

**Sureśvara's Vārtika on  
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad [1.4.176-300]**

Shoun HINO

अन्तरेण प्रमेयार्थं नापि ते साधवसाधुनी ।  
साधवसाधिवति वा ज्ञानं ज्ञातमेयस्य जायते ॥१७६॥

And (those two superimpositions this is) good and (this is) bad are not (possible) without any object of knowing; or rather, even the knowledge of something as good or bad arises (only) in respect of some known object of knowing<sup>1</sup>. [176]

<sup>1</sup>'Object of knowing' for literal 'object to be known' for avoiding clumsy repetition of words in the translation, cf. NKL editor's note: *jñātatvaviśiṣṭārtha*.

प्रमातृत्वादिसंबन्धो नासदात्मकवस्तुनि ।  
नन्घटाद्यर्थविज्ञानं सत्येव जगतीष्यते ॥१७७॥

In the case of a thing which is of the nature of non-existence there cannot be any connection of a knower etc.<sup>1</sup> in this world, the knowledge of an object as a non-existent pitcher etc. is entertained (i.e. understood) while there has/had been some existent (object). [177]

<sup>1</sup>*pramātrtvādi*— *ādi* refers to *pramāṇa*, this is possible when there exists some *prameya*.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंमोहमृते सत्त्वं न कुत्रचित् ।  
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंबुद्धौ न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते ॥१७८॥

There is no existence (of an object)<sup>1</sup> possible anywhere<sup>2</sup> except without ignorance of the true nature of the inner self. (And) when there is the awareness of the true nature of the inner self, there is a statement that there is no existent and no non-existent.<sup>3</sup> [178]

<sup>1</sup>This signifies non-existence also. SP points out: *sattvam asattvam ceti cchedah*; for both these are intended as indicated in the second line.

<sup>2</sup>That is, at any time or place.

<sup>3</sup>This is to say: The expressions existent and/or non-existent would be possible only in worldly dealings (*vyāvahārikadaśāyām*).

असाधारणमज्ञानं प्रतीच्येव यतः स्थितं ।  
एतत्प्रमेयमेवातः प्रमाणं नान्यदिष्यते ॥१७९॥

Since incomparable ignorance remains/exists only in the case of the inner self, therefore it has to be known<sup>1</sup> and no other means (than itself) is accepted. [179]

<sup>1</sup>That is, it is indeed the object of knowing.

एवं प्रमेयसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रवृत्तैषोत्तरा श्रुतिः ।  
क्रियाकारकरूपे ऽस्मिन्व्यवहारे तमोन्वयात् ।  
अक्रियाकारकं वस्तु पारोक्ष्यान्नैव लभ्यते ॥१८०॥

This subsequent Śruti proceeds to establish the object thus to be known, for there is connection with darkness<sup>1</sup> in this dealing<sup>2</sup> which comprises action and the means of (effecting it) and because the thing which is not of the nature of action and its means cannot be obtained (i.e. known) on account of its being beyond direct perception.<sup>3</sup> [180]

<sup>1</sup>That is, ignorance about the true nature of the inner self.

<sup>2</sup>This signifies the common world where, Śāṅkara has already pointed out in his *Adhyāsabhāṣya* (p.40), worldly dealings comprise *śāstrīya* and *laukika* dealings based on *pramāṇa* and *prameya*.

<sup>3</sup>It means: because of (its) imperceptibility; SP cites *parāñci khāni vyatṛṇāt svayambhūh ... (Kāthopanīṣad 4.1)*.

तद्ध्यदृष्टम् सदज्ञानकार्यं स्रगिव पन्नगम् ।  
सर्वं बिभर्त्यसक्तं सदसक्तमिति च स्मृतेः ॥१८१॥

That, indeed, not being<sup>1</sup> seen, is (but) the product of ignorance and it bears (gives the impression of) all that is not attached to it like a garland (which gives the impression of) a serpent. (This becomes clear) from the Smṛti *asaktam* ....<sup>2</sup> [181]

<sup>1</sup>It means: no being perceptible.

<sup>2</sup>*Gītā* 13.14: *asaktam sarvabhṛc caiva nirguṇam guṇabhoktr ca.*

अपूर्वाद्यात्मकं वस्तु यत्र साक्षात्प्रसिध्यति ।  
तत्कात्शन्याल्लभ्यते तत्र व्यवहारो न मोहजः ॥१८२॥

Where (however) the existent entity which is of the nature of *apūrva* etc.<sup>1</sup> is directly established (i.e. obtained) and that (an existent thing) is obtained (=grasped) in its fullness, there is no dealing produced from ignorance. [182]

SP says *sambhāvanādi-tiraskāreṇa* ‘by setting aside the notion of impossibility’.

<sup>1</sup>This has a reference to the Brahman (=Ātman/inner self) which is *apūrva*, *anapara* etc.; cf. BU 2.5.19.

यथासिद्धानुवादेन पूर्वं नो ह्यभ्यधात्स्फुटम् ॥१८३॥

(This subsequent Śruti, viz. BU 1.4.7 now proceeds)<sup>1</sup> because the Śruti has not clearly declared to us earlier<sup>2</sup> (the nature of the thing) for the reason that it is not repeated the same as what is already established (in worldly dealings).<sup>3</sup> [183]

The objector’s argument is: ‘When BU 1.1-2 have already declared the nature of the thing (which is *upāśya*), why now the subsequent Śruti?’. To this, this is an answer.

<sup>1</sup>We have to understand *pravṛttaṣottarā śrutih* from verse 180 above.

<sup>2</sup>Namely, in the *Aśva* and *Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇas* which pertained to worship of fire, cf. our book [vol.3:1990].

<sup>3</sup>This implies: acceptance of duality in *upāśya* and *upāśaka*.

पदानिह तदर्थश्च प्रसिद्धानेव लोकतः ।

आदाय कर्मशास्त्रं तन्निषेधविधिबोधकृत् ॥१८४॥

(Now) here<sup>1</sup> (we should remember that) the science of ritual takes words and the things signified by them as they are known from the world itself, and then prescribes (for us) the prohibition or performance of the same.<sup>2</sup> [184]

<sup>1</sup>That is, while accepting instruction regarding the true nature of the Ātman.

<sup>2</sup>This is to say: The science of ritual does not pertain to *vastu* 'Reality'.

इतः परं वस्तुतत्त्वपरीक्षणकृतक्षणा ।  
श्रुतिः प्रवृत्तातस्तावत्प्रमेयो ऽर्थो ऽत्र चिन्त्यते ॥१८५॥

[Verses 185-190 explain the purport of BU 1.4.7.]

Hereafter begins the Śruti<sup>1</sup> which has decided to examine the true nature of the thing<sup>2</sup>; therefore, here is considered the object of knowing, to begin with<sup>3</sup>. [185]

<sup>1</sup>Namely, *tad dhedam ...*

<sup>2</sup>That is, Reality.

<sup>3</sup>SP points out: *tadadhīnatvād upaniṣatprāmānyasya*.

संसाराख्यमहाव्याधेः किं मूलमिति चिन्त्यते ।  
तद्धवस्तये चिकित्सेयं तदा फलकवती भवेत् ॥१८६॥

It is (now) considered as to what is the root of the great disease called transmigratory existence (and) this desire to discuss (lit. to know), (that is) for the sake of the destruction of that (root). Only then it<sup>1</sup> would be fruitful.<sup>2</sup> [186]

<sup>1</sup>It means: the Śruti which disusses the root of transmigratory existence.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. NKL: *samsāraroganirāsāya nidānajñāne sati śravaṇādicikitsā phalavatī syāt*. Further, SP quotes: *smṛtimān yuktihetujño matimān prtatipattimān / bhiṣag auśadhasamyogaiś cikitsām kartum arhati*

// (*Caraka Saṃhitā* 1.2.36) and (NKL joins) *saṃcayam ca prakopam ca prasaram sthānasamśrayam / vyaktibhedam ca yo vetti doṣānām sa bhaved bhiṣak* // (*Suśruta* 1.21.36).

ऊर्ध्वमल इति तथा मन्त्रवर्णो ऽपि विद्यते ।  
गीतास्वपि तथैवैतदूर्ध्वमूलमितीरणम् ॥१८७॥

So also, (to this effect) there is the text of a Mantra<sup>1</sup>, viz. *ūrdhvamūlah*. In the *Gītā*<sup>2</sup> also, there is statement in the same way, viz. *ūrdhvamūlam* .... [187]

<sup>1</sup>*Kāthopaniṣad* 6.1: *ūrdhvamūlo 'vāksākha eṣo 'śvattaḥ sanā-tanaḥ*.

<sup>2</sup>*Gītā* 15.1: *ūrdhvamūlam adhaḥśākham aśvattham prāhur avyayam*.

अशेषानर्थमलस्य प्रत्यगज्ञानरूपिणः ।  
ध्वस्तौ ध्वस्तिरनर्थानां पुमर्थश्च समाप्यते ॥१८८॥

There occurs the destruction of all the undesirables when there is the destruction of the root of all the evils, which is in the form of ignorance of the individual self<sup>1</sup> (and thereby) is obtained the end of human endeavour.<sup>2</sup> [188]

<sup>1</sup>Now *pratyag* is translated as the individual self wherever there is reference to a human being. Elsewhere it is translated as the inner self in contrast with the Supreme Self.

<sup>2</sup>The thrust of this is well brought out by SP thus: *jñānād ūrdhvam bandhadhir bādhitānuvṛttir ity uktatvāt* and also *na kevalam anarthadhvastir eva ... ānandaprāptir api*.

निरस्तातिशयानन्दरूपता प्रत्यगात्मनः ।  
अथैष यो वै भूमेति श्रुत्यैव प्रतिपाद्यते ॥१८९॥

The Śruti *athaiṣa; yo vai bhūmā* ... itself<sup>1</sup> asserts the nature of the individual self as the essence of joy that has surpassed every (other) excellence. [189]

<sup>1</sup>In reality these are two different statements in two different Śrutis *athaiṣa eva paramānandaḥ* (BU 4.3.32), and *yo vai bhūmā tat sukham* (CU 7.23.1).

स्वत आनन्दयाथात्म्यात्कुतो दुःखेन संप्लुतिः ।  
तथापि निहृते शास्त्रं न लिप्यत इतीरणात् ॥१९०॥

Because, in its own right<sup>1</sup>, it has the true nature of (only) joy, how then can it (Ātman) be overpowered (lit. inundated) by misery? Even then,<sup>2</sup> the Śruti statement *na lipyate ...*<sup>3</sup> negates (the existence of sorrow). [190]

<sup>1</sup>That is, independently of any other cause.

<sup>2</sup>That is, despite this.

<sup>3</sup>*Kāthopanīṣad* 5.11: ... *na lipyate lokaduḥkhena bāhyah*.

अज्ञातात्मैकसंसिद्धबीजावस्थमिदं जगत् ।  
तदित्यनेनाभ्यघायि परोक्षार्थीभिघायिना ॥१९१॥

[Verses 191-210 explain the meanings of words of BU 1.4.7: *tad dhedaṃ tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt*.]

This world in the state of a seed that existed only in the form of the Ātman<sup>1</sup> is referred to by the word *tat ...*, which expresses an object beyond senses.<sup>2</sup> [191]

This verse intends to explain the Śruti-idea conveyed by words *tad dha*. This world already exists in the form of the seed though not known to people. The word *tat* is used to convey the world beyond sense perception.

<sup>1</sup>This has a reference to *sābhāsapratyagvidyā* understood in verse 167 above; it pertains to the Ātman, not known in its true nature.

<sup>2</sup>That is, *parokṣārthakena tadabhidhāyisarvanāmnā* (NKL editor's on the basis of SP and NKL).

अव्याकृतस्य जगतो भूतकालाभिसंगतेः ।  
सुखावबुद्धये हेति निपातो ऽत्र प्रयुज्यते ॥१९२॥

The particle *ha* is used in this (sentence) for the easy understanding of the undifferentiated world which has been<sup>1</sup> through the time in the (long) past. [192]

<sup>1</sup>It literally means: which has gone together with ....

नामरूपादिविकृतं पराङ्मानैकगोचरः ।  
सहस्रभेदवत्साक्षादिदमा जगदुच्यते ॥१९३॥

What is differentiated by name, form etc.<sup>1</sup> is in the purview of<sup>2</sup> only that means which is operative in respect of objects beyond perception<sup>3</sup> (and) composed (lit. possessed) of thousand (and one) differences, this world is directly expressed by the pronoun *idam*<sup>4</sup>. [193]

<sup>1</sup>The word etc. refers to action (*karman*).

<sup>2</sup>Or alternatively, is the object of.

<sup>3</sup>This means Anumāna 'inference', for that grasps distant objects. Or alternatively, it might refer to the self-illuminating Ātman (*parān*).

<sup>4</sup>Cf. *idamaḥ pratyakṣagatam samīpavartī caitado rūpam / adasas tu viprakṣtam tad iti parokṣe vijānīyāt* / (as quoted by NKL editor). This justifies understanding Anumāna earlier, for that pertains to what is *parokṣa*.

सामानाधिकरण्यस्य तदिदंपदयोः श्रुतेः ।  
कार्यकारणयोर्नित्यमभेदो ऽध्यवसीयते ॥१९४॥

Here is noticed the capacity for referring to one and same object (*sāmānādhikarānya*) in the two words (pronouns) *tad* and *idam*; for the oneness of (the two as) the effect and the cause<sup>1</sup> is (easily) understood. [194]

<sup>1</sup>These are *idam* (= *jagat*) and *tad* (= *brahma*); cf. the usually accepted notion of *kāryakāraṇayor abhedah*— this *abhedā* here is *sāmānādhikarānya*, viz. being expressive of only one object.

न क्रियाकार्यविरहे कारणं सिद्ध्यति क्वचित् ।  
निष्क्रियं कारणं चेत्स्यात्तद्वन्नित्यं फलोत्थितः ॥१९५॥

Indeed, nowhere is there any cause established (as existent) when the performance of an action (viz. production of an effect) by it is absent.<sup>1</sup> If it be said that a cause is (i.e. can be) non-operative, then there would ever be the existence of the effect. [195]

This verse denies the existence of a *niṣkriya-kāraṇa* 'cause without any action'.

<sup>1</sup>NKL edition reads *na kriyākāryavirahāt* and explains it as *kriyārūpakāryābhāvāt*. AnSS edition shows no awareness of this reading. Translation follows AnSS edition (*sati saptamī*).

तयोश्च युगपद्भावे न स्यात्कारणनिश्चितिः ।  
क्रियान्तरप्रसक्तेश्च तत्कार्यत्वे ऽनवस्थितिः ॥१९६॥

If the two (viz. the cause and the action)<sup>1</sup> are held to be simultaneously existing, one would not be able to decide which (exactly) is the cause. And because it would involve the contingency of (accepting) another action (of the cause for producing the action). Further, that (itself) being an effect, there would result *infinite regress*. [196]

This verse denies *sakriyakāraṇa* 'cause accompanied by action'. This is possible in two ways: (i)Both cause and action exist simultaneously, and (ii)there is a sequence of them. The first possibility is discarded on the ground stated in the first half of the verse. The second possibility is considered in the second half. The argument here is: If the sequence is understood to be first the cause and then the action, even then the (later) action would expect some earlier action which, in its turn, would expect yet earlier action and so on — this is *infinite regress*!

कार्यं चाक्रियमाणं सन्न कार्यत्वं समश्नुते ।  
अकर्तृकं चेत्कार्यं स्यात्कारणं कार्यतां व्रजेत् ॥१९७॥

An effect, (which is said to be) not being produced, cannot attain the status (i.e. nature) of an effect. (And) if it were



held that an effect is (produced) without (there being) an agent, then the cause itself would be (considered as) the agent.

[197]

कारणत्वात्सदन्यस्य कार्यत्वाच्च सतस्तथा ।  
अन्योन्याव्यतिरेकाच्च कुतो नाशादिसंभवः ॥१९८॥

Since it is the cause, it is real; since the other is an effect of that real (it also) is real. And since these do not exist apart (from each other), where (or whence) could there be their destruction etc.?

[198]

It was earlier argued that the Brahman and the world are related as the cause and the effect. Therefore, their reality has to be argued. There should be *samānaguṇavattva* between a cause and its effect. If there would be *asamānaguṇavattva* between them, then it is not possible that an *asat* effect arises from a *sat* cause. Therefore, to say that there comes into existence the *asat* (=perishable) *jagat* (=effect) from the *sat* (=imperishable) Ātman. The second line of the verse expresses rejection of the idea of their *real* difference (as two distinct things). The difference is merely indescribable or imaginary.

क्रिया वा तत्फलं वा स्यात्कारकं वा न किञ्चन ।  
निरन्वयो ऽयं नाशः स्यादेषामन्यतमो ऽपि न ॥१९९॥

(An argument is made:) If action or effect or agent or any instrument of action does not exist, that would mean<sup>1</sup> destruction which has not any subsequent to it.<sup>2</sup> (The Siddhāntin answers: In reality) there exists none of them. [199]

<sup>1</sup>It literally means: there would be.

<sup>2</sup>This is an argument of the Vaiśeṣikas. In this, they would imply an all-time existing absence of every thing. But, the Siddhāntin holds that *tad idam* suggests the continuous existence of the Brahman, i.e. permanence of the Brahman. This is in opposition to the Vaiśeṣikas' Asatkāryavāda.

क्रियायाः फलरूपेण ध्वस्तिर्नावस्थितेर्भवेत् ।  
तेन तेन विशेषेण कारणं प्रथते सदा ॥२००॥

Since there is continued existence of a certain action in the form of its effect, therefore, there cannot be destruction. Ever does a cause extend itself<sup>1</sup> (in the form of its effect). The argument in the preceding verse is stated in this and the following verses (up to verse 203). [200]

The first line explains away the first alternative of the Asatkāryavādins. In the second line, it is stated that the same result (viz. *na abhīṣṭā dhvastih*) would follow in the case of the other alternatives also. Only the real appears to be existing in one form or another — this is the Siddhāntin's view.

<sup>1</sup>That is, it extends its existence.

यथा जन्मादिकर्तृत्वाद्बीजं नैव विनश्यति ।  
नाशे ऽपि तस्य नष्टृत्वान्न नष्टुः स्याद्विनाशिता ॥२०१॥

As the seed does not at all perish, by its being an agent of the birth etc.<sup>1</sup> (of a plant) and it (viz. the seed) is the destroyer (also) even in its destruction<sup>2</sup>, therefore, there is no perishability in (this) destroyer. [201]

This verse re-affirms the argument in the preceding verse by an illustration.

<sup>1</sup>The word etc. refers to the continued existence or growth of the plant.

<sup>2</sup>That is to say: The plant would perish but not the seed. It seems to be called the destroyer because the seed remains even when the plant perishes.

एवं चेन्न सतो नाशो नोत्पत्तिरसतस्तथा ।  
अव्याकृताभिधानाच्च कार्यस्य स्यात्कदाचन ॥२०२॥

If such is the case, there cannot be the destruction of the existent (*sat*), nor (can there be) the origin of the non-existent, likewise, in the case of the effect which has the name of what

is not differentiated also, there cannot ever be perishability.

[202]

The verse implies the non-manifest existence of the *sat* when its so-called effect has (it is said) perished.

तत्त्वबोधातिरेकेण न नाशो ऽन्यो यथा तथा ।  
महतातिप्रयत्नेन ह्युदके ऽपि प्रवक्ष्यते ॥२०३॥

It will be stated with great care in the later portion of the text also (as stated here before) that there is no other destruction beside (that, viz.) the knowledge of the truth. [203]

Destruction is for the Siddhāntin *svarūpajñapti*. But there is no *niranvayanāśa* 'destruction involving no subsequent' as understood by the Asatkāryavādin. It is held that there is destruction only of bondage, together with desires, of the individual self. There is no destruction subsequent to *svarūpajñapti*; the *vastu*, viz. the Brahman continues to exist.

नामरूपाद्यभिव्यक्तेः प्राक्तनः काल उच्यते ।  
तर्हीति ह्यनभिव्यक्तमव्याकृतगिरोच्यते ॥२०४॥

[The words *tarhi* and *avyākṛta* are explained.]

Time preceding (the moment of) manifestation in the form of name, form etc. is mentioned (by the word) *tarhi*. By the word *avyākṛta* is mentioned the unmanifest. [204]

अविद्याकर्मसंस्कारास्तेजोऽक्षमासूत्रसंश्रयाः ।  
खे लीनास्त्वस्तितामात्रा अव्यक्ताख्याः सहात्मना ॥२०५॥

Impressions originating in ignorance and (ritual) activity, which have resorted to fire, water, earth and wind<sup>1</sup>, and<sup>2</sup> merged in sky; with mere existence (as their character)<sup>3</sup>; they have, together with the Ātman, the name of the unmanifest. [205]

<sup>1</sup>This is the meaning of Sūtra, cf. verse above; cf. *vāyur vai*

*gautama tat sūtram* (BU 3.7.2). NKL states: Sūtra signifies two elements!

<sup>2</sup> = *tu*

<sup>3</sup>That is, in their subtle form.

कार्यकारणभेदेन प्रपञ्चो यः पुरोदितः ।  
यश्चोर्ध्वं वक्ष्यते तस्मात्परस्तादेतदुच्यते ॥२०६॥

It is this (Brahman) which was explained earlier as this world comprising differences (such as) the cause and the effect and which will be later described as beyond that.<sup>1</sup> [206]

<sup>1</sup>Namely, world.

प्रथते वैश्वरूपेण यतो ऽविद्यैव सर्वथा ।  
अविद्यामात्रयाथात्म्यादतस्तद्वेदमुच्यते ॥२०७॥

Because only ignorance extends itself everywhere in a variety of forms<sup>1</sup>, (therefore) on account of (its manifest) nature being mere ignorance, this is stated *tad dhaidam*. [207]

<sup>1</sup>This verse states one more argument for establishing the identity of the cause and the effect; cf. verse 194 above.

<sup>1</sup>This is *prapañca* mentioned in the preceding verse.

मा भूद्व्याकृतधीः पुंसां नामरूपात्मवस्तुनि ।  
ऐकात्म्यव्यक्तितो ऽन्यत्र तस्मादेवेति गौरियम् ॥२०८॥

Lest there be apprehension by men of the (variously) modified (Reality which appears before them) in the objects having the nature of name and form, i.e. elsewhere than in the manifestation of the uniqueness of the Ātman, there is made the statement *tasmād eva*. [208]

This justifies the restriction (*avadhāraṇa*) in *nāmarūpabhyām eva*.

सामानाधिकरण्योक्तिर्व्यक्तस्याव्यक्तसिद्धये ।  
न हि कात्शन्यमभिव्यक्तेर्व्यक्तस्याकात्स्न्यदर्शनात् ॥२०९॥

The Śruti statement, which contains two words which are expressive of only one object, is intended for establishing the unmanifest becoming the manifest; indeed, fullness is not (understood) of the manifest, since the manifest is seen (in it) to be not full. [209]

This is to support the *sāmānādhikarānya* of *tat* and *idam*, even though *idam* refers to what is *parimita* and *tat*, to *aparimita*.

प्रमात्रादिनिषेधेन श्रुत्याव्याकृतमुच्यते ।  
तद्वित्तिसाधनाभावात्कथं तदवगम्यते ॥२१०॥

The Śruti mentions the differentiated (world) by negating (the notion of) the knower etc.<sup>1</sup> (And) how can that become known since there is absence of the means of knowing it? [210]

The verse presupposes an objection regarding the means of ascertaining the nature of the unmanifest. There are alternatives; (i) *mānam asti* and (ii) *mānam nāsti*. The first and the second lines have refuted the first and the second alternatives respectively.

<sup>1</sup>This refers to *pramāṇa*.

विधूताशेषसंबन्धमनन्यानुभवात्मकम् ।  
कटस्थसंविन्मात्रैकं ब्रह्मास्मीतिस्वभावकम् ॥२११॥  
अतिरोहितसंवित्कं सदानस्तमितोदितम् ।  
निःसामान्यविशेषं तत्प्रत्यगात्मैकनिष्ठितम् ॥२१२॥  
स्वतो ऽवबुद्धं तद्यस्मान्निरविद्यमतः सदा ।  
संगतिर्निरविद्यस्य नाविद्याहेतुर्जैर्मलैः ॥२१३॥

[Verses 211-214 describe *nityānubhavasādhana*.]

That (Brahman) is such as has shaken off all relations (to various worldly objects); as is of the nature of having experience of none else (than itself)<sup>1</sup>; as is immovable and mere sentience; and is aware of its own state (in the form) 'I am Brahman. '; [211]

as has it sentience never concealed (i.e. overpowered by

anything else<sup>2</sup>); as has never perished or originated; as is not possessed of any general or particular character<sup>3</sup>; as has remained only in the inner self<sup>4</sup>; [212]

(and) as is ever awake and is, therefore, without (any influence of) ignorance (on it). As such, there cannot be any association of it, that is devoid of ignorance, with sins/taints caused by ignorance. [213]

<sup>1</sup>The first line stresses that there exists nothing else than the Brahman.

<sup>2</sup>That is, since there exists none else than the Brahman.

<sup>3</sup>This is the same as *avyāvṛttānanugata*.

<sup>4</sup>That is, it is not different from the inner self.

एवंसवभावमप्येतदविज्ञातं स्वभावतः ।  
तमोवृत्तमपेक्षयैतन्न तु यद्वास्तवं स्वतः ॥२१४॥

Though it is of this nature, yet, only by its very nature, it remains unknown. This is (so said) keeping in view the effect of darkness (i.e. ignorance) but it is not a real situation. [214] There can be an objection: 'The Brahman is *nityabuddha*, then how is it that no one knows it?'. The answer is: Though the Brahman is *nityabuddha*, yet due to ignorance it remains usually unknown by nature.

स्वानुभूत्यनुसारेण यथोक्तो ऽर्थो ऽवसीयताम् ।  
मानहैत्वतिवर्तित्वान्नेह मात्रादिसंभवः ॥२१५॥

[Verses 215-220 explain that the unknownness of the Brahman is established by our usual experience.]

Let this thing (which is) thus described, be ascertained, in accordance with one's own experience. There is no possibility of having the means of knowing etc., because the Ātman is beyond the (usual act of) knowing. [215]

तस्मिन्नपहतध्वान्ते ऽप्यविद्या स्वानुभूतितः ।  
स्वानुभूतिर्न वेद्मीति प्रागैकात्म्यप्रबोधतः ॥२१६॥

There is ignorance even on the part of that (Ātman) whose darkness (i.e. ignorance) is (by its very nature) far-removed (lit. destroyed) there is ignorance (as understood) from one's (i.e. the individual self's) experience. There is on the part of one the experience, 'I do not know'; (but this is so) before (i.e. so long as there is not) the awareness of the uniqueness of the Self. [216]

ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वो जानाति त्रिकालं तदसंभवम् ।  
अन्यतः संगतिः सेयमविचारितसिद्धिका ॥२१७॥

One who has known the true nature of the Ātman knows that it is in all the three periods of time impossible (to think 'I do not know myself'); (and also that) this association with the other<sup>1</sup> is established by the absence of (proper) thought. [217]

<sup>1</sup> *anyah* = *anyena* (NKL), i.e. *ajñānena*.

स्वभावव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ध्वान्तसिद्धेरसंभवात् ।  
न चेत्प्रमाणतः सिद्धिरस्याव्याकृतरूपिणः ।  
न चैकात्म्यस्वभावेन कुतस्तन्मानगोचरः ॥२१८॥

Because there is no possibility of existence of darkness (i.e. ignorance) unless (one accepts the existence of) the Ātman and the other. Also, if it is not possible to establish the existence of what has not appeared (manifested) in discrete forms or by its nature of uniqueness, how would it be within the ken of knowing? [218]

This asserts the inutility of the *mātrādi* in respect of Ātmajñāna.

तद्धेदमित्यनेनोक्तिर्व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मनोः ।  
प्रमाणयोग्यतैवोक्ता न त्वैकात्म्यमितात्मता ॥२१९॥

By the sentence *tad dhedam* there is the statement of the two of manifest and unmanifest natures. (But) here is thus

stated the possibility of its becoming known by means of knowing and not the uniqueness (of the Ātman) and the limitedness (of the non-Ātman). [219]

The universe (*jagat*) was unmanifest and it is manifest now. The words *tad dhedam* are not for conveying the possibility of knowing the oneness of what is unmanifest (= Ātman) and what is manifest (= non-Ātman).

अव्याकृतमविज्ञातं प्रमाणाविषयं मतम् ।  
प्रमाणानभिसंबद्धं प्रमाणाच्चेति साहसम् ॥२२०॥

(The Brahman) is understood to be unmanifest, unknown, non-object of the means of knowing, not connected with any means of knowing. And still to say that (it is understood) by the means of knowing is (but) folly<sup>1</sup>. [220]

<sup>1</sup>The word *sāhasa* means: thoughtless statement. SP does not explain it and NKL says *vyāhata* which means paradoxical.

अविज्ञातार्थगन्तृणि प्रमाणानीति वादिनाम् ।  
सर्वेषामभ्युपेतो ऽर्थः कुतो ऽसाविति चिन्त्यते ॥२२१॥

Now is considered (a question:) By what<sup>1</sup> does it (become known) (even though) it is an object understood (lit. accepted) by all who state that the means of knowing pertains to (lit. reaches up to) object(s) not known?<sup>2</sup> [221]

<sup>1</sup>Or, 'on account of what?'. SP makes this clear thus: *sa ca kutaḥ sphurati svato vā parato vā parataś cen mānād vā sākṣiṇo veti vicārya nirdhāryam*.

ज्ञातो वा ऽर्थो ऽथवा ऽज्ञात उभयं वा न चोभयम् ।  
प्रमाणानां प्रमेयः स्यात्सर्वमेतद्विचार्यते ॥२२२॥

All this is discussed, viz. whether the object is known or not known or both (known and not known) or not both could be the object knowable by the means of knowing. [222]



There are here four alternatives mentioned regarding the nature of the object sought to be known. These are discussed in the verses hereafter.

मेयमानत्वसंभितौ न पश्यामो ऽत्र साधनम् ।  
ज्ञातस्याव्यतिरेकित्वादज्ञातस्याप्यमानतः ॥२२३॥

As regards *meyatva* 'the character of an object of knowing' and *mānatva* 'the character of a means of knowing', (we have to say that) we do not see here any means of distinguishing (between the two), because what is to be known does not exist apart (from the means) and what is not known does not have any means of knowing it. [223]

In the case of the Ātman there is no distinction between *meya* and *māna*, unlike in the normal knowing-situation.

As intended by verse 221 above, there follows a discussion as to how an object of knowing becomes known. First, the views of the Vaiśeṣikas and other logicians. The argument of the Vedāntin is: If they hold *meya* as *jaḍa* (and they do so), then, *māna* also being *jaḍa*, how could one distinguish between the two? If again the *meya* and *māna* are accepted by them as *viśaya* and *viśayin*, a question can be asked: Whether the *meya* is already known or unknown? The first half of the second line of the verse answers away the first and the second half, the second. The answers are clarified in the next two verses.

जगत्यर्थो हि यः कश्चिज्ज्ञात एव स बुद्धिवत् ।  
मानादेव स विज्ञात इत्येतत्स्यात्कृतो ऽमितेः ॥२२४॥

In this world,<sup>1</sup> whatever be the object of knowing, that has got to be known (i.e. existent for becoming known) even like the intellect (itself)<sup>2</sup>; that<sup>3</sup> would become known only by that knowing one<sup>4</sup> (— hence we ask:) How can it be (objected to) on the ground of the absence of the object of knowing?

[224]

This explains *jñātasvāvyatirekitva*.

<sup>1</sup>This refers to worldly dealings (*vyavahārabhūmi*).

<sup>2</sup>*buddhi* 'intellect' reveals itself; it does not remain unknown, for it in contact with the inner self.

<sup>3</sup>This refers to the object of knowing which is mentioned earlier.

<sup>4</sup>*māna*— this refers to the knower, inner self.

मानातिरेकासंसिद्धेर्मेय एव तथा न किम् ।  
न हि दीपान्तरादीपो भारूपत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥२२५॥

So also, since it cannot be established that the object of knowing exists apart from knowing, why should it not become similarly known<sup>1</sup>? Indeed, a lamp does not attain the nature of light from another lamp. [225]

<sup>1</sup>That is to say: Like *jñāna* it is self-evident; it cannot remain unknown.

ज्ञातरूपातिरेकेण नान्यद्रूपं समीक्ष्यते ।  
एवं चेन्मानतो मेयो विज्ञात इति का प्रमा ॥२२६॥

They do not accept (or grasp) any form apart from the form which has been known. If this is so, how can it be right knowledge (to hold) that an object of knowing is known from knowledge. [226]

न चापर उपायो ऽस्ति मेयसद्भावसिद्धिकृत् ।  
मानेभ्यस्तत्फलासूतेरन्धकारप्रनृत्तवत् ॥२२७॥

There is no other means<sup>1</sup> of establishing the existence of what is (the object) of knowing (in Vedānta) since there would not result any fruit from the (known) means of knowing, exactly as (from) the act of dancing in darkness.<sup>2</sup> [227]

This verse presupposes an objection that the *jada* object can be known by some means of knowing.

<sup>1</sup>That is, other than the usually accepted means of knowing.

<sup>2</sup>This would lead to absence of any dealings (*sarvavyavahāralopa*).

स्वत एव प्रसिद्धश्चेत्प्रमेयो ऽर्थस्तथा ऽपि न ।  
अनन्यायत्तसंसिद्धेर्मेयत्वं किंनिबन्धनम् ॥२२८॥

If it be held that the object of knowing is established as existent on its own (i.e. within its own right), (we answer:) Even that is not the case; (for we ask:) In what is rooted the character of the objects' capacity to be known whose existence does not depend on another? [228]

Here is denied another alternative objection, viz. the *jaḍa* can be known in its own right or, by itself.

निःसाधनो न साध्यो ऽस्ति नासाध्यं साधनं क्वचित् ।  
तुल्यशक्तिमतां नापि मिथो ऽपेक्षा ऽस्ति कुत्रचित् ॥२२९॥

There cannot be any *sādhya* (object) which is without *sādhana*, nor can be there any *sādhana* which is without its *sādhya* (object). And, there is no mutual expectancy on the part of two (*sādhya* objects) having equal capacity also.<sup>1</sup> [229]

<sup>1</sup>SP points out that *api* 'also' suggests *anavasthā* as the result if a knowledge of some *sādhya* is held to depend upon that of another.

नासिद्धयोः स्वतो ऽपेक्षा सिद्धयोश्चापि नेष्यते ।  
नापेक्ष्यापेक्षकत्वं हि लोके ऽप्यतिशयं विना ॥२३०॥

Two objects which are not self-established do not have expectation (of each other<sup>1</sup>); so also two objects which are self-established do not expect (anything) of each other. For, in this world, we do not indeed find the relation of something as expected and something (else) that expects, unless there is a certain excellence (in the object desired.) [230]

This verse answers a question whether two *jaḍa* objects get established by each other, be they *svatahsiddha* or *svato 'siddha*.

Two possibilities are discussed here, the third is considered in the next.

<sup>1</sup>It literally means: of themselves. SP refers to the son of a barren woman and a sky-flower as instances.

नापि सिद्धः स्वतो ऽसिद्धं नृशृङ्गवदपेक्षते ।  
तथा ऽसिद्धः स्वतः सिद्धं नात्यन्ताभावरूपतः ॥२३१॥

So also, one self-established<sup>1</sup> (object) does not expect another (object which is) not established<sup>2</sup>, like a man (expecting) a (non-existent) horn. Similarly, what is not self-established does not expect what is established because it itself has the form of absolute non-existence<sup>3</sup>. [231]

<sup>1</sup>This refers to an existent object.

<sup>2</sup>That is, non-existent object.

<sup>3</sup>For example, a man's horn.

अपेक्षते चेत्सिद्धो ऽसौ नासिद्धो ऽपेक्षितुं क्षमः ।  
येनातो ऽज्ञानतः सिद्धिं स्वतःसिद्धो ऽप्यपेक्षते ॥२३२॥

If it is held that if a thing (self-established) expects (some *māna*), then (it has to be said that) a non-existent (object) is not capable of expecting (it). Therefore, since (this is so), even a self-established (object) expects to be established by ignorance.<sup>1</sup> [232]

<sup>1</sup>NKL reads: *yenāto jñānataḥ* for the reading of the AnSS edition *yenato 'jñānataḥ(?)*. Possibly, *ajñānaḥ* suggests that falsely conceived *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra*.

विश्वेश्वरो ऽपि प्राहैतत्प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ।  
भावाभावत्वमज्ञानादतद्वत्येव कल्पितम् ॥२३३॥

This Lord of the world declared this to Arjuna who (approached) Him (as a pupil) that the state of Reality and non-Reality is experienced (i.e. imagined) (by all) in what does not possess (the character of) that, due to ignorance. [233]

SP points out that all *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra* is like *raju-sarpa(jñāna)*.

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।  
उभयोरपि दृष्टो ऽन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥२३४॥

The non-existent has no being, the existent never ceases to be, the truth of both has been seen by the seer of the truth.

[234]

This is *Gītā* 2.16.

ज्ञेयं यत्तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वा ऽमृतमश्नुते ।  
तथा न जायत इति विध्वस्ताशेषकल्पनम् ॥२३५॥

‘I shall explain the nature of that which is to be known and having known which, one attains immortality.’<sup>1</sup> So also, (the statement of the Lord), *na jāyate*<sup>2</sup> ... declares the entire (cluster of) imaginary suppositions (that are) destroyed (i.e. set aside).

[235]

<sup>1</sup> *Gītā* 13.12.

<sup>2</sup> *Gītā* 2.20.

वासुदेवः सर्वमिति प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिपूर्वकम् ।  
अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ॥२३६॥

(So also He declares) ‘(I), son of Vāsudeva, am all this.’<sup>1</sup> which has a direct statement of the Śruti as its forerunner<sup>2</sup>, and later, (He states), ‘I am the origin and merger of the entire universe.’<sup>3</sup>

[236]

Kṛṣṇa described in these verses of the *Gītā* the Paramātman. And, according to SP, the statement of Kṛṣṇa is preceded by the direct statement of the Śruti (*pratyakṣaśruti*), viz. *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ* (CU 6.8-6.16).

<sup>1</sup> *Gītā* 7.19.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to *idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā* (BU 2.4.6).

<sup>3</sup> *Gītā* 7.6.

सत्यज्ञानादिरूपस्य प्रत्यगात्मन एव च ।  
कारणत्वं सुविस्पष्टं श्रुतौ हि बहुशः श्रुतम् ॥२३७॥

Indeed, in the Śruti, it is many times clearly heard that it is only the individual self which is of the nature of truth, knowledge etc., that is the cause of the universe. [237]

In the preceding verse, the CU is taken into account and here the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* for pointing out the *śrutimūlatā* of the statement of Kṛṣṇa. In other words, the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* is the Śruti conveying the same idea as in the *Gītā*. That is: Kṛṣṇa declares *aham (pratyagātman)* as the creator, sustainer and destroyer and this same idea is already conveyed by the Śruti (*Taittirīyopaniṣad*): *satyaṃ jñānam anantam brahma / yo veda nihitaṃ guhāyām* (2.1); *tasmād vā etasmād ātmā ākāśaḥ saṃbhūtaḥ* (2.1); *idaṃ sarvaṃ asṛjata* (2.6); and *yato vā imāni bhūtāni ...* (3.1).

अज्ञातात्मातिरेकेण ब्रुवतः कारणं तथा ।  
सम्यग्ज्ञानान्न मुक्तिः स्यान्न ज्ञानं वस्तुनुत्क्वचित् ॥२३८॥

There cannot be liberation (which results from) the right knowledge in the case of one who states that the cause (of this universe) is apart from the Ātman which is not known (to him). Nowhere does (such) knowledge (as his) negate the existence of the real (object)<sup>1</sup>. [238]

This is a remark about those, like the Sāṃkhyas, who hold, in opposition to the Śruti, that the world is caused by some other thing, like Pradhāna etc.

<sup>1</sup>Namely, the Ātman.

कर्मभ्यो ऽपि न मुक्तिः स्यात्कर्मापि न हि वस्तुनुत् ।  
तस्यानित्यफलोत्पत्तौ प्रभविष्णुत्वकारणात् ॥२३९॥

Even by ritual activity there cannot be (attainment of) liberation. Indeed, action also cannot negate the real object,

for it is capable of causing the rise of the impermanent fruit.<sup>1</sup>

[239]

<sup>1</sup>This implies the incapacity of *karman* for effecting the permanent result, viz. liberation.

कूर्मलोमादिवच्चेत्स्यादबुद्धत्वं तथा ऽपि वः ।  
स्वतः सर्वज्ञतैव स्यान्न वस्त्वज्ञातमस्ति हि ॥२४०॥

(If the objector says:) As in the case of the hair of a tortoise etc.<sup>1</sup> there could be unknownness (i.e. absence of knowledge) (about the Ātman), in your (view); (we answer:) There is (lit. would be) only omniscience (of the Ātman which is) on its own account<sup>2</sup>, for the (real) thing<sup>3</sup> is not unknown.<sup>4</sup> [240]

<sup>1</sup>The word etc. implies its milk; this signifies non-existent objects.

<sup>2</sup>That is, not caused by any other thing.

<sup>3</sup>Namely, the Ātman.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. Śaṅkara's assertion in the Adhyāsabhāṣya (p.81): *sarvo hy ātmāstitvam pratyeti*.... This sets aside the idea of holding Anumāna as necessary for knowing the Ātman in the way of the Sāṃkhyas who require it for knowing the Pradhāna.

न च मानात्प्रसिद्धिः स्यात्कूर्मलोमादिवस्तुनः ॥२४१॥  
ज्ञातार्थव्यतिरेकेण मानानां मानता यतः ।  
मेयार्थापहृतिश्च स्यान्नाज्ञातमिति जल्पतः ॥२४२॥

And one would not be able to establish a thing like the hair of a tortoise etc. with (the help of) the means of knowing since (it would mean that) the means of knowing the character of the means of knowing (even) in the absence of the known (i.e. existent) object(s) and also there would result for one who states that there is not (any object which is unknown) the negation (lit. concealment) of the object of knowing.

[241-242]

The argument regarding the hair of a tortoise is still the basis for argument. The question is: 'How can this non-existent object

for it is capable of causing the rise of the impermanent fruit.<sup>1</sup>

[239]

<sup>1</sup>This implies the incapacity of *karman* for effecting the permanent result, viz. liberation.

कूर्मलोमादिवच्चेत्स्याद्बुद्धत्वं तथा ऽपि वः ।  
स्वतः सर्वज्ञतैव स्यान्न वस्त्वज्ञातमस्ति हि ॥२४०॥

(If the objector says:) As in the case of the hair of a tortoise etc.<sup>1</sup> there could be unknownness (i.e. absence of knowledge) (about the Ātman), in your (view); (we answer:) There is (lit. would be) only omniscience (of the Ātman which is) on its own account<sup>2</sup>, for the (real) thing<sup>3</sup> is not unknown.<sup>4</sup> [240]

<sup>1</sup>The word etc. implies its milk; this signifies non-existent objects.

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न च मानात्प्रसिद्धिः स्यात्कूर्मलोमादिवस्तुनः ॥२४१॥  
ज्ञातार्थव्यतिरेकेण मानानां मानता यतः ।  
मेयार्थापहृतिश्च स्यान्नाज्ञातमिति जल्पतः ॥२४२॥

And one would not be able to establish a thing like the hair of a tortoise etc. with (the help of) the means of knowing since (it would mean that) the means of knowing the character of the means of knowing (even) in the absence of the known (i.e. existent) object(s) and also there would result for one who states that there is not (any object which is unknown) the negation (lit. concealment) of the object of knowing.

[241-242]

The argument regarding the hair of a tortoise is still the basis for argument. The question is: 'How can this non-existent object



become known?' Neither knowledge nor false impression about it is possible.

ततश्च वेदसिद्धान्तसंत्यागः कारणादृते ।  
न भिद्यते प्रमेयो ऽथो मानाद्येषां च वादिनाम् ।  
तेषां दुःशकमत्यन्तमबुद्धार्थावबोधनम् ॥२४३॥

From that there follows, without any reason<sup>1</sup>, abandoning of the doctrine of the Veda<sup>2</sup>. And, in the case of those who argue that the object of knowing cannot be distinguished from the means of knowing<sup>3</sup>, it is extremely difficult to get to know what is not known.<sup>4</sup> [243]

Earlier, as implied in verse 222 above, there was a discussion about the view that the object of knowing by philosophical query is a directly perceptible object. This was the view of the realists, viz. the Sāṃkhyas. Now, follows a discussion of the views which are like the Buddhist opinions — the third alternative. In this verse, there is reference to the view that there is no distinction between *māna* and *meya*.

<sup>1</sup>Or, for no reason.

<sup>2</sup>The authoritativeness of the Veda is accepted in the field of Dharma. Therefore, the contingency would be in denying the authority of the Veda which is accepted as *ajñātārthajñāpaka*.

<sup>3</sup>This is the view of the Yogācāra Buddhists.

<sup>4</sup>It is implied that every argument is based on the relation between *māna* and *meya* as two distinct objects.

ज्ञानमेयप्रभेदो ऽपि मानस्य स्वार्थरूपिणः ।  
बौद्धराद्धान्तसक्तिः स्यात्स्वार्थस्य क्षणिकत्वतः ॥२४४॥

And, when a distinction (is accepted) between the means of knowledge and the object of knowing even while that means of knowing has (i.e. is) to be taken as having the form of its object, there would result inevitable acceptance of the Buddhist doctrine, on account of the fact that its (viz. of the *māna*) object of knowing has (only) momentary-existence. [244]

The argument is: *māna* and *meya* are distinct, but the latter was not known (as existent) until the *māna* became operative. But while there results the knowledge of the object, the means of knowing has ceased to exist. Thus there results *kṣaṇikatvavāda*, as acceptable even to one who holds the *māna* and *meya* as reals.

This argument is adduced after accepting the need of *vyavahārasiddhi*.

स्वार्थं प्रत्येव संसिद्धेः परार्थस्येह वस्तुनः ।  
स्वप्नादिवदनात्मार्थो मृषा स्यात्क्षणिको ऽपि वा ॥२४५॥

Since, in worldly dealings, every object which exists for the sake of another<sup>1</sup> gets established (only) with reference to its own object<sup>2</sup>, the object which is non-Ātman would be either futile like one in a dream etc. or (it would be) momentary.<sup>3</sup> [245]

<sup>1</sup>The word *padārtha* is paraphrased by SP as *meya artha* and by NKL as *jaḍa artha*. Possibly this refers to the view that *jñāta* and *jñāna* (= *māna*) are both *jaḍa*— cf. the concept of the Sāṃkhyas: *saṃghātasya parārthatva*.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the object of knowing. (Or, *ajāḍa* Ātman).

<sup>3</sup>The argument is: If this *svārtha* also were *jaḍa*, then it has to be considered at the time of its being known by the means as non-existent, and that would resemble the view of the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika Buddhists.

न च सौगतसिद्धान्तस्तत्सिद्धौ मित्यभावतः ।  
मेयमानैकतो ऽभावादज्ञातत्वस्य तत्क्षणे ॥२४६॥

And (in this regard we do) not (hold) the doctrine of the Buddhists (as correct) owing to the absence of the knowledge which leads to establish that<sup>1</sup> on account of (the fact that) there could not be oneness of the object of knowing and the means of knowing<sup>2</sup> and (therefore) there would be unknownness of the object at the moment (time)<sup>3</sup>. [246]

<sup>1</sup>Namely, the object of knowing (*jñāta* which is also *jñeya*).

<sup>2</sup>*meyamānaikataḥ = meyamānaikatvataḥ.*

<sup>3</sup>Supply: of knowing it.

अथाभ्युपेयते ऽज्ञातः प्रमेयाव्यतिरेकतः ।  
एकत्रापि प्रमाणत्वप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं क्षणात्मनि ॥२४७॥

Well then (*atha*) it is accepted that the character of being unknown is apart from the object of knowing, in order that its nature of being the means of knowing becomes established even while it is as momentary in nature. [247]

This is the argument of a Vijñānavādin — a concessional acceptance for the sake of arguing that the means of knowing is informative (*jñāpaka*) of an earlier unknown object.

मानात्मके ऽपि मेये ऽर्थे यद्यबद्धत्वमिष्यते ।  
अज्ञातत्वापनुन्मानात्किमन्यदिति कथ्यताम् ॥२४८॥

If, in respect of the object of knowing, which is of the nature of the knower (lit. a means of knowing), it is held that it cannot be known then let this be told: What else is there, apart from the means of knowing, (so that it is capable of) removing the unknownness (of the object of knowing)? [248]

This is in answer to the Buddhist concessional argument stated in the preceding verse.

स्वतो वा परतो वेदमज्ञातत्वं भवद्भवेत् ।  
स्वतश्चेत्ततोवत्स्यात्जज्ञातत्वं रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥२४९॥

This character of being unknown would be either self-established or established by another (means). Then, if it is self-established, it would be (ever) accompanied by (lit. possessed of) darkness<sup>1</sup> (and) the character of being known (would be) like that of the serpent in a rope. [249]

<sup>1</sup>That is, what is *ajñāta* would ever remain so.

<sup>2</sup>It means: it would be false apprehension.

अथान्यतस्तदज्ञातं किंरूपं वस्त्वतीर्यताम् ।  
मानादवगतं तच्चेन्मैवमव्यतिरेकतः ॥२५०॥

Now, if (it is held that) it remains unknown owing to another (factor), let it be told me as to what form it<sup>1</sup> has? And if it is (said to become) known by some means, let it not be said so, for it does not exist apart (from the thing). [250]

This has a reference to the fourth alternative: *na cobhayam* mentioned in verse 222 above. It means: the object of knowing remains unknown owing to non-knowing and also becomes known owing to knowing — not on account of its own nature!

<sup>1</sup>It means: the object of knowing, viz. Reality.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यथोक्तो ऽर्थः प्रसिध्यति ।  
ताभ्यां विना कुतो ऽज्ञायि त्वेवं रूपमितीर्यताम् ॥२५१॥

The object which has been so far discussed gets ascertained by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka<sup>1</sup> (and) from which other than these two (viz. Anvaya and Vyatireka) is known such a form (of object) — tell me. [251]

This is the explanation of the verse 250. The theory of an opponent does not establish the nature of Reality. This method is not applicable to the means of ascertaining the nature of Reality.

<sup>1</sup>Cf. see our book [vol.1:1982] Introduction on the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka.

न चेह वास्तवं रूपं तदध्यासेन बाध्यते ।  
रज्जुसर्पधिया लोके न रज्जुरिति धीवृत्तिः ॥२५२॥

And further, here<sup>1</sup> the real form of the thing is not stultified by a superimposition (of anything on it). In this world, the knowledge 'this is a rope' is not concealed<sup>2</sup> anywhere by the knowledge 'there is a serpent' in the place of a rope.

[252]

This verse refers to two possible views regarding the nature of the object which is not known: its unknownness is (i)imaginary, or (ii)real. The first possibility has not to be considered at all! The second is answered by the whole verse.

<sup>1</sup>That is, in *vyavahāra*.

<sup>2</sup>That is, stultified.

स्वसंवित्त्वमात्रे च न तमःसंभवः क्वचित् ।  
तथाभ्युपगमे तस्य नापनुत्तिः कुतश्चन ॥२५३॥

And, there cannot be any time<sup>1</sup> a possibility of ignorance when the object of knowing is held to be what has the nature of mere sentience of one's own; for, that view being accepted, there cannot be its stultification on account of anything.<sup>2</sup> [253]

According to SP, this refers to the view of the Yogācāra Buddhists, incidentally.

<sup>1</sup> = *kvacit*.

<sup>2</sup>Or, for any reason.

दुर्बलानां विरुद्धानां बलवद्विरपाक्रिया ।  
विरुद्धैरेव दृष्टा सा तदैकात्म्ये कथं भवेत् ॥२५४॥

It is noticed that removal<sup>1</sup> of the weak in opposition is effected only by the strong ones who are opposed (to them). How can that<sup>2</sup> be in the case where there is uniqueness of that<sup>3</sup>?

[254]

It seems that the verse refers to the view that real ignorance is removed by some sudden knowledge of Reality; but this does not have to be answered since the generally accepted maxim is not relevant upon matter in hand.

<sup>1</sup>That is, setting aside or disproving.

<sup>2</sup>This refers to *apākriyā* explained in note 1.

<sup>3</sup>It means: self-illuminating Reality or sentience.

बाध्यबाधकयोर्योगः स्वशक्त्यनपहारतः ।  
यो ऽन्यथा संगतिं ब्रूते चर्मवद्वेष्टयेत्स खम् ॥२५५॥

Whatever connection we notice between *bādhya* and *bādhaka* knowledges that occur on account of the non-removal of their own essence (i.e. strength); (and, therefore) he who holds that the connection (between unknownness and knownness) can exist in some way would be trying to wrap the sky with some skin.<sup>1</sup> [255]

<sup>1</sup>It refers to an impossible task. A skin does not lose its capacity to cover something and the sky also does not get covered (i.e. does not lose its expanse) — thus the connection between the two as the wrapper and the wrapped is not at all possible.

नच जाड्यातिरेकेण ह्यविद्या काचिदिष्यते ।  
अविद्यां गमयित्वेति श्रुतितो ऽप्यवसीयताम् ॥२५६॥

Ignorance<sup>1</sup> (or any absence of proper knowledge) is not understood (to be) apart from (some) non-sentience. Let this be concluded also from the Śruti 'Having dispelled (i.e. overcome) ignorance ....' [256]

This verse adduces one more argument for holding any association of the unknownness of the real with sentience.

<sup>1</sup>It literally means: non-sentient; but the second line refers to it as *avidyā*.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. BU 4.4.3: *evam evāyam ātmedaṃ śarīraṃ nihatya avidyāṃ gamayitvā anyam ākramam ākramyātmānam upasaṃharati.*

अज्ञातं न यथा मानान्मिथ्याधीसंशयौ तथा ।  
न्यायः पुरोदितः सर्वो यस्मादस्ति तयोरपि ॥२५७॥

As what is unknown does not get established by any means of knowing, so also do not wrong knowledge and doubt get established (by any means of knowing), since, in the case of these two also, there holds good the method of thought<sup>1</sup> already stated. [257]

<sup>1</sup>Namely, the object of knowing (in this case) is not such as

can be established by any means of knowing.

अपि सर्वप्रमाणानामज्ञातत्वादिसिद्धये ।  
नेक्ष्यते ऽन्यतमं मानं स्वतःसिद्धं न चापि तत् ॥२५८॥

Further, not any one of all the means of knowing is capable of establishing the unknownness etc.<sup>1</sup>, so also that (unknownness) is not self-established. [258]

This is to argue that *avidyā* is not self-established (*svataḥsiddha*) either.

<sup>1</sup>The word etc. refers to *mithyādhī* and *saṃśaya* mentioned in the preceding verse.

न तावदिह संभाव्यं प्रत्यक्षं तदसंभवात् ।  
विषयेन्द्रियसंबन्धविरहात्तदसंभवः ॥२५९॥

Here (i.e. in this inquiry), the direct perception (of Reality) is just not to be considered (as the means of knowing it), since the possibility of direct perception cannot arise — (this) impossibility of that is owing to the absence of any connection between the object of reality and the sense-organs. [259]

Reference was made to the means of knowing (in verse 257 above). Therefore, there is yet further discussion whether that means is external (*bāhyapratyakṣa*) or mental (*mānasa*) or inferential. This verse is to deny the first alternative.

न च दुःखादिधीवत्स्याज्ज्ञातस्यैवानुभूतितः ।  
प्रत्यक्षार्थवदेवैषा मिथ्याधीरनुभूयते ॥२६०॥

And (that unknown thing) would not be (possible) like the experience (i.e. awareness) of misery etc.<sup>1</sup> for the reason that there is experience of only that which is known. This knowledge, which is (according to us) false, is experienced entirely like an object of direct perception.<sup>2</sup> [260]

Here are discussed the second and third alternatives mentioned

just before.

<sup>1</sup>This is to say that *mithyādhī* is not imaginary.

<sup>2</sup>Experience is the result of some knowledge. At the most, the object known in that knowledge can be inferred from it, but not *anubhūti* which is *pratyakṣa* 'direct perception'.

प्रत्यक्षादिफलं ज्ञानं कथं तस्य प्रमेयता ।  
माफलं न च मेयस्थं क्रियाफलवदिष्यते ॥२६१॥

Knowledge<sup>1</sup> is the result (lit. fruit) achieved by direct perception etc. How can that have the character of an object of knowing? The result of right knowledge is not taken to exist in the object of knowing like the result of an action.<sup>2</sup>

[261]

<sup>1</sup>Namely, the character of what is known (*jñātatva*).

<sup>2</sup>For example, the act of cutting results into a thing's division into two (at least); this division is seen in the thing cut.

अपि मानाभिसंबन्धो मेयार्थेनैव युक्तिमान् ।  
नाफलस्य तु मात्रैव ह्यतो ऽन्यत्र वृथा श्रमः ॥२६२॥

And, further, it is reasonable to hold a relation of a means of knowing to only an object of knowing. As against this, the result of knowing (has connection) indeed only with the known; (accepting it<sup>1</sup> to exist) elsewhere (than in the knower) would mean an effort (of knowing) for nothing. [262]

<sup>1</sup>That is, the result of knowledge.

माफलस्य तु मेयत्वे प्राप्नोतीहानवस्थितिः ।  
प्रमाफलाभिसंबन्धः किंमान इति कथ्यताम् ॥२६३॥

But, (if it is accepted that) the result of knowledge has the character of an object of knowing, then here follows *infinite regress*. It has to be explained<sup>1</sup> as to what is the means (that brings the awareness of) the relation between knowledge and its result. [263]



<sup>1</sup>It literally means: let this be pointed out.

इहापि चानवस्थेति नानुमातो ऽत्र युज्यते ।  
न च रागादिसंसिद्धौ मानव्यापार ईक्ष्यते ॥२६४॥

Therefore, it is not proper to employ inference<sup>1</sup>, since, here (in this case) also, there arises *infinite regress*. And, indeed, in the case of the rise of attachment etc. one does not expect any function of the means of knowing. [264]

<sup>1</sup>Namely, to understand from the characteristic in the form of some effect (called the result) its relation to some means (which has produced it).

रागादेर्नापि चाभावो भावात्तदनुभूतितः ।  
न च कश्चित्फले भेदो मेयमानप्रमातृषु ॥२६५॥

As for attachment etc. also, there is no non-existence of the same, as it proceeds from experience. And, in respect of result, there is no difference (in relation to) the object of knowing, the means of knowing and the knower. [265]

मानकार्यं फलं चेत्स्यान्न स्यात्तन्मातृमानयोः ।  
तदभावे च माभावात्कुतस्तत्स्यात्प्रमां विना ॥२६६॥

If the result<sup>1</sup> were (to be taken as) the effect (or product) of knowing, then it would not exist in the knower and the means of knowing since, in the absence of them, there is the absence of knowledge. How could that (effect of knowing) follow (exist) when there is no knowledge? [266]

<sup>1</sup>Namely, knowledge.

प्रमात्रादेरभावे च नाप्यभावः प्रमेष्यते ।  
सुषुप्ते मातृपूर्वत्वात्सर्वमाव्यापृतेरिह ॥२६७॥

And, while there is the absence of the knower etc., one would

not entertain *pramā* to be non-existence, because in deep sleep everything of knowing activity is preceded by a knower (etc.).<sup>1</sup>

[267]

<sup>1</sup>That is, even if there is no apparent activity of any knower, there is a complete process of knowing.

न प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामतो ऽर्थापत्तितो ऽपि न ।  
न हि दृष्टं श्रुतं वर्ते सार्थापत्तिः प्रसिध्यति ॥२६८॥

It cannot be known by direct perception and inference, not also by *arthāpatti*, for *arthāpatti* cannot get established (lit. be effective) indeed without what is seen or heard. [268]

सादृश्यासंभवाच्चेह नोपमानस्य संभवः ।  
मिथ्याज्ञानादिसंसिद्धौ न चाभावो ऽपि शङ्क्यते ॥२६९॥

Because there is no possibility of (there being) its<sup>1</sup> similarity (with any other thing); there is no possibility of any analogy (for knowing it). And (the idea of) its absence also cannot be entertained in respect of the experience of false knowledge etc. [269]

<sup>1</sup>This means: of what is unknown.

अत्यन्तापूर्वदृष्टे ऽर्थे प्राङ्नाद्राक्षमिमं नगम् ।  
प्रत्यभिज्ञायते साक्षाद्दृष्टपूर्वो यथा तथा ॥२७०॥

As in the case of an object which was never seen before (there arises only such awareness as) 'I have not seen this mountain.' and there arises the recognition, this one is like that as one directly perceived earlier. [270]

This verse intends to point out how some unknown thing becomes known even if it cannot be established by any known means of knowing, its existence and non-existence.

न च मात्रादिसद्भावस्तस्यात्यन्तमदृष्टतः ।  
न प्रमाणान्न चाभावात्प्रत्यभिज्ञात इष्यते ॥२७१॥

There does not exist any knower etc., for it is absolutely unseen; nor is there any recognised means of knowing<sup>1</sup>; not can it be taken (as a thing to be) recognised just because of the non-existence (of any directly perceptible object).<sup>2</sup> [271]

This verse denies recognition of the unknown as implied by the preceding verse.

<sup>1</sup>The NKL edition reads *na prāmāṇyāt* for *na pramāṇāt* of the AnSS edition. But NKL itself does not offer any help to decide if this is correct.

<sup>2</sup>Which is responsible for recognition as in the illustration of the preceding verse.

तस्मात्प्रमाप्रमाभासाप्रमाणानामशेषतः ।  
स्वार्थानन्यप्रमाणात्स्यात्प्रसिद्धिस्तमसस्तथा ॥२७२॥

Therefore, (right) knowledge, what appears as knowledge<sup>1</sup> and absence of (right) knowledge — all of those can get established only on account of the unique means (of knowing) itself<sup>2</sup>; so also is darkness (i.e. *avidyā*) established (by that). [272]

This is the conclusion: *avidyā* can be known only through experience, because it is not knowable by any accepted means of knowing and has the character which is not known (as similar to that of any other thing known); cf. SP: *ajñātatvāder aprameyatvād anubhavād eva taddhir ity upasamharati*.

<sup>1</sup> = *ābhāsa*.

<sup>2</sup>It means: the inner/the individual self.

आन्तरं मेयमाश्रित्य स्वतःसिद्धमनन्यमम् ।  
भावाभावादिमद्विश्वं सर्वमेतत्प्रसिध्यति ॥२७३॥

All this universe<sup>1</sup> which is made up of existence and

non-existence etc.<sup>2</sup> gets established only by resorting to the object of knowing which is within (every being or thing), self-established, and having matchless knowledge. [273]

<sup>1</sup>It means: the universe under discourse, viz. *mātr*, *meya*, *māna*.

<sup>2</sup>The word etc. refers to their modifications (*pariṇāmas*).

मेयार्थानभिसंबन्धान्न यथावस्तुधीरियम् ।  
ज्ञातत्वात्तदभावो ऽपि प्रात्यक्ष्यान्नेष्यते स्मृतिः ॥२७४॥

[Verses 274 -280 discuss that false knowledge is established by experience in case knowledge does not correspond to the object.]

This knowledge of the thing, as it is does not arise in the absence of the contact (of intellect) with the knowable things and the absence of them,<sup>1</sup> is not taken as remembrance on account of their being known and directly perceptible.<sup>2</sup> [274]

<sup>1</sup>Their character as non-essence.

<sup>2</sup>Hereby there is discarding of Ākhyātivāda.

इदं रजतमित्येवंरूपं वस्तु न कुत्रचित् ।  
न शक्तौ रजतज्ञानं नेदंता रजते ऽस्ति नः ॥२७५॥

There is not anywhere a thing which is taken as 'this is silver', for, there is no knowledge of silver in a shell and, for us, the character of being this thing (=thisness) does not exist in silver. [275]

An example of *mithyājñāna* is *idaṃ rajatam*. The questions raised are: This form (*rūpa*) qualified as it is, — does it belong to (i)the shell?, (ii)silver itself?, (iii)only the speaker's mind (*buddhi*)?, (iv)some other place?, or (v)some other moment? The second line answers the first two questions. The next verse answers the rest. This refers to Anyathākhyātivāda.

तदन्यत्र द्वयाभावात्साक्ष्यादावपि नेष्यते ।  
न नेहार्थावबोधो ऽस्ति मिथ्याज्ञानत्वकारणात् ॥२७६॥

Elsewhere than in those two (viz. silver and shell), (i.e.) where the two are absent, also is it not taken to exist in the knower<sup>1</sup> etc.<sup>2</sup> Again, it is not that there is no knowledge of the thing which has the nature of being the cause of false knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

[276]

<sup>1</sup>That is, *buddhi*.

<sup>2</sup>The word etc. means: place and time.

<sup>3</sup>This is according to *Anirvacanīyakhyāti*.

मिथ्याज्ञानादिसंसिद्धौ क उपाय इतीर्यताम् ।  
सम्यग्धीतो ऽथ तत्सिद्धिर्न तस्या मेयसंगतेः ॥२७७॥

(The opponent remarks:) Let it be told as to what is the means of establishing this as false knowledge etc. (If<sup>1</sup> it is asked:) Is it established by (lit. from) right knowledge?<sup>2</sup>, (then the answer is:) No, since that<sup>3</sup> is related to (or associated with) what is to be known.<sup>4</sup>

[277]

<sup>1</sup>This is to understand thus: *atha (cet)*— this refers to the possibility of *mithyājñāna* being *mānasa pratyakṣa*.

<sup>2</sup>It means: knowledge of the thing as it is.

<sup>3</sup>It is *samyagdhī*.

<sup>4</sup>False knowledge cannot be associated with it (i.e. any object of knowing)! For, if it were so, false knowledge would also be right knowledge — it would cease to be false.

मेयप्रमामृते कार्यं मानानां नान्यदिष्यते ।  
न च सत्त्वादिमात्रेण रूप्यादिमितिसंभवः ॥२७८॥

No other purpose than the right knowing of the objects of knowing is expected of the means of knowing<sup>1</sup>; and also there is no possibility of the knowledge of silver etc. by mere (existence of) etc.<sup>2</sup>

[278]

This further clarifies the thought in the preceding verse.

<sup>1</sup>This presupposes an objection that even *mithyājñāna* could

be an object of *samyagdhi*.

<sup>2</sup>This means the capacity of an existent shell which arouses the impression of its similar, viz. silver, and also its shining.

तस्यासाधारणात्मोत्थविज्ञानविषयत्वतः ।

तस्माद्भ्रजतसंस्कारसंस्कृतात्स्वान्ततः स्मृतिः ॥२७९॥

That (false knowledge)<sup>1</sup> being an object of specified knowledge<sup>2</sup> that has arisen from what has the unusual nature<sup>3</sup>, there is a remembrance from that which has acquired the impression of silver etc.<sup>4</sup> within.<sup>5</sup> [279]

This is the reason for the statement in the preceding verse.

<sup>1</sup>*idam rajatam iti jñānam.*

<sup>2</sup>Knowledge requiring subject-object relation (*prapañcajñāna*).

<sup>3</sup>This is not the knowledge of common experience.

<sup>4</sup>This is *bhrānti*. SP points out that this *mithyājñāna* cannot be considered as some kind of *anumāna*. It cites:

*svīkāre vibhramāṇām syāt svīyasiddhāntabādhanā /  
anabhyupagame teṣām āśrayāsiddhir uddhatā //*

(*Tattvapradīpikā* p.63, ll.1-2 (*Tattvapradīpikā* = *Citsukhī* with *Nayana-prasādinī* of *Pratyagrūpa*. ed. by Raghunāth Kāshīnāth Shāstrī, Nir-naya Sagar Press, 1931)

<sup>5</sup>There is no such cognition as ‘This is like silver.’; but it must have been within and therefore the cause of *mithyājñāna*.

प्रथते ऽविकृतात्मैकनित्यदृष्टेः परात्मनः ॥२८०॥

ज्ञानज्ञात्रतिरेकेण तमस्यपि न विद्यते ।

मेयं वस्तु ततो ऽज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं सप्रमातृकम् ॥२८१॥

False knowledge becomes evident on account of the highest Ātman which has ever the knowledge of himself as unmodified<sup>1</sup> (by anything else). [280]

An object of knowing does not exist as apart from knowledge and the knower even in darkness. Therefore, ignorance is an object of direct perception and has a knower (of it). [281]

<sup>1</sup>That is, unaffected.

न हि संविदनारूढः प्रमात्रादिः प्रसिध्यति ।  
संविन्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यात्प्रमात्रादेरनात्मनः ॥२८२॥

[Verses 281-299 discuss that ignorance along with the knower is established by experience.]

A knower etc. that has not mounted (=is not connected with) knowing does not get established for the reason that the true nature of knowing consists only in knowing itself, and also on account of the fact that the knower etc. are (but) the non-Ātman(s). [282]

This verse explains how while knowing the immutable Ātman there is existence or need of the knower etc. (*mātrādi*) which are declared as *jadapadārthas*.

ज्ञातो ऽयमर्थो ऽज्ञातो वा धीरियं कर्तृसंश्रया ।  
स्मृतिः सा न यथावस्तु तेनासावप्रमोदिता ॥२८३॥

That this thing may become known or remain unknown — this knowledge has its basis in its agent and that (basis) is not memory<sup>1</sup> (of it) as the thing is; therefore, that is called ignorance. [283]

<sup>1</sup>SP paraphrases *smṛti* as *bhrānti*, i.e. superimposed *karṭṛtvādi*.

न हि वस्त्वनुरोधयेतज्ज्ञाताज्ञातत्वलक्षणम् ।  
रूपं वस्त्वपरिज्ञानसमुत्थं ज्ञातृसंश्रयम् ॥२८४॥

This form, which is characterized as being known and/or unknown, does not follow (=is not in accordance with) the thing (=Reality) as it is, it has (really speaking) arisen from the absence of the (right) knowledge of the thing and has the support in knower<sup>1</sup>. [284]

<sup>1</sup>To whom the act of knowing is attributed.

ज्ञाताज्ञातविभागो ऽतः स्वतःसिद्धात्ममातृकः ।  
संविदा ज्ञाततासिद्धिर्मितेरपि न मात्मना ॥२८५॥

Therefore, the division (of things) into known and unknown has its origin in the self-established Ātman. It is on account of knowledge that its character (as a thing known) gets established; and knowledge also (does not get established<sup>1</sup>) by what is (called) right knowledge. [285]

<sup>1</sup>That is, become known as knowledge.

वस्त्वज्ञातं समुद्दिश्य तत्प्रमित्सन्ति मानिनः ।  
ज्ञातत्वकार्यतश्चातः सिद्धं तत्फलतो ऽथवा ॥२८६॥

Keeping in view the unknown thing, those (persons), who have the means of knowing, seek to know it (and) (that unknown thing) gets established by its being known (by some means of knowing) or by its being the effect<sup>1</sup> (of its knowledge by some means of knowing it) but (*ca*) not so;<sup>2</sup> (it is known) by its being the result of experience. [286]

The idea is: *jñātatva* and *ajñātatva* would belong to two moments of time and the Brahman cannot be said to be related to them. Therefore, only *anubhavadgamyatva* has to be accepted.

<sup>1</sup>*jñātatvakāryatvataḥ* is cryptic for *jñātvataḥ kāryatvataḥ (ca)*.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. SP: *uktakalpadvayadūṣaṇadyotanārthaś cakārah*.

यतो ऽज्ञातत्वसंसिद्धिर्ज्ञातत्वस्यापि चाञ्जसा ।  
तत एव च मानत्वं संविदते न तत्त्रयम् ॥२८७॥

Since unknownness and also of course knownness (thus) get established smoothly, there follows from the same their being the means of knowledge; there cannot indeed be the three without the (real) knowing one. [287]

<sup>1</sup>Cf. NKL: *ajñātatvaṃ jñātatvaṃ mānatvaṃ ca*.

षष्ठगोचरवन्नेदमज्ञातत्वं समीक्ष्यते ।



न च प्रत्यक्षवत्सिद्धं स्वानुभूतिसमाश्रयात् ॥२८८॥

This character, viz. being unknown, is not considered to be like what is (within the scope of) the sixth (sense-organ)<sup>1</sup>. Nor does it get established like what is directly perceptible, since it has resorted to one's own experience. [288]

<sup>1</sup>The object of the sixth organ means a non-existent object, for there is no sixth organ and therefore its object.

प्रमात्रादिविविक्तार्थमनुभूयोत्थितस्ततः ।  
नावेदिषमिति प्राह स्वानुभूत्यनुसारतः ॥२८९॥

A person, who has awakened from (sleep) after having experienced various objects, viz. the knower and others, as discrete (objects), says in accordance with his own experience 'I did not know.'. [289]

<sup>1</sup>This verse explains how, in deep sleep, one sees various objects only to find after waking that there was in reality no experience whatever.

प्रमात्राद्युत्थितेः पूर्वं चिदन्यानन्वयात्तमो-  
विशेषणा चिदेवैका स्वानुभूत्यैव गम्यते ॥२९०॥

Before the rise (from ignorance), since there was no connection of anything else than sentience that persisted, there was the knower etc. which in reality was sentience itself, with ignorance as its attribute, (and) that (sentience) becomes known by experience alone. [290]

This explains the difference between experience of Reality and experience even in waking state.

आसीदिदं तमोभूतमप्रज्ञातमलक्षणम् ।  
अप्रतर्क्यमविज्ञेयमित्येतत्स्वानुभूतितः ॥२९१॥  
प्रथते यः स्वयं साक्षादज्ञातत्वादिभूमिषु ।  
स प्रमेयः स्वयंज्योतिः प्राक्प्रसिद्धेः प्रमातृतः ॥२९२॥

This (world) was (only) darkness, unknown, not having any characteristics (which would help any inference), beyond any guess, unknowable<sup>1</sup> — this (is known as true) from experience.

[291]

The one, who himself continues to be present, in (all) those states of unknownness etc., is to be known; the self-illuminated, (as existent even) before there was awareness of the knower etc.

[292]

<sup>1</sup>This is Manu's statement; *Manusmṛti* 1.5<sup>a-c</sup>.

एष एवानवगतः स्वतो ऽवगततत्त्वकः ।  
एतावन्मात्रसंव्याप्तेरज्ञानादेः पुरा मितेः ॥२९३॥

Before right knowledge (occurs), this one whose real nature is understood from itself is itself unknown on account of ignorance etc. whose extent is only this much.

[293]

यथेह घटविज्ञाने घटाकारो ऽनुभयते ।  
ज्ञातृतत्साक्षिणौ चैवं नाज्ञाने साक्षिणो ऽपरम् ॥२९४॥

As here<sup>1</sup> the shape of a pitcher is experienced (i.e. becomes known) when there is a specified knowledge<sup>2</sup> about the pitcher, so there are not in ignorance a knower and the experience of it (existing) apart from the experiencer himself.

[294]

<sup>1</sup>That is, in our worldly dealings.

<sup>2</sup>Namely, information known.

अज्ञातत्वं न मानेभ्यो ज्ञातत्वं तत्कृतं यतः ।  
तैरप्यज्ञातता चेत्स्यात्कातिशीतिर्मितेर् भवेत् ॥२९५॥

Because the nature of being unknown (in the case of the Ātman) does not (originate from) the means of knowing and the nature of being known is caused (i.e. effected) by the same, therefore, what could be the excellence of the right knowledge if with those means of knowledge also the Ātman continues to have unknownness?

[295]

स्वानुभूत्यैव संसिद्धेर्नाज्ञातः खरशृङ्गवत् ।  
संवित्तरूप्यसंबोधात्स्यात्तन्मानव्यपेक्षिता ॥२९६॥

Therefore, the Ātman gets established on account of its own experience; it is not unknown like the horn of a mule; in the case of knowledge also, there is absence of it before (its rise) and there will be its dependence on the means of its knowing. [296]

This stresses the need of hearing etc. the Śruti-sentences like *tat tvam asi* (NKL).

प्रत्यक्षकुम्भवत्साक्षात्सुषुप्ते ऽनन्यबोधगम् ।  
आत्मा ह्यात्मानमैकात्म्यादात्मना वेत्त्यकारकः ॥२९७॥

As (in the waking state one knows) directly an actually existent, so also does one know (the pitcher) in deep sleep which arises from none else<sup>1</sup>. But, it is the Ātman indeed who, because of its uniqueness, knows itself (even thought) it does not have any means of knowing (lit. activity). [297]

<sup>1</sup>In both the states, viz. waking and sleep (signifying dream), one sees the object through the so-called means of seeing.

पराक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या धीस्थो ज्ञो ज्ञानमात्मनि ।  
व्योमकाष्ण्यादिवत्तज्जं सम्भावयति न स्वतः ॥२९८॥

The knower<sup>1</sup>, who has resorted to intelligence acquires (lit. sees) in himself some knowledge by an eye, which is directed outwards, as (they see) darkness of the sky etc.<sup>2</sup> and its products; but indeed not (what comes from) itself.<sup>3</sup> [298]

The idea of the verse is to explain our everyday experiences of objects. These proceed when sentience has on it the superimposition of an individual, his sense-organs etc. — this superimposition is *anādisiddha* for that individual.

<sup>1</sup>This refers to sentience (within an individual).

<sup>2</sup>Cf. the Śruti passage *devātmaśaktim svaguṇair nigūdhām ...* (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 1.3).

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Śaṅkara's *Adhyāśabhāṣya* (p.39): *apratyakṣe 'py hy ākāśe bālās talamalinatādy adhyasyanti.*

नैवाज्ञानं मृषाज्ञानं संशयज्ञानमीक्ष्यते ।  
प्रत्यक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ॥२९९॥

Not indeed is ignorance, false knowledge, or doubtful knowledge obtained by the eye which has turned within<sup>1</sup> in (all) the (three) states of waking, dream and deep sleep. [299]

This answers away a doubt if the Self also could be ignorant like the Self with superimposition of a body etc. on it.

<sup>1</sup>Or, the seer within, viz. the Self.

न सुषुप्तगविज्ञानं नाज्ञासिषमिति स्मृतिः ।  
कालाद्यव्यवधानत्वान्न ह्यात्मस्थमतीतभाक् ॥३००॥

[Verses 300-319 discuss that the knowledge arising after deep sleep in the form 'I did not know the real things for all this time' is not dream.]

The specified knowledge<sup>1</sup> obtained in a dream, (which is later) memory<sup>2</sup> in the form 'I did not know'; for it has no delimitation by time etc. (and therefore) does not belong to the Ātman. [300]

<sup>1</sup>*vijñāna* which has the usual complex of a knower etc. (*mātrāḍi*).

<sup>2</sup>Memory of the basic *ajñāna*, since every experience of the state(s) of waking (etc.) gets sublated — basic *ajñāna* however gets sublated only after one has obtained the knowledge of the Self.

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I express our special thanks to Prof. K. Macida (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies), Prof. J. Takashima (Institute for Asian and African Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies) and Mr. S. Watanabe (GPU graduate) helped me with computerization of the work. Prof. Macida offered me his own Devanāgarī printing software CATUR. Prof. Takashima provided me with various programmes for page-making. Mr. Watanabe gave me the instruction of initial setting up and its operation.