

**SUREŚVARA'S VĀRTIKA ON
BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD 4.4 [235-544]**

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Verses 235-254 are the discussion on BU 4.4.6: In verses 235-237, Sureśvara states the explanation of the Mantra tad eva ... and later verses 238-252 follow BUB.

तदेवैति पुमानस्य सक्तं यत्र मनो भवेत् ।
आत्मा सक्त इदं लिङ्गं कर्मणा सह तत्सदा ॥२३५॥

In the verse *tad eva* (it is stated that) the individual self goes to where his *manas* has clung to; the Ātman has clung to this subtle body together with its actions. [235]

This means, according to SP, that sentience thus becomes affected by desire and activity and therefore becomes transmigratory.

सूक्ष्मो देहोऽत्र लिङ्गं स्याल्लिङ्गनात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
स्वात्मचैतन्यबिम्बेन निःसङ्गः सक्त आत्मना ॥२३६॥

Here, the subtle form of the body is an indication (*liṅga*) of the individual self owing to its function of indicating (*liṅgana*); (for,) the Ātman, which is (by its nature) without any attachment, becomes attached to the reflection of its own sentience (in the subtle body). [236]

उदपात्रार्कगतिवदगतेर्गतिरात्मनः ।
ध्यायतीवेति च तथा निषिद्धैव स्वतो गतिः ॥२३७॥

This movement of the Ātman is understood (really) from non-movement in the same way as the (supposed) movement of the sun from a waterful pot. So is it that the movement of the Ātman, by itself,¹ is denied (lit. rejected) (by the Śruti) in the words *dhyāyatīva*.² [237]

¹Cp. the preceding verse. This is to stress the idea of *adhyāsa* to be the basis of the self's movement.

²Cf. BU 4.3.7.

Verses 238-253 explain the meaning of BUB sentence tad eva

....

तदेवैतीति यदि वा गन्तव्यमभिधीयते ।
कामप्रधानता चैवं प्रकृतार्थानुरोधिनी ॥२३८॥

Or perhaps by the words *tad evaiti* is mentioned the goal of the self's movement and thus there follows the self's having desire as its prominent impelling force and that is in accordance with the matter in hand. [238]

Read SP: *pūrvavyākhyānād asya sāksāt prakṛtopayogitvena yuktataratvaṃ* is understood from the second line.

कामादयो यतो धर्माः स्वान्तस्यैवेह कीर्तिताः ।
तदात्ममानिनोऽतः स्युरात्मनस्ते न तु स्वतः ॥२३९॥

Since here are mentioned the properties of *manas* of the self, viz. desire etc.; therefore, they are to be often understood also of the Ātman which has identified itself with them, and not because of its own nature (*svataḥ*).¹ [239]

¹Once again, there is a stress on *adhyāsa* of the self on a body.

लिङ्गासकितवशादात्मा सक्त इत्यभिधीयते ।

सक्तः सन्कर्मणा सार्धमेत्यात्मा कर्मणः फलम् ॥२४०॥

Individual self is said as clung (to the subtle body) under the influence of (its attachment) to the subtle body; and (saying that) the self has clung to (the subtle body) together with its action, is but the result of action (in the earlier transmigratory existence). [240]

मनोभिष्वङ्गवशाः कर्मणैति यतः सह ।
कामस्यातः प्रधानत्वं तत्प्रयुक्तात्मसंसृतेः ॥२४१॥

Since it moves (out from a body) together with its own action, having been under the influence of its identification with *manas*; that indicates the prominence (*pradhānatva*) of desire, which is (or, has resulted) from the self's transmigration caused by it. [241]

लिङ्गं मनःप्रधानत्वलिङ्गं मन इहोच्यते ।
यदि वा लिङ्ग्यते तेन मनो लिङ्गमिहात्मनः ॥२४२॥

In this context, *manas* is called *liṅga*, on account of *manas* being the prominent¹ (among the seventeen constituents of) the subtle body or because the self is indicated, i.e. is realised² by *manas*— thus *manas* is mentioned here as an indication of the self?³ [242]

¹Here Sureśvara uses the word *liṅga* in the sense of conglomeration of seventeen Sāṃkhya principles. Cf. verse 48 above, and SP on it: *saptadaśakaliṅgātmany ahamabhimānī saha*.

²BUB (p.628): *liṅgyate 'vagamyate 'vagacchati yena talliṅgam*.

³This is the word of BUB *atha vā*

निश्चयेन तदासक्तं यस्मिन्विषय आत्मना ।
विषयं कर्मणा सार्धं तमेवैतीति संगतिः ॥२४३॥

The mind goes, together with (its) action, to that object, to

which it has clung together with the self by its its resolve
(*niścaya*). [243]

इति कामप्रधानत्वसिद्धान्तस्योपसंहतिः ।

Thus¹ is the conclusion of the statement of the doctrine of
Vedānta about the prominence of desire in transmigration.
[244ab]

¹This is with reference to the word *iti* in the Mantra (BU
4.4.6) under discussion.

कर्मणोऽन्तं फलं प्राप्य भक्त्वा निरवशेषतः ॥२४४॥
कस्य कर्मण इत्युक्ते यत्किंचेहेति तद्वचः ॥२४५॥
फलभोगावसानेऽथ किमसौ प्रतिपद्यते ।
तस्माल्लोकादिमं लोकं पुनरैति स कर्मणे ॥२४६॥

(That is to say:) 'Having attained to the end, i.e. the result,
and having enjoyed it in its fullness, [244cd]
that (self) goes to this (another) *loka* 'transmigratory existence'
from that (earlier world)—(this is an answer to what is asked,
lit. said) where and what does the self go to, viz. what does
it becomes after the exhaustion (*avasāna*) of the enjoyment
of the result?' [245-246]

Verse 245 refers to action by the word *kim ca* and verse
246 explains the words *tasmād ...* in BUB, preceded by the
question implied.

अस्मै लोकाय देहाय देहयोगश्च कर्मणे ।
इत्येवमपरिश्रान्तो बंभ्रमीति पुनः पुनः ॥२४७॥

(It goes) unto this world, i.e. the body (*deha*) and the
connection with the body is (for performance of) action; thus
does (this transmigratory being) repeatedly keep on wandering
without getting tired. [247]

This explanation is offered after dividing *asmai lokāya* and *karmane* in the sentence.

The idea of this verse is amplified in the next verse.

अनिर्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वः सन्कामबन्धनबन्धनः ।
घटीयन्त्रवदश्रान्तो बभ्रमीत्यनिशं नरः ॥२४८॥

A human being ever keeps on moving without getting tired, just like a wheel for drawing water, without having known the (true) nature of the Ātman and bound by a rope in the form of desire. [248]

इतीत्युक्तपरामर्शे न्विति खेदानुकम्पयोः ।
एवमज्ञः कामवशाद्भूयो योनीः प्रपद्यते ॥२४९॥

(Now the word) *iti* in the BU passage is used for referring to (*parāmarśa*) what was stated (earlier) and (the word) *nu* is used in the sense of sorrow and pity. Thus, (remaining) ignorant, (the individual self) moves to (i.e. born in) various species under the influence of desire. [249]

What is meant by sorrow and pity is explained in the next verse.

अस्माल्लोकादमुं लोकममुष्मादिममेव च ।
अज्ञः कामाङ्कुशाकृष्टो जायते म्रियतेऽसकृत् ॥२५०॥

That (i.e. this ignorant self), dragged/impelled by the goad in the form of desire becomes born many times and (also) dies, moving from this world to that and from that to this (world). [250]

Reference to two different worlds for a transmigratory being evokes the sense of sorrow and feeling of compassion.

इति कामप्रधानस्य संसारानर्थसंगतिम् ।
उक्त्वा तदुपसंहारमितीतिवचसाकरोत् ॥२५१॥

Having thus described the association with the undesired transmigration (of the individual self), overpowered by desire (*kāmapradhāna*), the Śruti made the concluding remark pertaining to that (description of the self's association) by using the word *iti*. [251]

This explains the connection between the two words *uktvā iti* with *atra*.

एवं कामयमानोऽयं स्वप्नबुद्धान्तवन्नरः ।
संसरत्यप्रबुद्धः सन्परलोकेहलोकगः ॥२५२॥

Thus entertaining desires, this person who has met death transmigrates, remaining unknowing and thus moving from the other world to this world, as a person moves from the state of dream to the state of waking (and *vice versa*). [252]

अथ तस्यावदत्पूर्वं योषिदालिङ्गने यथा ।
सौषुप्तं स्थानमाप्तस्य रूपं कामादिवर्जितम् ॥२५३॥

Now, the Śruti has stated earlier about the form of that self which is without desire etc., when it has come to the state of deep sleep, as similar to the state at the time of a man's embracing a woman.¹ [253]

¹This refers to BU 4.3.21. The point of similarity is here 'not being aware of anything else than happiness'.

तद्वा अस्यैतदित्येवं प्राक्श्रुत्या प्रतिपादितम् ।
मोक्षो दाष्टीन्तिकस्तस्य दृष्टान्तस्येह वर्ण्यते ॥२५४॥

The Śruti has already explained earlier the nature of this state in the words *tad vā asyaitad* Now here is described

liberation, which is the matter to be exemplified by this example. [254]

The second line connects the BUB explanation *yasmāt* ... with what has been stated earlier in verses 252-253.

In verses 255-263 there is explanation of the BUB passage yasmāt
....

अथशब्दोऽत्र हेत्वर्थ उक्तस्य तदपेक्षतः ।
काम्येव हि यतोऽजस्रं संसरत्यविचक्षणः ॥२५५॥

Here the word *atha* is to express the sense of the clause on which it depends, or what is already stated: since (this self) is merely full of desire and therefore it continuously undergoes transmigration, being ignorant (lit. non-discriminator) of its true nature. [255]

From here starts the discussion in BU on the state of liberation of an individual self. This has a reference to what is said earlier about the portion of BU in the beginning with BU 4.4.

तद्भावभाविहेतुत्वादतोऽकामो विमच्यते ।
नरोऽकामयमानः स्यात्कामहेतोर्निराकृतेः ॥२५६॥

From this (bodily state), a human being, who is (now) without any desire, is released on account of his (earlier body) being the cause of what he is going to be, on account of the existence of that (i.e. earlier desire). It would be without any desire, since the cause of desires has been removed.¹ [256]

¹The state of being without any desire, at the time of liberation, is distinguished from the state of desirelessness in the deep sleep state— for, there in that state, the causes of desires have not been destroyed/removed.

स्वत एवाखिलसुखप्राप्ततत्त्वे स्व आत्मनि ।
निरस्ताशेषदुःखे च मोहात्तत्र विपर्ययः ॥२५७॥

And (yet) there is (i.e. can be) the reversal (of desirelessness) owing to the ignorance on the part of the Ātman itself, when in its own nature, it has obtained the nature of being full of all bliss and also become one that has thrown away the entire (mass of) miseries. [257]

This verse explains why the desireless Ātman proceeds to manifest itself in the worldly relation of beings and objects.

अप्राप्तं दुःखवन्मोहान्मन्वानः सुखमुत्तमम् ।
सुखं मे स्यादिति सदा नरः कामयतेऽबुधः ॥२५८॥

Considering as misery excellent happiness which has not (really) come to it, a non-knowing (man) i.e. the individual self desires, 'let there be happiness for me'. [258]

This is another expression of the same sense of *viparyaya* in the preceding verse.

तथा परिहृताशेषदुःखहेतुः स्वतोऽपि सन् ।
मा भूद्दुःखं ममेत्येवं जाड्यात्कामयतेऽनिशम् ॥२५९॥

In that way, the individual self (or, being), though by its very nature, the cause of (the state wherein) all miseries have been removed ever thinks, 'let there no misery befall me', on account of the ignorance (*jādyā*). [259]

कृत्स्नानन्दस्य चानाप्तिरवाप्तिरसुखस्य च ।
नात्मवस्त्वनुरोधेन तदबोधात्तदश्नुते ॥२६०॥

Further, non-obtainment of the entire bliss and also obtainment of all miseries does a human being experience not considering in accordance with the (real) thing, viz. the Ātman, (but) on

account of not knowing (the true nature) of it. [260]

This explains the state of a human being as a product of ignorance.

वस्तुतन्त्रा भवेद्विद्या कर्तृतन्त्रैव च क्रिया ।
अतः कामयमानत्वं कर्तृतन्त्रमबोधतः ॥२६१॥

Any specific knowledge would depend on the (real) thing, viz. the Ātman; the activity (of a human being) depends on it as the agent; therefore, the state (of an individual) of having a desire depends on its being the agent through ignorance.

[261]

कारकाण्युपमृद्नाति विद्या बीजमिवोषरम् ।
तत्कारणोपमर्दित्वाज्जन्मनैव न कारकम् ॥२६२॥

Knowledge¹ destroys various means of activity in the same way as a barren land destroys the seed (of any crop); there does not exist any means of activity, since (that knowledge) is, by its very rise (lit. birth), capable of destroying the cause of that, i.e. ignorance.

[262]

¹This refers to the knowledge of the Brahman and not *pūrvavidyā* which had been under reference earlier.

यत एवमतो विद्वान्कामहेतूपमर्दनात् ।
स्यादकामयमानोऽत्र न त्वविद्वान्कथं चन ॥२६३॥

Since this is so, therefore, a knower (of the nature of the Ātman), by destroying the cause, i.e. desires, becomes devoid of them, desires; and here (in acquiring liberation) a non-knowing person is not eligible in any way.

[263]

Verses 264-270 state that desirelessness consists in the absence of ignorance.

कृतोऽकामयमानः स्यादित्येवमभिचोदिते ।
योऽकाम इति वचनं पूर्वप्रत्युक्तिरुच्यते ॥२६४॥

If one asked 'Why is that individual self not having any desires?', there is an answer to the question in the statement *yo 'kāmah*. [264]

कामा यस्य न विद्यन्ते दृष्टानुश्रविका बहिः ।
सोऽकाम इति संभाव्यः कृत्स्नकर्मनिराकृतेः ॥२६५॥

It is to be understood that one (individual self) is without any desire when in its case there are not seen the desires (for activity in response to the statement in) the Śruti (lit. seen text) and the hearing (of the tradition or Smṛti),¹ since there is complete abandoning of all activities. [265]

¹The word *dr̥ṣṭānuśravika* reminds one of *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 2.

क्रियमाणो यथा कामः क्रत्वादीनि प्रसूयते ।
तथा संत्यज्यमानोऽपि नैष्कर्म्येणावतिष्ठते ॥२६६॥

As desire, being pursued (or accomplished) gives rise to (*prasūyate*) thought etc., so also, being abandoned, it comes to remain in the state of liberation (lit. state of being devoid of any activity).¹ [266]

¹Sureśvara uses the word *naiṣkarmya* principally in the sense of abandonment of activity, thereby indicating the state of liberation, which is the subject matter of his work *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. So also, *prasūyate* is not understood passively; cf. its paraphrase in SP as *ādhatte*.

अकामोऽपि क इत्येवं पृष्टे निष्काम उच्यते ॥२६७॥
प्रयोजकात्मकाः कामा निष्क्रान्ता यस्य बुद्धितः ।
अतिग्रहाः स निष्कामो विद्वद्भिरभिधीयते ॥२६८॥

If one were to ask 'And who is this one devoid of desires?', it is stated (in answer), *niṣkāma* 'the one who has discarded desires'. [267]

That one is described by the wise as 'one who has discarded desires', i.e. from whose intellect have gone away desires which have the nature of being the promoters (of activities), and also the sense organs.¹ [268]

¹This refers to BU 3.2.

बाह्यानामान्तराणां च कार्यकारणता मिथः ।
प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुः स्यात्तदुच्छित्तौ न सा ततः ॥२६९॥

Further, (the desires) which are (noticeable) outside the body, and which are inside the same (i.e. are imperceptible), have the relation of being causes and effects mostly; they become the cause of ignorance (about the nature) of the inner self; but that¹ does not remain there when that is the cause (*pratyagajñānahetu*). [269]

¹This refers to *kāryakāraṇatā*.

तदुच्छित्तावतः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यज्ञानमुच्यते ।
आप्तकामादिवचसा यथावस्त्ववबोधिना ॥२७०॥

Therefore, when that (*kāryakāraṇatā*) is destroyed, there arises (it is said) the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self by the statement about *āptakāma*¹ which brings about the cognition of the (real) thing as it is. [270]

¹BU 4.4.6; 4.3.21.

Verses 271-281 are the statement as to why the knower of the nature of Ātman comes to have attained all desires. Among these, verses 271-272 state first that the knower has virtually

obtained liberation.

आप्ताः सर्वे स्वतोऽप्यस्य कामा ये बाह्यसाधनाः ।
फलतोऽवाप्तकामोऽसौ परानन्दस्वभावतः ॥२७१॥

For this one (i.e. the knower), all these desires, which have external means (for their fulfilment), are themselves obtained; therefore, this one, the individual self, becomes the one, who has obtained all his desires, owing to its being of the nature of the highest delight. [271]

मानुषानन्दमारभ्य ह्युत्तरोत्तरवृद्धितः ।
सहस्रदशमांशोक्त्या परानन्दो निरूपितः ॥२७२॥

The experience of the highest delight is described (in the Śruti statement) as the highest of human delights, which go on increasing one after another, as conveyed by the statement about its being thousandfold, tenfold etc.¹ [272]

¹Refer to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.8.

Verses 273-282 point out that desirelessness leads to obtainment of liberation.

कामिकामप्रभेदस्य प्रसक्ताविदमुच्यते ।
श्रुत्यात्मकाम इत्येवमात्मैवामी न ते पृथक् ॥२७३॥

In the context of the difference between desire and those who have desires it is said that they are indeed only the Ātman (i.e. not different from it) as stated by the Śruti, by the word *ātmakāma*. [273]

आत्मैव सर्वमित्येवं बुद्ध्वावस्याप्तकामता ॥२७४॥
अबाह्याभ्यन्तरः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघनमात्रभाक् ।
इत्येवं यस्य वेदान्तवाक्योत्थं ज्ञानमात्मनि ॥२७५॥
ध्वस्ताशेषतमस्कत्वात्सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रसूतितः ।

वद तस्य कुतो हेतोः कामादेः स्यात्समुत्थितिः ॥२७६॥

The state of this one in having obtained all the desires is stated in the words *ātmaiva sarvam*.¹ [274]

So also, knowledge arises in the case of this individual self from the Vedānta sentences as *abāhyābhyantarahaḥ kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghanamātrabhāk*, [275]

and since that (individual) is one who has the entire ignorance of him destroyed and (in whom) there has been the rise of right (or, exact) knowledge,² then one would say, 'Tell me this, owing to which cause does there arise in this one desire etc.' [276]

¹CU 7.25.1.

²Add: of the nature of the Ātman.

यत्र वा अन्यदित्येवं सत्येवाज्ञान आह हि ।
ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिकं भेदं तमोऽवस्तौ न सोऽस्त्यतः ॥२७७॥

Such being the case, (the answer is:) 'The Śruti has indeed stated *yatra vā anyat*¹ Also it has stated with reference to the distinctions of the knower, the object of knowing etc. And, therefore, when ignorance is removed, that (distinction) does not remain any more (or, thereafter)'. [277]

¹BU 4.3.31.

यत्र त्वस्येत्यतः प्राह ऽवस्तात्मतमसि श्रुतिः ।
तत्केन कमितीत्यादि साक्षेपं वचनं स्वयम् ॥२७८॥

Therefore, has the Śruti itself stated in respect of the one who has destroyed darkness on the part of itself, *yatra tv asya* ...¹ and together with (or followed by) *tat kena kam*² [278]

¹BU 4.5.15.

²BU 2.4.14; 4.5.14.

ऐकात्म्यमात्रकूटस्थप्रबोधावसितेः कुतः ।
मातृमानक्रियामैयव्यवहारस्य संभवः ॥२७९॥

How could there be any existence possible of the dealings¹ in terms of knower, means of knowing, activity of knowing, and object of knowing after the final attainment of the knowledge of the immutable (self) revealing merely the singleness of the Ātman? [279]

¹The singular in the original is taken in plural sense.

अविजानन्निह विज्ञेयं कामं कामयते कथम् ।
ज्ञात्वैव विषयाँल्लोके सर्वः कामयते यतः ॥२८०॥

How indeed would the individual self have a desire when it is not knowing (any object of) desire to be known? (This is asked.) Indeed (*hi*), every person in the world desires various objects only after knowing about them. [280]

इत्येवमात्मकामत्वादाप्तकामोऽत्र यो भवेत् ॥२८१॥
आप्तकामतया तद्वन्निष्कामत्वं समश्नुते ।
निष्कामत्वेन चाकामः स आत्मज्ञो विमुच्यते ॥२८२॥

Thus, having obtained (the fulfilment of) the desires of its own (*ātmakāma*), the one, who has here become one of desires fulfilled (*āptakāma*), [281] attains the state of desirelessness (*niṣkāmatva*) through having all the desires fulfilled; therefore, being one without any desire, for all of its desires have disappeared, and thus a knower of the Ātman, it is liberated. [282]

Verses 283-290 state that the purport of the subsequent portion of the Śruti is: there is liberation of the desireless.

संसारानर्थबीजस्य प्रध्वंसादात्मबोधतः ।
तस्मादात्मनि विज्ञाते कामहेतोरसंभवात् ॥२८३॥
कामकर्माद्यसद्भावात्पूर्ण आत्मावतिष्ठते ।
न तस्येत्युत्तरोक्त्यायं यथोक्तोऽर्थः समर्थ्यते ॥२८४॥

After there has been achieved the destruction of the seed of all the undesired in the transmigratory world through knowing (about the nature) of the Ātman, there would not be any possible existence of the cause of desire, as/when the Ātman has become known through that (knowledge). [283]
There remains (only) the Ātman in/with its fullness owing to the non-existence of desire, activity etc.; this sense which is (just) stated is supported/justified by the later statement *na tasya* [284]

अपास्तानर्थहेतुत्वं यदुक्तं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
योऽकाम इत्यादिगिरा यो वेदात्मानमागमात् ॥२८५॥
जिघृक्षत्यायसं तप्तं शास्त्राचार्यात्मनिश्चयात् ।
तस्योत्क्रामन्ति न प्राणा आसते नापि तत्र ते ॥२८६॥

The individual self who is said to be the cause of the removal (lit. throwing away) of all the undesired by the words *yo 'kāmaḥ* and who has known the Ātman from the tradition (of the scriptures) [285]
and wishes to hold a heated piece of iron¹ by the decision of scriptures/preceptors, that one's life-breaths do not depart (from that one's body), nor also do they (continue to) remain in that (body). [286]

¹This refers to CU 7.1.1. This pertains to the earlier practice of the Vedic people for testing truthfulness in the speech of a person. If he spoke the truth, a hot piece of iron would not cause any burn to his hand.

स्थित्युत्क्रान्त्योर्हि यो हेतुरात्माविद्यादिलक्षणः ।
ध्वस्तत्वात्तस्य सर्वस्य प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यदर्शनात् ॥२८७॥

Indeed, that which is the cause of the existence (in a body) and departure (from it, in the case of a transmigratory being), noticed as ignorance about the Ātman; that being destroyed, in its fullness, there results the awareness (lit. sight) of the true nature of the Ātman (and there is liberation of that being).

[287]

यत एवमतः प्राणाः सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य जन्मनि ।
नोत्क्रामन्ति न तिष्ठन्ति न च नश्यन्त्यहेतुतः ॥२८८॥

Since this is so, the life-breaths of that person do not either depart from his body nor do they remain there (in it), when there has arisen (in him) proper knowledge of the Ātman—(then the life-breaths) do not get destroyed, since there is not any (real) cause (of the same). [288]

रज्जुसर्पो यथा लोकेऽज्ञातरज्जुसतत्त्वकः ।
नोत्क्रामति न चाप्यास्ते न च नश्यति रज्जुतः ॥२८९॥

This is as it is in the world: like the serpent, which is (really) a rope, with its true nature of being a rope not known, it does not either disappear (lit. go out) nor does it continue to remain, nor does it get destroyed on account of the (real) rope. [289]

स्थित्युत्क्रान्तिविनाशानां रज्जुस्तत्त्वं यतस्ततः ।
रज्जुज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ रज्ज्वा नान्योऽवशिष्यते ॥२९०॥

Since the rope is the truth (underlying) the (temporary/-assumed) sustenance, the departure and the destruction (of the imagined serpent); therefore, there remains nothing else than the rope, when there has arisen the knowledge of the rope. [290]

Verses 288-290 have amplified the thought expressed earlier

in verse 287.

Verses 291-295 explain the meaning of *samavanīyante* as *adhiṣṭhānamātratayā tiṣṭhanti*.

अविद्यातज्जनिर्मुक्तं वस्त्वत्रैवेति भण्यते ।

(By this) it is said that the (real) thing (i.e. the Ātman) which is freed from ignorance and its effect(s), remains only here (i.e. in this very body). [291ab]

समित्थैकात्म्यमात्रेण प्राणानां स्थितिरुच्यते ॥२९१॥

अवनीयन्त इत्युक्त्या नाशादिभ्योऽन्यतोगतिः ।

प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकनिष्ठत्वान्न भावाभावयोः स्थितिः ॥२९२॥

In the statement of the Śruti,¹ the preposition *sam* conveys the sustenance of *prāṇas* only as being one with the single Ātman; [291cd]

by saying *avanīyante*, there is reference to (their) movement away from destruction etc.—thereby it is pointed out that there does not exist any positive and negative entity owing to the fact those *prāṇas* have remained supported in the inner self.

[292]

SP states *prāṇānām ātmamātratayā sthitiḥ avanayanam*.

¹The Mādhyandina recension of BU says: *atraiva samavanīyante*, but not the Kāṇva recension of the same.

तादात्म्यमेव सर्वस्य कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।

उत्क्रान्त्यादेश्च कृत्स्नस्य सर्वमात्मैतिशास्त्रतः ॥२९३॥

The oneness (with that Ātman) of everything known as effect and/or cause; and, is (referred to) because of the departure etc.¹ of the entire (mass of things) and (also) (this is) on the basis of the scriptural text *sarvam ātmā*.² [293]

¹This refers to *nirgama* and *dehāntaraprāpti*.

²BU 2.4.6; 4.5.7.

इति वस्तु स्वतो बुद्धमज्ञानं चानुभूतितः ॥२९४॥
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यमात्रत्वात्तन्मोहाद्यप्यशेषतः ।
निवर्तते निवृत्तं चेत्येतदप्यनुभूतितः ॥२९५॥

Thus (the real) thing is, in its own right, what is known and there is (only) ignorance (of the worldly objects)—this is on the basis of experience (of us all). [294]

Ignorance about that (Ātman) etc.,¹ in its fullness, on account of its having its real nature to be the inner self, disappears (i.e. gets destroyed); and that it has disappeared is also (understood/known) through experience (of everyone). [295]

¹This refers to the effects of ignorance.

यत एवमतो वस्तु मुक्तमेव विमुच्यते ।
कठवल्लीषु चाप्युक्तं विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते ॥२९६॥

Since this is so, therefore the (real) thing which is already free (from everything else) is said to be freed from it; in the sections of the *Kāthopanīṣad* also it is said; *vimuktaś ca vimucyate*.¹ [296]

¹*Kāthopanīṣad* 5.5.1.

इहापि सपरीवारं श्रुतिन्यायोपपत्तिमत् ।
श्रुतिस्तदेव चाचष्टे वस्तु ब्रह्मैव सन्निति ॥२९७॥

Here, in this context also, it is reasonable to understand from the example of the Śruti that there is the release of the (real) thing (viz. the inner self) together with it accompanying (world of objects); for the Śruti has said just about that, viz. the (real) thing in the words: *brahmaiva san*¹ [297]

¹*brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti* (BU 4.4.6).

There follows in verses 298-303 the conclusion of the Upaniṣadic statement brahma vā idam

ब्रह्म वा इदमित्येवं सूत्रितं वस्तु यत्पुरा ।
स्पष्टं व्याख्याय तच्छ्रुत्या ह्युपसंहियतेऽधुना ॥२९८॥

That (real) thing, which was earlier stated in a brief statement: *brahma vā idam*,¹ has been thus explained by the Śruti clearly thus and then it is now concluded. [298]

¹This refers to BU 1.4.10-11 and 1.6.1 and in passing *brahma te bravāni ...* (BU 2.1.1).

योऽयं संसारभूमिष्ठो व्याख्यातोऽज्ञाततत्त्वकः ।
कार्यकारणरूपोऽयं मोहवृत्तानुरोधतः ॥२९९॥

This one (individual self), who is in the state of transmigration and has the nature of the Ātman not known (to it), is (so far) explained as the one having the form of effects and causes, in accordance with the procedure (or, modifications) of ignorance. [299]

यतो ब्रह्मैव सन्नेष प्रथते मोहतोऽन्यथा ।
ब्रह्मैवैतीह सन्ब्रह्म तस्मान्मोहनिराकृतौ ॥३००॥

Since, being the Brahman itself (though), it becomes known (in the transmigratory world as the individual self), owing to its ignorance, but (otherwise) it is only the Brahman, therefore it is here said to become the Brahman itself after (its) ignorance about that has been removed. [300]

This is the purport of verses 297-299.

नान्यदज्ञानतोऽस्तित्वं द्वितीयस्यात्मनो यथा ।

निवृत्तिस्तद्वदेवास्य नावगत्यात्मनोऽपरा ॥३०१॥

As there is no existence of a second (apart) from the Ātman except one from ignorance (about it), therefore, the return (of it) from worldly existence (i.e. becoming one with the Ātman) is (also) not different from (merely) knowing (about itself as being) one with the Ātman. [301]

यस्मादेतत्स्वतो बुद्धं स्वतः शुद्धमतोऽद्वयम् ।
प्रमात्रादेस्तदज्ञाननिवृत्तौ विनिवृत्तितः ॥३०२॥

Since this one (i.e. the Ātman) is, by its nature what is known (i.e. knowledge), by its own nature (only) pure, therefore it is without a second, and that (becomes known) after the ignorance about it as knower etc. has been destroyed, there is discontinuation of the individual self (apart from the Ātman). [302]

मुक्तं चातः स्वतस्तत्त्वं मुक्तमित्युपचर्यते ।
तदविद्यादिविध्वंसान्निर्वः शपथयाम्यहम् ॥३०३॥

For this reason, the true thing, though, by its own nature, free, is stated metaphorically as being released, and that on account of destruction of ignorance about it—this do I state to you on oath three times. [303]

Verses 304-307 state that the knower of the Brahman does not have to perform any activity.

योऽक्रियाकारकं साक्षादक्रियाकारकात्मकः ।
आत्मानमात्मनैवात्मा साक्षाद्वेत्ति सुषुप्तवत् ॥३०४॥
निरस्ताशेषसंभेदं दृष्टिमात्रं निरञ्जनम् ।
वितमस्कं स आत्मज्ञस्ततोऽन्ये मूढचेतसः ॥३०५॥

That person is the knower of the self, who directly experiences himself by himself¹ as one not (being related to) any activity

or its means, not of the nature of either action or its means to be like the one who is in deep sleep, i.e. merely the untainted seer with all distinct objects for him disappearing and who is thus free from ignorance; and others are of dull intellect. [304-305]

¹It means not through help of any other person.

न तस्य जीवतः कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति मृतस्य वा ।
यतः सर्वविशेषाणामविद्यैवास्ति कारणम् ॥३०६॥

There is not any difference in him when he is alive or when he is dead; since the cause of all the differences is merely ignorance. [306]

अविचारितसंसिद्धिप्रत्यङ्मोहादिलक्षण-
व्यवधानमात्राभावेन ब्रह्माप्येतीति शब्दघटे ॥३०७॥

The statement *brahmāpyeti* is made (with a view to referring to) only the absence of any hindrance characterized by ignorance about the individual self etc., which is (already) established ever without any (deliberate) consideration. [307]

Verses 308-312 affirm that liberation is not effected by any activity.

इतोऽन्यथा चेन्मोक्षः स्यादारम्भोऽनर्थकः श्रुतेः ।
मुक्तेश्च कर्महेतुत्वादनित्यत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥३०८॥

If liberation were otherwise (in nature), then the activity¹ of the Śruti would be meaningless; and liberation would then be understood as having action as its cause (and then) would be non-eternal.² [308]

¹This refers to the Śruti statement enjoining it.

²This is based on the accepted doctrine: whatever is produced

by action perishes.

एष नित्यो महिमेति श्रुतिवाक्यं विहन्यते ।
स्वाभाविकात्स्वभावाच्च नित्यो नान्योऽस्ति कश्चन ॥३०९॥

And, the statement in the Śruti *ēṣa nityo mahimā*¹ would then be contradicted and (further) the nature of the Ātman (also would be opposed); also, there is not any thing else (than that as) eternal.² [309]

¹BU 4.4.23.

²This refers to *ato 'nyad ārtam*.

आत्मस्वभावो मोक्षश्चेद्वियच्छिद्रत्ववत्सदा ।
अग्न्युष्णवच्चाशक्योऽतः कर्मोत्थ इति भाषितुम् ॥३१०॥

If liberation is (thus) ever the (very) nature of the Ātman like a hole in the sky (which is not, or cannot be, ever there), then it would be impossible to state that it (i.e. liberation) has arisen from any action like heat in fire.¹ [310]

¹One can never make a hole in the sky and also one cannot be said to produce heat in fire, since not having a hole and having heat in the case of the two respectively is merely natural. This supports the argument in the preceding verse.

ज्वलनव्यापृतेरग्नेः प्रकाशौष्ण्यादि चेतफलम् ।
नोपलब्ध्यन्तरायार्थध्वंसाभिव्यक्त्यपेक्षतः ॥३११॥

If it is held that light, heat etc. of fire were the result of the burning activity of fire, (then we should be required to say that) it is not so, because they depend only on the revelation of (that fire) on (or, after) the destruction of the obstacle for finding it. [311]

ज्वलनव्यापृतेर्वहेः प्रकाशौष्ण्यादिजन्मनः ।

न त्वग्न्यपेक्षयौष्ण्यादेरभिव्यक्तस्वभावतः ॥३१२॥

(This is so) as light, heat etc. are (held to be) produced from fire, which has burning as its activity, but (*tu*) heat etc. have the nature of being revealed (together with fire) and, therefore, (they are) not dependent on fire (i.e. its activity of burning).

[312]

Verses 313-316 state that the Ātman is, by nature, luminous and does not thus expect any revealer (of itself).

नाभिव्यञ्जकसंसाध्या घटादेरिव चात्मनः ।

अभिव्यक्तः स्वतोभास्वद्धोधमात्रैकरूपतः ॥३१३॥

Also, the revelation of the Ātman is not to be obtained like a pitcher¹ through (the help of) any manifestor, because it is of only one form, that is bright knowledge.

[313]

¹It becomes visible to the eye through the light of a lamp; it cannot reveal itself.

अग्नेरन्यस्य पुंसोऽग्निज्वलनादिनिमित्ततः ।

उष्णप्रकाशयोर्व्यक्तव्यवधानस्य संभवात् ॥३१४॥

And the hindrance is possible in the case of (the appearance of) heat and light of fire, for it (viz. the fire) is revealed through (some) incidental activity of a person enkindling it.

[314]

अप्यभिव्यक्तरूपेऽस्मिन्मोक्षे नैवास्ति कार्यता ।

प्रदीपादेरभिव्यङ्ग्यं नैव कार्यं घटादिकम् ॥३१५॥

Further, even though liberation (of an individual self) is of a sort of revelation (of the Ātman itself), it is not of the nature of an effect; it is indeed not like a pitcher etc. an effect to be manifested through (the help of) a lamp etc.

[315]

अभिव्यक्तिश्च नैवास्ति सौण्ड्याद्यात्मकवस्तुनः ।
तदन्तरायासद्भावाद्वास्तवी न तु मोहजा ॥३१६॥

And there is not at all any manifestation of the thing, fire which has the nature of being possessed of heat etc.; because there is really no existence (of any) hindrance to it (i.e. its manifestation), it is a matter of fact (in worldly sense), being not a product of ignorance. [316]

ज्वालानुग्रहतो वह्नेस्तत्प्रकाशादिदर्शनात् ।
भ्रमोऽयमग्निव्यापारादुष्णादेर्जन्मकल्पना ॥३१७॥

This notion of the production of heat etc. as resulting from the activity of fire is false cognition (or error), because light etc. of fire become seen (only) through the help (lit. favour) of the flames of fire. [317]

न चेदग्नेः प्रकाशादिस्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते ।
यत्स्यात्स्वाभाविकं यस्य तदुदाहरणं भवेत् ॥३१८॥

If one did not accept light etc. to be the natural property of fire, then there would be (adduced by us) as an example which would be a natural property of a thing. [318]

The first line of the verse opens the discussion whether a thing can have its natural property and in the second line it makes a point that there can be some natural property of a thing as it is understood in light and heat as natural property of fire. But, if for argument's sake, one did not regard them as natural properties, then Vedāntin would like to point out such natural property of fire as can be suitable example for liberation as natural to the Ātman. The next verse refers to the non-existence of such a property in a thing.

न च स्वाभाविको धर्मः कस्यचिन्नास्ति वस्तुनः ।
स्वयं तु भवतो यस्माद्वस्तुनोऽन्येन संगतिः ॥३१९॥

It is not that a thing does not have a natural property of its own, for it is only thereby that it is connected with another thing while it is in existence in reality. [319]

निगडध्वंसवन्नापि पुंसो मोक्ष इहात्मनः ।
निवृत्तिमात्रं बन्धस्य कथंचिदुपपद्यते ॥३२०॥

Moreover, here (i.e. in Vedānta), liberation of the individual self is not like the destruction of fetters of someone bound, i.e. consisting in mere removal of bondage—that cannot stand to reason in any way. [320]

एकमेवाद्वितीयं सदद्वितीयं तदबोधतः ।
न च बद्धस्ततोऽन्योऽस्ति यस्य नश्यति बन्धनम् ॥३२१॥

And that, existent (the Ātman, here, the individual self) is not (really) fettered because that one single self, which is without a second, is taken to be having some second owing to the ignorance about it(self);¹ therefore, that whose fetter is destroyed (lit. perishes) is a thing other than that (Ātman). [321]

¹CU 6.2.1.

प्रतीचो व्यतिरेकेण तथैवाव्यतिरेकतः ।
वस्त्वन्तरस्य सद्भावमभावं च प्रयत्नतः ॥३२२॥
निराकार्षं सुयुक्त्युक्त्या मोक्षोऽतोऽज्ञाननिहृतिः ।
सर्पाद्यभाववद्भज्जुमोहमात्रनिवृत्तितः ॥३२३॥

I have (already) refuted with a detailed thought (*prayatnatah*);¹ with good and plausible reasons that there does not exist any positive and negative entity apart from individual self: not also as not apart from it; this, therefore, liberation is (merely) the

removal (lit. concealment) of the absence of knowledge—it results from the mere removal of ignorance as in the case of a rope which is (actually) not accompanied by a serpent etc.² [322-323]

This verse is based on BU 1.4.7

¹SP explains this by the word *vicāraparinispīdanam*.

²Other examples of *adhyāsa* and basis for the same are implied by this word.

Verses 324-329 refer to a view on mokṣa (most probably of the Kashmirian thinker Bhāsarvajña or some of his predecessors) together with some codakas 'questioners' doubts' and verses 330-336. the refutation of the same.

ये तु व्याचक्षते मोक्षे नित्यानन्दैकगोचरा ।
ज्ञानाभिव्यक्तिरित्येवं स्वसिद्धान्तसमाश्रयात् ॥३२४॥
तैरभिव्यक्तिशब्दार्थो वक्तव्यः कीदृगिष्यते ।

(Those) who state, by resorting to their own view,¹ that in the state of liberation there is manifestation/revelation of knowledge, which has only one object (for it), viz. eternal bliss, [324]

have to explain as to what sort of meaning is understood of the word *abhivyakti* 'manifestation'.² [325ab]

It is mentioned by the MRI edition that there is here a reference to the view of Bhāsarvajña (who could have belonged to the ninth century). It is not certain whether he was a predecessor or contemporary of Sureśvara. The view under reference should better be understood as a view of some Vaiśeṣika who held a view similar to that of Bhāsarvajña, which can be summarised in his words thus: (*tat*) *siddham nityasaṃvedyamānena sukhena viśiṣṭāntikī duḥkhanivṛttiḥ puruṣasya mokṣa (iti)*; (quoted from *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña

(ed. with translation and notes in Marathi by Raddīśāstri, Pune, 1922, p.167).

¹This suggests that the view under reference does not have any authoritative basis, viz. the Śruti, or good reasoning.

²This indicates the fact that the meaning of *abhivyakti* 'manifestation' cannot be production (*utpatti*).

प्रसिद्ध एव चेदर्थो विज्ञानालम्बनाप्तिता ॥३२५॥
विज्ञानालम्बनप्राप्तिः किं सतो वाथवासतः ।
अभिव्यक्तः सतश्चेत्स्याद्यस्य मुक्तस्य तत्सुखम् ॥३२६॥
स्वरूपमेव तस्येति विशेषणमनर्थकम् ।

If the meaning of that word is just which is well-known, viz. getting to know (lit. obtaining) it by some specific means of knowing (*viññānārambha*), [325cd]

(the question arises:) 'Is that getting to know (lit. obtaining) by some specific means of knowing manifestation/revelation through (or, by) some existent or non-existent (means)?' If it is held to be through (or, by) some existent (means), then that happiness, which would come to/for the liberated being [326]

(is) the very nature of it (and, therefore) the specification (*tasya*) to/for it would be redundant (lit. meaningless).¹ [327ab]

¹Cp. *Nyāyasāra* (*ibid.*, p.162): *sukhasaṃvedanayor nityatvān muktasaṃsāriṇo 'viśeṣaprasaṅga iti cen na ..., duḥkhādeḥ saṃsārāvasthāyām sambhavāt tannāśe ca muktāvasthāyām bhavati sukhasaṃvedanayoḥ (saṃvedana = jñāna; bracket ours) sambandha ity ato nāviśeṣaḥ.*

मुक्तौ तद्व्यज्यते ज्ञानं सुखं चेति यदीरितम् ॥३२७॥
स्वात्मभूतं हि यद्यस्य नैव तद्व्यवधीयते ।
आत्मनस्तत्स्वभावत्वात्सर्वदेति विनिश्चयः ॥३२८॥
अमुक्तावथवा मुक्तौ विशेषोऽस्ति न कश्चन ।

And as to what has been stated: "There, it is in liberation that there become manifest (or, revealed) knowledge and

happiness;'¹ [327cd]
indeed (*hi*), that² which has been one's own nature cannot
be obscured, because the Ātman has always that (i.e. bliss)
as (part of) its own nature; this is the decision.³ [328]
There is not any difference whatsoever whether or not it is
the state of liberation.

¹This argument implies the non-existence of any means of
knowing manifestation, if it were accepted as known (*prasiddha*).

²This refers to the thing to which that knowledge and
happiness belong.

³That is, knowledge and happiness cannot ever be obscured
in the case of the Ātman, for it has both of them as a part
of its nature. [329ab]

प्रत्यगात्मस्वभावत्वात्सुखविज्ञानयोरतः ॥३२९॥
मुक्तौ तद्व्यज्यत इति विशेषवचनं मृषा ।
स्वसिद्धान्तविरोधोऽपि तदभिव्यक्तिवादिनः ॥३३०॥
सत्कार्यवादिनो यस्मादभिव्यक्तः प्रशस्यते ।
व्यज्यते सर्वमेवेदं सत्त्वात्सर्वस्य वस्तुनः ॥३३१॥

Therefore, happiness and knowledge being the nature of the
inner self, [329cd]

the statement of the specification that 'it becomes manifested
(or, revealed) in liberation', is false.¹ Further, there would
occur self-contradiction in the doctrine of the one who
postulates the manifestation of the same; since it is proposed
(lit. praised) by one, i.e. the holder of the view that the effect
is (but what has been) already existent, and from that there
is manifestation/revelation,¹ [330-331ab]

(that is to say:) all this world is (but) manifested/revealed
from the (real) thing, because of its (continuous) existence
(for ever). [331cd]

This refers to the manifestation of happiness and knowledge
(*sukha-vijñāna*).

This refers to the acceptance of *satkāryavāda* by the thinker under reference, and, if he were to be taken to hold *asatkāryavāda* (or *ārambhavāda*), there is here an argument against that opinion which is stated in the following verse.

¹The refutation of the view under reference begins actually here.

आरम्भवादे त्विच्छादेः कार्यत्वादसदात्मता ।
असत्श्चाप्यभिव्यक्तिर्न युक्ता खरशृङ्गवत् ॥३३२॥

It was earlier argued that there cannot be any modification/revealing of an already existing knowledge and happiness.¹ Now, it is argued that there could not be any modification/revealing of them as non-existing! This is like the horn of a *khara*! [332]

¹This implies the existence of desire to create something and/but desire is said to be an effect of something else.

व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकसंबन्धः प्रदीपघटयोरिव ।
उभयोः सिद्धयोर्योगान्नेष्टा कारणकार्यता ॥३३३॥

Because this relation of the manifestor and the manifested is taken to be of two already existent but different things, as of a lamp and a pitcher, therefore, it is not desirable to accept the relation of cause and effect between liberation and some cause of it. [333]

This implies a twofold question: whether or not there is real manifestation of happiness and knowledge. In the next two verses, the two aspects of them are discussed severally.

सुखविज्ञानयोश्चापि किमभेदोऽथवा भिदा ।
नैक्येऽभिव्यक्तिशब्दार्थः कदाचिदपि लभ्यते ॥३३४॥

Further, one has to ascertain if there is non-difference or

difference between happiness and knowledge; if there is non-difference, there cannot ever be obtained any meaning (i.e. meaningfulness) of the word 'manifestation'. [334]

अथ भेदस्तयोरिष्टो व्यवधानं प्रसज्यते ।
तद्भेदाभेदतासिद्धौ न च मानमिहास्ति वः ॥३३५॥

If (on the contrary) it is accepted that there is difference between the two, then there would contingently follow (the existence of) what separates (or differentiates) the two. Thus, there is not, for you¹ any authoritative means of ascertaining if the two are different or non-different, in proving/holding them, here.² [335]

¹Sureśvara refers to the holder of the other view as present before him, as it were, and therefore directly addresses him.

²That is, in relation to this, either the Ātman or liberation.

भेदग्राहि न नो मानमितोऽन्यत्रापि विद्यते ।
मेयमात्रावसायित्वात्सर्वमानस्य सर्वदा ॥३३६॥

There does not exist for (all of) us, be it in this (context) or elsewhere, any means of knowing which grasps the difference (between happiness and knowledge), because all the authoritative means of knowing are ever to result into (knowing) merely the objects of their knowing.¹ [336]

¹A valid means by its nature secures the exact nature of the thing to be known, but since there is not here either difference or non-difference between happiness and knowledge as certain, that cannot be accepted by a valid means of knowledge.

In verses 337-348 there is a discussion on the nature of a valid means of knowing, as giving rise to distinct properties of the things to be known.

स्वमेयव्यतिरेकेण मेयान्तरसमाश्रयः ।

न व्यावृत्त्यनुवृत्त्यादिव्यापारोऽस्ति मितेः क्वचित् ॥३३७॥

There is not anywhere in any situation of knowing (*miti*) the function of distinguishing one object from another or showing one as similar (to another) which is related to an object of knowing and another which is apart from the object of its knowing. [337]

अभिव्यक्तिः सुखस्यास्तु कामं ज्ञानेन संगतेः ।

ज्ञानव्यक्तौ तु किं मानं यतोऽभिव्यक्तिवागियम् ॥३३८॥

Granted that there is manifestation of happiness owing to its (close *-sam*) association with knowledge; but (the question) would be as to what can be the means for manifesting that knowledge, since there is the Śruti statement about the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of happiness. [338]

प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं न स्वरूपप्रमेयता ।

न च मानान्तरादिष्टं तयोस्तुल्यस्वभावतः ॥३३९॥

Valid means of knowing have the nature of being valid only by referring to the objects of their knowing, in their own forms, and it is not accepted that some other means of similar nature can reveal the difference between their objects of knowing. [339]

अभिव्यक्तिर्मताथापि कादाचित्की न सर्वदा ।

तदन्तरायसद्भावादव्यक्तिः स्यात्सदा ध्रुवम् ॥३४०॥

If again manifestation (of happiness and knowledge) is held to be occasional (at some time) and not on all times, then there would always be for certain the non-manifestation (of the object of knowing) on account of the existence of some obstruction to it. [340]

अन्तरायनिवृत्तौ च व्यपेक्षा वः प्रसज्यते ।
साधनान्तरविषया तज्ज्ञानव्यतिरेकतः ॥३४१॥

And, further, with reference to the removal of that obstruction, there would be necessary for you to expect yet another means as apart from the knowledge of the same. [341]

उपलब्धयेकनीडत्वे व्यवधानस्य कल्पना ।
न चोपपद्यते मानात्तयोरेकात्मकत्वतः ॥३४२॥

Moreover, this notion of the existence of some obstruction does not stand to reason, if there is accepted oneness of cognizing the two (i.e. happiness and knowledge) together, because each of them has the nature of being a means of knowing but one object. [342]

एवं च सत्यभिव्यक्तिः सर्वदा सुखबोधयोः ।
अभिव्यक्तिर्न चेदेवं नाभिव्यक्तिः सदा तदा ॥३४३॥

This being so, there would ever be manifestation of happiness and knowledge (together); if manifestation were not like this (i.e. not occurring simultaneously with knowledge) then there is never any manifestation. [343]

इतोऽन्यथा कल्पनायां न प्रमाणं समीक्ष्यते ॥३४४॥
नाप्येकाश्रयिणां लोके धर्माणां क्वचिदीक्ष्यते ।
मानमेयत्वसंबन्धो मिथोयोग्यत्वतस्तथा ॥३४५॥

For holding a notion other than this, there is not seen any other valid means of knowing (the same), [344]
for there is not seen anywhere, in this world, in the case of properties which have but one support/basis as that between a means of knowing and its object so as to be suitable to one another. [345]

सुखादिव्यक्तितः पूर्वं यस्य संसारिता मता ।
सोऽन्य एव सदाव्यक्तनित्यज्ञानसुखात्मनः ।
शीतोष्णयोरिव तयोर्वैलक्षण्यात्परस्परम् ॥३४६॥

The one, in respect of whom it is held (by you, my opponents) the nature of a transmigratory being before there appeared (in that one) happiness etc.¹ It is certainly quite different (from the Ātman), which is of the nature of eternal knowledge and happiness and is ever unmanifest; (this is so) on account of their mutual difference in characteristics as in the case of what is cool and what is hot. [346]

¹This refers to knowledge.

परात्मभेदकलृप्तौ च संत्यागो वः प्रसज्यते ।
यतो वैदिकपक्षस्य नातः कल्प्यात्मनो भिदा ॥३४७॥

And there occurs a contingency (in your opinion) of abandoning (Vedic authority), when (you accept) distinction between the highest Ātman and individual self, since any such differentiation/difference cannot ever be considered in the doctrine of one who follows the Vedic¹ text. [347]

¹This refers to Vedāntic texts. Refer to *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.11: *eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu ...*; CU 6.2.1: *ekam evādvitīyam*

....

आत्मधीमानमात्रत्वात्प्रत्यगात्मैकवस्तुनः ।
प्रमाणासंभवश्च स्यादात्मभेदप्रकल्पने ॥३४८॥

In respect of the acceptance of the two (as different) the Ātman¹ and the individual self (which you postulate), there is impossibility of any valid means of (so) knowing only one reality, i.e. the self as dependent only on the knowledge of the Ātman as the means of knowing it. [348]

¹This refers to the highest Ātman and the individual self.

Verses 349-358 state that, in the view of the Vedānta, there is no differentiation in the case of the Ātman, because that is (so-called) bondage and (the state of) liberation.

नन्विदानीं यथा तद्वन्मुक्तौ चेदविशेषता ।
नातियत्नो भवेन्नृणां शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यमेव च ॥३४९॥

(An objection is raised:) ‘Indeed, as (argued by you) there does not exist any non-difference (in the Ātman) in the state of liberation in the way (you have stated), but then there would not be on the part of men a great effort¹ (to get to know the nature of the Ātman) and there will only be meaninglessness/futility of the scripture’.² [349]

¹Sureśvara uses this word in the sense of effort to acquire the *śamadamādisādhanasampat*. (SP explained *śāstrīyaśamādir atiyatnaḥ*.)

²This refers to *mokṣasāstra*.

नात्माविद्याहानमात्रकारित्वादागमात्मनः ।
तदर्थं यत्नसाफल्यं शास्त्रारम्भोऽपि चार्थवान् ॥३५०॥

(The answer is given:) ‘This is not so, because usefulness of the scripture is in that it is for liberation, for bringing about the destruction of ignorance about the Ātman, and thus the activity of (*mokṣa*)*śāstra* is meaningful’.¹ [350]

¹SP supports the argument of this verse by citing Bharṭṛ-prapañca: *yathāhuh— avidyākālpitābhedanivṛttiparatvāc chāstrasya (iti)*.

मुक्तामुक्तत्वरूपोऽयं न विशेषोऽस्ति वस्तुनि ।
तदविद्यैव निःशेषविशेषाणां प्रसूतिकृत् ॥३५१॥

There does not exist in the (real) thing this difference of what is liberated and what is non-liberated; therefore, only ignorance is the cause (lit. origination) of the entire differences (in respect of products etc.). [351]

अशेषानर्थहेतुं तामविद्यां शास्त्रजा मतिः ।
यतो निहन्ति तेन स्यात्साफल्यं यत्नशास्त्रयोः ॥३५२॥

Since knowledge which results from the study of (*mokṣa*)śāstra destroys fully that ignorance which is the cause of all of the undesired effects; therefore, there would be meaningfulness/usefulness of *yatna* and *mokṣaśāstra*. [352]

अथाविद्यावतोऽविद्याहान्यहानिकृतो भवेत् ।
विशेष आत्मनः कश्चिदिति चेन्नैवमिष्यते ॥३५३॥
अविद्यामात्रहेतुत्थगोचरत्वसमाश्रयात् ।
रज्जुखण्डाद्यविद्योत्थसर्पादिविनिवृत्तिवत् ॥३५४॥

(An objection:) ‘Now, if one were to say: there does occur some difference in respect of the Ātman which is effected by ignorance that is caused by the destruction and non-destruction of ignorance’; then (the answer is given:) ‘No, it is not so accepted, [353]

because this is based on objects which have originated only from ignorance—this would be like the removal (of the knowledge) of a serpent etc. which has arisen from the ignorance about a piece of a rope. etc.’¹ [354]

¹We have followed the reading AnSS edition *rajjukhaṇḍādya* ... and ignored the variant reading *rajjūṣarādya* Yet it appears that the variant might have been intended here in view of the use of *ādi* in the verse *-sarpādi*. However, looking to Sureśvara’s casual (or indifferent) use of *ādi* in a number of verses, we have ignored that better looking variant. NKL (ms.) does not show any indication of the v.l.

आत्मनो मोहकर्तृत्वमकर्तृत्वं यदीष्यते ।
विशेष इति नैवं स्याद्ध्यायतीवेति वारणात् ॥३५५॥

(An objection is raised:) 'If it is held that the individual self is the agent of creating ignorance and the absence of it (i.e. both) and the difference in it'; (the answer is:) 'It is not so, because there is warding away of it (in the Śruti) statement *dhyāyatīva*'.¹ [355]

¹BU 4.3.7.

अजो न जायते नेति ध्यायतीवेति चागमैः ।
निषेधः क्रियतेऽशेषविकारादेरिहात्मनः ॥३५६॥

Further, there is the rejection of every modification here¹ in respect of the Ātman (as) by the traditional texts of the non-born (Ātman) in *na jāyate*,² *neti*³ and *dhyāyatīva*.⁴ [356]

¹This means: in respect of *mokṣasāstra*.

²*Kāthopaniṣad* 2.1.18.

³BU 4.4.22 etc.

⁴BU 4.3.2.

विषयत्वोपपत्तेश्च प्रत्यङ्मोहतदुत्थयोः ।
नाविद्यावान्भवेदात्मा नापि तत्कार्यवांस्ततः ॥३५७॥

Moreover, because ignorance about the inner self and what arises from it are known by reason to be the object(s) (of some knowing), the Ātman would not be affected by ignorance, nor can it be possessed of the effect(s) of the same. [357]

While translating this verse, we have ignored the note of AnSS editor regarding variant reading *-kāryavānatah*. NKL (ms.) does not give any indication of that v.l.

ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यभावाभावप्रसिद्धता ।

यथात्मसाक्षिका तद्वन्न वेद्मीत्यात्मसाक्षिकम् ॥३५८॥

As it is known that the distinction of what grasps, the act of grasping and the object of grasping, these objects, positive and/or negative entities, is witnessed/known by the Ātman; so also the cognition 'I do not know' has the Ātman as its witness/knower. [358]

Verses 359-381 state that ignorance does not have a support in the Ātman.

अज्ञातत्वान्यथाज्ञातसिद्धेरात्मैकसाक्षितः ।
अज्ञानमन्यथाज्ञानमतो नास्त्यात्मसाक्षिणः ॥३५९॥

Since being unknown or being known otherwise becomes established only on account of the witness, the Ātman; therefore, ignorance or wrong knowledge (lit. knowledge other than what the thing is) cannot exist there wherein there is the Ātman as the witness. [359]

न हि यो यत्र साक्षीह स तत्राज्ञ इतीर्यते ।
असामान्येन तत्सिद्धेः साक्षिसाक्ष्यपदार्थयोः ॥३६०॥

Here (in the worldly dealings) the one, who is the witness in respect of something is not called ignorant in respect of that (thing); because the meanings of the two words *sākṣin* and *sākṣya* become established as not belonging to one thing in common. [360]

तस्मिन्साक्षी च मूढश्चेत्यतीवैतद्विरुध्यते ।
मिथो वाक्यमतो नैदृग्वक्तव्यं मानिना ततः ॥३६१॥
न जाने मुग्ध एवाहं भवदुक्तं मनागपि ।
इति चेद्वीक्षसे तर्हि मूढमज्ञं च कुम्भवत् ॥३६२॥

(Therefore) a witness in respect of that thing is also the one deluded in respect of that same thing—this statement is

altogether (*atīva*) self-contradictory; such a sentence as this should not be uttered (by you), holding (as valid) some means of knowing, [361]

as in your statement, 'I do not know and I am deluded'; if you see thus, then (you see) yourself as both deluded and ignorant just as there would be an (ignorant) pitcher. [362]

त्वं त्वज्ञो मूढ एवेति भव कामं यथेच्छसि ।
मूढाज्ञयोस्तु यः साक्षी नासौ मुग्धोऽज्ञ एव वा ॥३६३॥

Well, be you a deluded one or an ignorant person, as you have wished; but the one, who witnesses both the deluded and the ignorant one, is indeed neither deluded nor ignorant. [363]

This explains BUB *bhavatvajñō* ... (BUB p.637)

लोकेऽपि यस्य यः साक्षी सम्यग्दर्श्येव तस्य सः ।
यथा लोके तथेहापि साक्षी सम्यक्प्रपश्यति ॥३६४॥

In the world also, one who witnesses something is a person who well sees that thing; as this is so in the world, so also is it here:¹ the witness well sees (the object of its seeing). [364]

¹This refers to *mokṣasāstra*.

महाभूतादिधृत्यन्तं क्षेत्रमेवेति चाब्रवीत् ।
साक्षात्स्वयंभूर्वेदात्मा संसारानर्थशान्तये ॥३६५॥

Further, the self-born, the Ātman of the Veda himself has said for the removal of the undesired (elements) in transmigratory existence: from the statement *mahābhūta* up to *dhṛti* being the field.¹ [365]

¹This refers to *Gītā* 13.5-6. Read SP on this verse with profit.

यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।
क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं प्रकाशयति भारत ॥३६६॥

(So also there is a verse in agreement with this verse:) “As this sun alone illumines this entire world, so does the possessor of the entire field illumine the entire field, O son of Bharata”.

[366]

This is *Gītā* 13.33 and referred to in 4.3.87ab, 291cd, 345ab, 1773cd.

ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिः स्वयंज्योतिःश्रुतेस्तथा ।
न तत्र सूर्यो भातीति नान्योऽतोऽस्तीति च श्रुतेः ॥३६७॥

So also it is known that the self-illuminating Ātman is not different from this one (i.e. the individual self) from (what is said in) the Śruti in *jyotiṣām api taj jyotiḥ*.¹ [367]

¹Cp. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.10 and BU 4.3.9: *svayaṃ jyotiḥ*; BU 4.4.16: *na tatra sūryo bhāti*; (BU 3.8.23) *nānyo 'to 'sti*.

यत एवमतो नास्ति विशेषोऽत्र मनागपि ।
बन्धमोक्षारूपोऽयमात्मनीति विनिश्चयः ॥३६८॥

Since this is so, therefore, there is not here in respect of the Ātman even a little difference which has the nature of bondage and liberation etc.¹—this is the decision. [368]

¹Perhaps *sukhaduḥkha*, *punya-pāpa* are meant.

ये त्वतः कल्पयन्तीममन्यथैव महाधियः ।
अर्थवादं च बन्धादिशास्त्रं व्याचक्षते तथा ॥३६९॥

But those people of great intellect, who think of this Ātman to be otherwise, explain the scriptural text as referring to

bondage etc. and as an Arthavāda¹ in that way. [369]

This refers to the other view as not based on the Śruti proper. Cf. also SP which refers to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7.

¹It is an explanatory statement praising the purport of a precept or an injunction.

इत्युक्तावसकृत्पूर्वं परिहारोऽपि वर्णितः ॥३७०॥
एवं परिहृतेऽप्याहुर्यथेच्छं दूषणं परे ।
विद्वद्भिस्त उपेक्ष्याः स्युर्बालौन्मत्तसमा जनाः ॥३७१॥

In respect of this statement (of theirs) there has been many times earlier presented a refutation. [370]

Yet, in respect of their refuted thought, the others have, at their (sweet will), mentioned that there is the fault (in our view); but those are to be ignored by the wise; they are indeed like children or mad men. [371]

The second line of verse 371 is based on *ta utsahante khe 'pi* (BUB p.637).

Verses 372-544 are the exposition of BU 4.4.7.

ब्रह्माप्येतीत्यतो वाक्यमुपचारसमाश्रयात् ।
तदविद्योत्थदेहादिसंतत्युच्छेदहेतुतः ॥३७२॥

Therefore, (the Śruti) statement *brahmāpyeti* is to be understood by resorting to a metaphor, because there is a reason in the destruction of the continuity of the body etc. which arises from ignorance about that (the Brahman). [372]

अविद्याध्वस्तिमापेक्ष्य सम्यग्धीजन्ममात्रतः ।
आत्मा ब्रह्मैव सन्साक्षाद्ब्रह्माप्येतीति भण्यते ॥३७३॥

What is said here is: The Ātman, itself being the Brahman, is said to be going/entering into it, on account of the mere

rise of proper understanding (about the nature of it),
consequent to the destruction of ignorance. [373]

Hereafter follows the exposition of BU 4.4.7.

इत्येतत्सर्ववेदान्तसर्वस्वं ब्राह्मणोदितम् ।
अर्थस्य ब्राह्मणोक्तस्य द्रढिम्नेऽतः परा श्रुतिः ॥३७४॥

This is then, the whole of all the Vedānta texts, which is expressed in this Brāhmaṇa. Therefore, the subsequent Śruti statement is for confirming the thought that is conveyed by the Brāhmaṇa. [374]

This is to state the purport in general of the Śruti sentence *tad ...* (BU 4.4.7).

यथा काममये तद्वन्मन्त्रं श्लोकमुदाहरत् ।
ब्रह्मास्मीति परिज्ञानात्प्रत्यगज्ञानहानतः ॥३७५॥
यदा सर्वेऽखिलाः कामाः काम्यैश्च विषयैः सह ।
प्रमुच्यन्ते विनश्यन्ति तेषामज्ञानहेतुतः ।
कार्याणां कारणे वृत्तिर्नान्यत्र जगतीक्ष्यते ॥३७६॥

As (in the case of the Ātman), consisting in desire, here also the Śruti has cited a Mantra, in a similar way, *brahmāsmi*, because there is the removal of ignorance about the individual self by knowing that thoroughly. [375]

When all of the desires, together with their objects, are abandoned, they perish, because they have ignorance (about the individual self) as their cause; it is noticed in this world that the effects exist (*vṛtti*) in their cause, not elsewhere. [376]

यदा कामाः प्रमुच्यन्त इत्युक्त्यैव कृतार्थता ।
विशेषणं सर्वं इति किमर्थमभिधीयते ॥३७७॥

(An objection is raised:) ‘When the purpose is served by the very statement, “when the desires are abandoned,” then why

is stated in addition the attributive (*viśeṣaṇa*) word *sarva* 'all'?

[377]

जाग्रत्स्वप्नक्षये कामाः प्रमुच्यन्तेऽखिला नृणाम् ।
संस्कारमात्रशेषास्ते सुषुप्ते यान्ति संक्षयम् ।
यतस्तदवरोधार्थं तस्मात्सर्वविशेषणम् ॥३७८॥
कामहेतौ हि विध्वस्ते न कश्चिदवशिष्यते ।
संस्कारो वाथवाप्यन्यः सर्वस्याज्ञानमूलतः ॥३७९॥

(The answer is given:) 'Since, at the end of the states of waking and dream, all of the desires of human beings get abandoned; remaining in the form of impressions they get gradually exhausted in the state of deep sleep; therefore, the attributive word *sarva*, is used for precluding (lit. stopping) even that.

[378]

Indeed, when the cause of the desires is destroyed (or removed), there does not remain either an impression or even the other, i.e. desire (itself), as all (of it)¹ has its root in ignorance'.

[379]

In the state of liberation, there do not exist even impressions of worldly desires.

¹This refers to desire.

हृदि श्रिता इति वचः कामधर्म्यब्रवीन्मनः ।
कामः संकल्प इत्येवं तथा च प्राक्श्रुतीरणम् ॥३८०॥

The statement in the Śruti *hṛdi śritāḥ* expresses the sense of *manas* which has desire as its property/characteristic; so also, there is already the statement in the Śruti: *kāmaḥ saṅkalpaḥ*¹

[380]

¹BU 1.5.3

इदं च हेतुवचनं प्रतिज्ञातस्य वस्तुनः ।
हृदि श्रिता यतः कामाः प्रमुच्यन्तेऽखिलास्ततः ॥३८१॥

And the statement of the cause of the thing, which is enunciated as *hṛdi śritāḥ* (is made) because all the desires are then¹ abandoned. [381]

In this context, read SP: *kāmāḥ pramucyanta itipratijñāta-vastuno hṛdi śritā iti hetuvākyam ity anum eva vibhāgam prakathayati.*

¹It means attaining the state of liberation.

Verses 382-389 point out that tattvajñāna leads to the removal of ignorance which, in its turn, destroys desires etc.

अविद्याया यतः कार्यमध्यात्मादिविशेषणम् ।
त्रयं वा इदमित्युक्तं वाङ्मनःप्राणभेदवत् ॥३८२॥

It is mentioned as *trayam vā idam*, since the effect of ignorance which is about the distinct notions of *vāc*, *manas* and *prāṇa*,¹ and which are attributive in relation to what is related to the body etc.² [382]

¹Cf. BU 1.5.

²Actually BU 1.6.1 mentions *nāma*, *rūpa*, *karma* as the three.

अतोऽविद्यासमुच्छ्रितौ तद्धेतूनामशेषतः ।
कामानामपि नाशः स्याद्ग्रहातिग्रहरूपिणाम् ॥३८३॥

Therefore, when there is destruction of ignorance, there is the destruction of all of the desires which are having that (ignorance) as their cause, and which have the forms of *graha*¹ and *atigraha*.² [383]

¹This refers to the organs (lit. that which perceives).

²This refers to the objects of sense organs and invites *ādhibhautika*, *ādhidāivika* also; cf. SP: *trividham vāgādikam jagadāvidyam iti.*

निःशेषजनिमद्धेतुः काम एवावधारितः ।
 श्रिता अतिग्रहाः कामा इन्द्रियाणां प्रवर्तकाः ।
 हृदि श्रिता इति वचस्तेषामवरुरुत्सया ॥३८४॥

It is specifically pointed out (*avadhārita*) that desire is the cause of all of those that are born (and) desires, viz. *atigrahas*, which have resorted to *grahas* are the inciters/impellers of (various) bodily organs; and the reference to them is made in the words *hṛdi śritāḥ* with a desire to emphasise them.

[384]

Refer to BU 1.5.2: *dhiyā dhiyā janayate karmabhiḥ*.

वेदव्यासोऽपि च मुनिर्जगादेमं यथोदितम् ।
 श्रुत्यर्थमररीकृत्य लोकानुग्रहकाम्यया ॥३८५॥
 विषया विनिवर्तन्ते निराहारस्य देहिनः ।
 रसवर्जं रसोऽप्यस्य परं दृष्ट्वा निवर्तते ॥३८६॥
 एवं बुद्धेः परं बुद्ध्वा संस्तभ्यात्मानमात्मना ।
 जहि शत्रुं महाबाहो कामरूपं दुरासदम् ॥३८७॥

The sage Vedavyāsa also has spoken of this, as stated (here), as the meaning of the Śruti, after having accepted it with desire to do a favour to the people in general: [385]

“In the case of a person, who has abstained from food, the objects (of desire) keep themselves (from him and yet) without hankering for them; but/and (that viz. the hankering) keeps itself away from him, after he has seen the highest Ātman.”

[386]

“Thus having known the one beyond the intellect and having steadied yourself¹ with the help of the Ātman, kill, O (warrior) of large arms, (your enemy), viz. the one who has the form of desire which is difficult to contain.” [387]

Verse 386 is *Gītā* 2.59 and verse 387, *Gītā* 3.43.

¹This is addressed directly to Arjuna.

हेत्वर्थे चाथशब्दोऽयं हेत्वर्थप्रकृतत्वतः ।
यस्मादज्ञानतो मर्त्योऽतोऽमृतोऽज्ञानहानतः ॥३८८॥

Further, this word *atha* is to convey reason, because it has been used in the sense the meaning of a reason of the matter in hand; (this is so), since (a human being) is mortal owing to his ignorance and he becomes immortal by abandoning (or the destruction of) ignorance. [388]

This verse explains the meaning of the second line in the Mantra quoted in the Śruti; cf. verse 384.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानं यदत्रेत्यभिधीयते ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तावत्रैव ब्रह्म सोऽश्नुते ॥३८९॥

In the words *yad atra*, there is reference made to the specific knowledge of the true nature of the inner self; and when that proper knowledge has arisen, that individual being attains the Brahman in this very (inner self). [389]

The verse explains the meaning of the word *atra*.

Verses 390-412 speak regarding the knowledge about the nature of the Ātman, in its own right, which is the means to the end of bondage in the case of the individual self. However verses 391-412 present the view of Bhartṛprapañca on the Mantra cited in the Śruti.

ब्रह्मज्ञानोदये यस्माज्जन्मबन्धो व्यपेयते ।
मृतिरात्ममतिस्तस्य हेतुहेतूपमर्दनात् ॥३९०॥

Since, at the rise of the knowledge of Brahman, the bondage of a being born (in the case of an individual) ceases to continue

(lit. goes away); therefore, the death of that individual consists in its having the knowledge of the Ātman: that is, by the destruction of the cause of the cause.¹ [390]

¹This refers to the cause, i.e. ignorance of the desire which in its turn is the cause of the cycle of birth(s).

यथोक्तादन्यथैवेमं व्याख्यानाद्यत्नतो बुधाः ।
श्लोकं व्याचक्षतेऽयुक्त्या हुतभुग्वरसंश्रयात् ॥३९१॥

The wise ones, (however,) explain this Mantra in an unreasonable way (*ayuktyā*) which is other than what is stated as an explanation (of it) before; this, (he does) by taking recourse to the boon of fire. [391]

Sureśvara scoffs at Bhartṛprapañca by referring to him in this verse in the plural, with the sense of mockery, and refers to the alleged boon of fire received by him.

यथैव पूर्वं संसारः काममूलोऽनुवर्णितः ।
श्लोकेन तद्वन्मोक्षोऽपि निष्कामस्योपवर्ण्यते ॥३९२॥

As, in the earlier portion, it is described that the transmigratory existence is rooted in desire, so also, in this Mantra, it is stated that there is liberation (for a transmigratory being) who is without desire. [392]

SP cites *uktam ca— yathā pūrvasmin kāmair bandha iti ślokenodbhāvitam evam evehāpi niṣkāmo 'pi mucyata iti ślokenodvibhāvayaṣatīti*.

प्राज्ञादात्मन एतस्मात्प्रमुच्यन्तेऽखिला यदा ।
कामास्ते कतम इति तद्विशेषणमुच्यते ॥३९३॥
हृदि येऽस्य श्रिताः कामाः प्रमुच्यन्ते त एव तु ।
आत्माश्रितास्तु ये त्वस्य प्रमुच्यन्ते न ते सदा ॥३९४॥

When it is said that all of desires become abandoned in the case of this individual self, who is now possessed of excellent knowledge (*prājñā*);¹ then (the question is asked:) ‘Which are those desires?’ and then (in answer) it is stated as attributes of them, [393]

‘those desires which have taken their abode in the heart’—it is these that are abandoned; whereas those desires, which have resorted to the self, do not ever get abandoned. [394]

Verse 394 refers to the intellect, while the Ātman has also desires associated with it, in contrast with those resorting to the intellect.

¹This refers to the grammatical explanation of it, viz. *prajñāh eva prājñāh*.

हृदयं नाम विज्ञानं मांसपेशी च भण्यते ।
रूढ्या वृत्तिर्मांसखण्डे तात्स्थ्याद्विज्ञानवाचकम् ॥३९५॥

‘Heart’ is called the organ of acquiring knowledge, (though, in reality) it is a lump of flesh; yet, by usage, the meaning (of that word is restricted) to a lump of flesh; it is expressive of specific knowledge, because that gets an abode in it (*tātsthya*). [395]

कामाः पुनरिहोच्यन्ते य उक्ता वासनात्मकाः ।
माहारजनमित्यादिवाक्येनात्मविशुद्धये ॥३९६॥

And, here,¹ desires are meant to be those which are (earlier) explained and have the nature of impressions in the sentence, which begins with the word *māhārajanam*;² this is for clarifying (the meaning of) the Ātman. [396]

¹This refers to in BU 4.4.7.

²BU 2.3.6. SP quotes: *yathāhuh— kāmāḥ punar māhārajanādirūpā iti*.

प्राज्ञस्याभ्यन्तरं रूपं तन्माहारजनादिकम् ।
हृदयाश्रयिणस्ते तु बाह्याः स्युर्बाह्यसंश्रयात् ॥३९७॥

The inner form of a person of excellent knowledge is expressed (in the words) beginning with *māhārajana*¹ (the usually known desires) and they have their abode in the heart, while they are external, since they are related to external (object(s)). [397]

This verse explains the forms of desires which are mentioned as impressions.

It seems that Bhartṛprapañca divides the desires inside the human body into two classes: (i) desires which resorted to the lump of flesh called heart; they are in contrast with (ii) those desires which resort to the Ātman. The former are described here by the word *bāhya*.

¹SP cites: *tad uktam— tad ye māhārajanādilakṣaṇāḥ kāma-viśeṣās te bāhye hr̥daye śritā iti.*

हृदयाश्रयिकामेभ्य आत्मसंश्रयिणां यतः ।
प्रसूतिरिह कामानामतोऽनेकसमाश्रयात् ॥३९८॥
हृदयाश्रयणं तेषां विशेषणमिहोच्यते ।
आत्माश्रयाणां कामानां विनिवृत्तिः फलं हि तत् ॥३९९॥

Since, in the case of those desires which resort to the Ātman, their origin is in the desires which have their abode in the heart, therefore here (i.e. in the individual self) there is one attributive explanation used of them in 'resorting to the heart' on account of their relation to many objects; but, in the case of those desires which resort to the Ātman, the result is their cessation. [398-399]

SP quotes: *yathāhuh— tato hi teṣām prasūtir bhavatīti.*

The Ātman here refers to Jīva, i.e. one having transmigratory nature; so is the case with verses 404 and 406.

मनोद्वारोपसंक्रान्ता भावना यात्मनि स्थिता ।

देहिनो जन्मबीजं सा तदुच्छेदाद्विमुच्यते ॥४००॥

That impression, which has entered through the doorway of *manas* and has (at the end) resorted to the Ātman, is the seed of the embodied self's being born again; and when that (impression) is destroyed one attains liberation. [400]

बीजस्थस्याङ्कुरस्येह जन्माश्रित्य यथैव गाम् ।
आश्रयादेव जन्मैवं कामानां हृदयाश्रयात् ॥४०१॥

As here (i.e. in this world) there is the appearance/birth of a sprout, which was already residing in the seed, (only) after resorting to the earth, similarly there is the rise/birth of the desires (only) from having a resort (inside the transmigratory body) through their resorting to the heart. [401]

SP invites attention to another explanation of the word *āśrayāt* as *hrdayāśrayāt*; also it cites: *uktam hi— yathā bījagatasyānikurasya pṛthivīm āśritya prasūtir evam prājñāśritānām hrdayam yonir iti.*

हृदयेन च संबन्धाद्दृश्यन्ते येन तेऽखिलाः ।
अतो विशेषकार्येण विशेष्यन्ते हृदैव ते ॥४०२॥

Since all of them are perceived/understood on account of their connection with the heart, they are distinguished by the distinguishing effect (of *kāmayakti*), viz. the heart. [402]

हृदि श्रिता यदा कामाः प्रमुच्यन्तेऽस्य देहिनः ।
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतः प्राज्ञो भवतीत्येष निश्चयः ॥४०३॥

When the desires of an embodied (self), which have resorted to his heart, are abandoned, then does the mortal one become immortal (and) excellent knower—this is the decision. [403]

In earlier verses was explained the meaning of the first half of the Mantra in BU and this verse has explained the meaning

of the second half of it.

विद्याकर्मसमहेन येनायं परमात्मनः ।
संसारित्वं परिच्छिद्य प्रापितः स यदाखिलः ।
प्रमुच्यतेऽथ तद्द्वानाच्छुद्धो ब्रह्म समश्नुते ॥४०४॥

When that combination of knowledge and action first cut off that individual self from (the state of being) the highest Ātman and was later brought to the state of a transmigratory being, (that being) is wholly removed (lit. released); then, thereby, being purified after the removal (lit. abandoning) of that,¹ it attains to (the state of) the Brahman. [404]

¹This refers to *vidyākarmasamuccaya*.

आत्मकामोक्तिमानाच्च प्रागप्येतद्विनिश्चितम् ।
आत्मैव कामा अस्येति न भिन्ना हार्दकामवत् ॥४०५॥

Earlier also, this has been decided on the basis of the authoritative statement about the Ātman's desire(s) in the statement that desires themselves are the Ātman of this individual self and they do not have (a reference to desires different from it), i.e. exist as they do in the form of desires of the heart. [405]

तत्र ये त्वात्मनोऽभिन्नास्तेभ्योऽनन्यत्वकारणात् ।
प्रमुक्तिरात्मनो नास्ति तैरसंसर्गतः सदा ॥४०६॥

There (i.e. between the two types of desires) from those which are non-different from the Ātman, owing to their not being other thing than the Ātman, there cannot be the release of the Ātman, since there has ever been a non-contact (of it) with them. [406]

संसर्गः प्रविवेको वा भिन्नयोर्वस्तुनोर्यतः ।
नाभिन्नयोरतो मुक्त आत्मस्थानामभेदतः ॥४०७॥

Since a contact or distinction (can be thought of) of two distinct things and, therefore, not of two non-distinct things; therefore (*atah*), the Jīva is not (considered to be) liberated (from them), on account of the non-distinction (of the desires) which are (accepted as residing) in the Jīva here. [407]

मिथ्यादर्शनजा ये तु माहारजनपूर्वकाः ।
 अन्यत्वेऽवस्थिता बन्धहेतुत्वेन च सर्वदा ॥४०८॥
 संसर्गप्रविवेकौ स्तो यतस्तैरात्मनः सदा ।
 तानेवोद्दिश्य तेनेदं विशेषणमिहेरितम् ॥४०९॥

But/And (*tu*) (the desires which are mentioned) as those (which are stated) with *māhārajana* (in the beginning) and (which are said to be) produced from (a being's) wrong cognition (lit. seeing), have always remained in the state of being different (from the Ātman) and as the cause of its bondage; [408] since they are in contact with and separate from the Ātman, they would always be there, and with reference to them only is here (in the Mantra) stated this attributive adjunct (viz. *kalpita* and *āgantuka* together). [409]

हृदयाश्रयिणो येऽस्य न त्वात्मैकसमाश्रयाः ।
 कामास्तेऽस्य प्रमुच्यन्त इत्येतत्प्रागपीरितम् ।
 तदा तीर्णो भवत्येष शोकान् हृदयसंश्रितान् ॥४१०॥

And those desires, which resort to the heart and are not having a resort in the Ātman (this being), are abandoned; and this has been stated earlier also: 'Then this one has crossed over the sorrows which have resorted to the heart'. [410]

This refers to the earlier statement about this in BU 4.3.22.

शोकाभिधानास्तत्रापि कामा एवोदिताः पुरा ।
 न्यायस्तत्राप्ययं कृत्स्नः संभवत्येव निर्णये ॥४११॥

There also, those desires have been earlier described (lit. called) by the word (or, name) *śoka*; even there this whole manner of interpretation (*nyāya*) does become imperative/relevant (*sambhavaty eva*) to the reference to the decision.

[411]

Read SP: *atra hr̥dītiviśeṣaṇasambandhī yo nyāyah sa sarvo 'pi tīrṇavākye hr̥dayasyetiviśeṣanāṛthavattvanirṇaye draṣṭavya iti yojanā.*

इति श्रीमन्महाभर्तृप्रपञ्चस्य महीयसः ।
व्याख्यामधीयते धीरा न्यायागमबहिष्कृताम् ॥४१२॥

Thus do the wise ones learn (i.e. understand) the explanation of the great scholar Bhartṛprapañca, i.e. the one which is rejected by the traditionally known Vedānta and logic (*nyāya*).

[412]

Sureśvara's mocking words are specifically to be noted.

Verses 413-424 are in refutation of the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

सर्वात्मभावं विद्यायाः फलमुक्त्वा च नः श्रुतिः ।
अथ योऽन्यामिति गिरा प्राहाविद्यां तथा फलम् ॥४१३॥

After the Śruti has stated the result of the lore of the Brahman, i.e. all is but (one with) the Ātman, it has once again stated for us (the nature of) ignorance and its results, by the words *atha yo 'nyām.*

[413]

This refers to BU 1.4.10.

कार्यकारणरूपेण यदेतद्वेददर्शनम् ।
अविद्याया इदं कार्यमन्योऽसाविति भण्यते ॥४१४॥

This, viz. which is the cognition of the differences (consisting

in worldly objects) in the form of effects and causes, is but the result of ignorance; and that (Ātman) is (quite) different (from the transmigratory world)—so is this stated— [414]

आ समाप्तेस्तृतीयस्य प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुकम् ।
ब्रह्म वा इत्युपक्रम्य मोहकार्यं विवक्षितम् ॥४१५॥

Up to the end of the third Adhyāya;¹ it is intended to state the effect of delusion (about the inner self), which has ignorance as its cause—(this) with the words *brahma vā*² in the beginning. [415]

¹This refers to the end of BU 1.4.

²BU 1.4.10.

अस्यामविद्याधिकृतौ सप्तान्नाविष्कृताविह ।
फलात्मकानामन्नानां प्रसङ्ग इदमीरितम् ॥४१६॥

This is (already) stated, with reference to (or, in the topic about) ignorance (about the nature of the self), i.e. in the exposition on seven types of food in connection with the foods being the nature of the results (of desires and actions). [416]

This refers to BU 1.4.5.

अव्याकृतस्य तत्त्वस्य नामरूपक्रियात्मभिः ।
व्याकृतियोदिता पूर्वं तदज्ञानविजृम्भितम् ॥४१७॥

This modification, which was earlier stated of the highest truth unmodified by means of what have the nature of *nāma*, *rūpa* and *karman* was (but) full (*vi*-) expression of ignorance. [417]

This has reference to BU 1.4.7.

नामरूपादिभेदेन वर्णादिप्रविभागतः ।
कार्यमेतदविद्यायाः श्रुत्या व्याख्यायतेऽखिलम् ॥४१८॥

It has been explained in the Śruti that on account of the division into Varna etc., all the results of ignorance have been explained with reference to name, form etc. in the Śruti. [418]

¹This refers to *karman* also..

Verses 419-501 refer to Kaṇāda and Jaimini for refutation.

कणभुग्जैमिनीयैर्य आत्मधर्मा इतीरिताः ।
नात्मनोऽनात्मनस्ते तु काम इत्यादिनोदिताः ॥४१९॥

Those (properties), which are mentioned by Kaṇāda and Jaimini's followers as properties of the Ātman, are (in reality) not of the Ātman; but they are of the non-Ātman—but/and (*tu*) this is (already) expressed (in the verse) *kāmaḥ*¹ [419]

Read the introductory to this verse in NKL (ms. pp.735-736):
evam śrutipaurvāparyapratisaṁdhānena kāmāder anātmadharmatvam pratīpādyā tasyādharmatvadarśanaṁ sarvavedavirodhād anādarāṇīyam ity āha (kaṇabhugg ...) iti.

¹Cf. 4.4.226 and particularly, the words *āsaṅgapūrvakaḥ kāmāḥ* have to be noted.

यावत्किञ्चिज्जगत्यस्मिन्नूपं मेयत्वमागतम् ।
सर्वं तन्मन एवेति श्रुत्या साक्षात्स्फुटीकृतम् ॥४२०॥

Whatever form in the world has become the object of knowing, is all but *manas*— so is this clearly stated in the Śruti. [420]

Cp. *etad dhi sarvāṇi nāmāni bibharti* (BU 1.6.1-3).

प्रकाशोऽपि च यः कश्चिदभिव्यञ्जक इष्यते ।
अभिव्यञ्ज्याभिसंबन्धः स च वागित्यथावदत् ॥४२१॥

Also whatever is light, that is described as the revealer (of

forms etc.) and the relation of what is to be revealed and what, the revealer, is all but *vāc*— so has it said. [421]

Cf. BU 1.6.1-3.

क्रियात्मकं च यत्किञ्चिन्मानतो जगतीक्ष्यते ।
तत्सर्वं प्राण एवेति संजहार श्रुतिः स्वयम् ॥४२२॥

Whatever is of the nature of activity, perceived in this world with help of means of knowing, is all but that *Prāṇa*—so has the *Śruti* itself concluded. [422]

Cf. BU 1.6.1-3.

निश्चितं यच्च संदिग्धं तथाविज्ञातमेव च ।
वाङ्मनःप्राणरूपाणि तानि हीति श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥४२३॥

Indeed has the *Śruti* declared (lit. sung) that whatever is ascertained, doubtful, and unknown is but the forms of *vāc*, *manas* and *prāṇa*. [423]

¹Refer to BU 1.5.8: *vijñātam vijijñāsyam avijñātam eta eva*.

यतोऽविद्यात्मकान्येव रूपाण्येतान्यतो दृशेः ।
नात्मनः स्युः समस्तानि कार्यकारणबाह्यतः ॥४२४॥

Since the forms (seen as of) the seer are only of the nature of ignorance which is different from the seer itself, therefore all of them cannot be of the *Ātman*, due to their being beyond effect(s) and cause(s). [424]

In verses 425-427 it is stated that hr̥daya alone is the support of all forms and names etc. and not the Ātman.

तथा दिग्भेदभिन्नानां नामरूपक्रियात्मनाम् ।
उक्तं हृदय एवेति नीडं नात्मा परो मतः ॥४२५॥

So also is it said that, with respect to those (things) of the nature of *nāma*, *rūpa* and *kriyā*, which are different in point of their areas; the heart is the abode of them; but not the highest Ātman. [425]

This verse refers to BU 3.9.22-24.

समान उपसंहृत्य जगत्कारणरूपके ।
कारणस्याप्यपह्नुत्यै नेतीत्यात्मानमब्रवीत् ॥४२६॥

Having explained (the Ātman) as the merging point of the entire world made up of causes by the words *samāne*, the Śruti has declared *neti* with the view to rejecting (lit. concealing) the final cause also. [426]

This refers to BU 3.9.26, the Śruti stating the origin of the varied universe and finally rejecting the idea of origin also.

कार्यकारणयोरेवं निषेधात्नेतिवाक्यतः ।
आत्माश्रयत्वं कामानां निष्प्रमाणकमुच्यते ॥४२७॥

Thus, from the statement in the Śruti *neti*: (i.e.) by rejection of both cause(s) and effect(s), it is brought out that the desires, being described as having a support in the Ātman, have not any authoritative basis (for holding their existence as true). [427]

In verses 428-429 is refuted the idea that desires arise in the Ātman, having a resort as they do in the intellect.

हृदयोत्पाद्यता नापि कामानामिह कीर्त्यते ।
हृदि श्रिता इति ह्युक्तेर्न श्रुता कारणात्मता ॥४२८॥

Also, it is stated here (in the Śāstra) that the desires are not produced from/by the heart; from the statement *hr̥di śritāḥ*

(it is not to be understood) as the heart's being their cause.

[428]

नेति नेतीति चोक्तोऽर्थो जनकं प्रति यः पुरा ।
किंज्योतिरित्युपक्रम्य स एवार्थः प्रपञ्चयते ॥४२९॥

Also, what is conveyed earlier¹ to Janaka by the words *neti neti* is itself fully explained in the words beginning with *kim jyotih*.²

[429]

¹It was introduced in BU 4.2 and further explained in BU 4.3.

²BU 4.3.20-23.

Verses 430-436 state the reasons indicative of the absence of desires in the Ātman.

क्रियाकारककर्मभ्यो व्युत्थाप्यात्मानमेकलम् ।
पुमासनादिलिङ्गेन रवीन्दूदाहृतेस्तथा ॥४३०॥

After having separated, i.e. distinguished, the single Ātman as above activity, means of activity and action by pointing out the characteristics of the Ātman such as sitting¹ etc. and also by citing of the examples of the sun and the moon Śruti rejects desires etc.

[430]

¹This signifies activity in general.

व्यतिरिक्तस्य तस्यैवमुक्ताध्यात्मादिभेदतः ।
स्वयंज्योतिर्विशुद्धयर्थं स वा इत्यादिका श्रुतिः ॥४३१॥

The Śruti, beginning with the words *sa vā ...*, is for amplifying the thought of the self illuminating which is thus distinguished from the various distinctions such as *adhyātma*.¹

[431]

Cf. BU 4.3.15.

¹This also refers to *ādhidaivika* and *ādhibhautika*.

स्वतोऽसंदूषितः प्रत्यङ्गामकर्मादिभिर्मलैः ।
अनन्वागतवचनात्तथासङ्गश्रुतेरपि ॥४३२॥

The inner self,¹ itself being unaffected by impurities such as desire and action, (is described) by the Śruti also by the word *ananvāgata* and the statement of being non-attached. [432]

¹The text reads *pratyankāma-* but it should have read *pratyak-kāma-* because *pratyani*, derived from a verb root *prati-ani* is the nominative form of *pratyak* (adjective) in adverbial sense 'turned within'; this is not at all relevant!

आत्मशुद्धेर्विवक्षेह न त्वशुद्धेः कथं चन ॥४३३॥
विशेषणस्य श्रवणाद्भृदीत्यात्मनि चेन्मतम् ।
सव्येनाक्षणा न पश्यामि यथा सामर्थ्यतस्तथा ॥४३४॥

Here, the intention is to state the purity of the Ātman but not that of its impurity. [433]

But, (if it is said:) 'It is held that, on hearing the attributive word *hr̥di* in relation to the Ātman as they understand in the statement, 'I do not see with the left eye', so also from the tenor of the expression'. [434]

नोक्तोत्तरत्वात्साध्वेतद्भवतेहाभिधीयते ।
प्रतिज्ञातार्थसिद्धयर्थहेत्वर्थं तद्विशेषणम् ॥४३५॥

(The reply is:) 'This is not (to be so said), because there has been already an answer given to it; therefore, you should say that 'it is right' in respect of this Mantra (*iha*). That attribute is (stated) for the purpose of establishing the matter which is enunciated.' [435]

That is to establish *kāmo na ātmāśrayāḥ*.

सर्वेषामपि कामानामाश्रयो हृदयं यतः ।
तद्धेतवतिक्रमादात्मा सर्वशोकातिगस्ततः ॥४३६॥

Since, heart is the abode/support of all the desires, therefore by overcoming the cause of them has the Ātman been (described as) one that has overcome all sorrows. [436]

Verses 437-439 affirm that kāmā hr̥di does not set aside anabhivyakta 'appearance of desire' and its cessation.

अनाश्रितविभागार्थमथवास्तु विशेषणम् ।
तेषु यत्नविधेयत्वात्सफलं स्याद्विशेषणम् ॥४३७॥

Or, let the specifying phrase (*hr̥di śritāḥ*) be for the sake of distinguishing what is (really) not supported; since (only) in the case of them, where an effort has been made (for their removal), that specifying phrase would be meaningful (or, having a result). [437]

नाश्रयापेक्षयैतत्स्याद्धृदीतीह विशेषणम् ॥४३८॥
न हि हृद्व्यतिरेकेण कामानामाश्रयान्तरम् ।
श्रुतौ स्मृतौ वा न्यायाद्वा दृश्यतेऽपि प्रमान्तरात् ॥४३९॥

Here, the specifying phrase *hr̥di* ... is not used with the expectation of the abode in view. [438]

Indeed, there is not for desires any support other than the heart—this is known (lit. seen) from the Śruti, the Smṛti, logical reasoning, or any other type of knowledge.¹ [439]

¹This may refer to the *upamāna*.

In verses 440-441 kāmā is related to karman.

प्रवृत्तिः कामशब्दस्य भूयःस्वर्थेषु दृश्यते ।
कर्मादिषु जगत्यसिंस्तानपेक्षयात् उच्यते ।

हृदि श्रिता इति वचो नाश्रयान्तरवीक्षया ॥४४०॥

In this world, the word *kāma* is known to have the capacity to express many meanings, action etc.,¹ therefore, keeping them in view has the Śruti stated *hr̥di śritāḥ* and not with any other abode in view. [440]

¹SP explains these meanings thus: *kāmyata iti vā kāmyate 'neneti vā kāmanam iti vā kāmasabdasyānekārthatvam*.

अतिच्छन्दा इति वचः कामाधारत्व आत्मनः ।
विरुद्ध्यते प्रमाणं सन्न चान्यार्थत्वमिष्यते ॥४४१॥

In holding the Ātman as the abode of desires, there would result opposition to the statement in the Śruti *aticchandāḥ* ... (BU 4.3.21); that being an authoritative statement, it is not accepted that the word has some other meaning to convey. [441]

Verses 442-453 state the absence of any means to show the Ātman as the abode of desire(s).

आत्मनः कामनीडत्वे न च मानान्तरं क्वचित् ।

And also there is not anywhere an authoritative means of knowing that the Ātman is the abode of desires. [442ab]

सर्वकामादिवचनं प्रमाणमिति चेन्मतम् ॥४४२॥
तत्रातिच्छन्दवचसा विरोधान्नास्य मानता ॥४४३॥
वस्तुनोऽप्यनृतन्त्रत्वात्षोडशिग्रहणादिवत् ।
विकल्पोऽप्यत्र नैवास्ति न हि वस्तु विकल्पते ॥४४४॥

If it is held that the statement about *sarvakāma*¹ ... is the authoritative means of knowing that (*viz. ātmanah kāmanīdatva*), [442cd]
that is not so, because there is opposition to this statement

by the statement of *aticchandāḥ*² [443]

Further, there is no opinion here in respect of the real thing, since it does not depend on (the activity of) a human being like taking up the *ṣoḍaśi* cup in ritual; indeed the (real) thing cannot entertain any option here.³ [444]

Verses 442cd-443 show Vedāntas' acceptance of only one teaching to be the purport of Vedāntas.

The acceptance of *vikalpa* is related to ritual actions such as *ṣoḍaśigrahana*, but this is not accepted in the case of the statement about the nature of the (real) thing. SP supports this thus: *uktam hi*—

evam eṣo 'ṣṭadoṣo 'pi yadvrīhiyavavākyayoḥ /
vikalpa āśritas tatra gatir anyā na vidyate // (iti)

¹CU 3.14.1-2.

²BU 4.3.21.

³In respect of the two sentences of *sarvakāmaḥ* ... and *aticchandāḥ*

सर्वं हि खल्विदं ब्रह्मेत्येवं तत्रापि च श्रुतिः ।
प्रतिज्ञायाह युक्तिं च तज्जलानिति सादरात् ॥४४५॥

Because, in the context of (the statement) *sarvam khalv idam brahma*,¹ has the Śruti stated regardfully (*sādarāt*) the reason for what is enunciated in the words *tajjalān* [445]

¹CU 3.14.1.

अक्रियाकारकफलं यतो ब्रह्माद्वयं ततः ।
त्यक्ताशेषक्रियैस्तस्मात्तदुपास्यं सदात्मना ॥४४६॥

Since the Brahman, not being related to activity, its means and its results, is without any duality; therefore, individual selves ever have that Brahman to be the object of worship,¹ as has the inner self discarded all other activities. [446]

¹SP states *sadā dheyam* as paraphrase of *upāsya*.

इत्येतज्जगतो वृत्तं ब्रह्मैवाकार्यकारणम् ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं प्रत्यङ्मात्रसत्त्वकम् ॥४४७॥

(Thus) this is all that is related to the world, and the Brahman is but what is devoid of effects and causes, not distinguished from, nor similar to any other (object) and has the nature of being only the inner self. [447]

Thus, in this verse, Sureśvara concludes the thought that has been explained in verses 442cd-446.

उक्तवैवं वस्तुनो वृत्तं तद्याथात्म्याप्रबोधजम् ।
कर्त्रादिकारकापेक्षं क्रियावृत्तमभाषत ॥४४८॥

Having thus stated what is related to the (real) thing, the Śruti has stated what is related to its activity which is produced from ignorance about its true nature and depends on various factors related to activity such as the agent. [448]

The verse introduces the thought in CU 3.14.1 *atha khalu*

....

ब्रह्मात्मानमुपासीत ब्रह्मतत्त्वाविचक्षणः ।
कुर्वीत स क्रतुं कर्ता ह्यकार्यत्वेऽपि वस्तुनः ॥४४९॥
मनोमयादिविषयः क्रतुः पुंसो विधीयते ।
स हि तस्मिन् यतः शक्तो लोकाग्न्यादिविधौ यथा ॥४५०॥

A person, who has not been cognizant (*avicakṣaṇah*) of the Brahman, should worship the Brahman which is the Ātman; he should entertain a thought about the (real) thing though it is not of the nature of what is to be produced; [449] the thought of the man¹ is here stated to have for its object what is made up of *manas*² etc., since he is capable (of any activity) related to that such as, for example, enkindling of

the usual fire.

[450]

¹This refers to *avicakṣaṇa*.

²SP states: *manomayatvādiguṇake parasminn ātmani sopādhike dhyānam vidhīyate sarvatra prasiddhopadeśād ity nyāyāt*.

अतः कर्त्रादितन्त्रत्वात्सर्वकामादिवस्तुनः ।

अतिच्छन्दोक्तिबाधः स्याद्वस्तुतन्त्रत्वहेतुतः ॥४५१॥

Therefore, all such things as desires etc. depend on (the activity of) an agent etc.; there would be stultification of the same by the statement *aticchandāḥ* ... since the reason is this (latter) as dependent on (the meaning of the real) thing. [451]

SP explains the purport of this verse: *vastunaḥ sarvakāmādirūpasya kriyātmakatvena kārakatantratvāt tadarthavākyasya na vastuparatvam aticchandavākyasya tu tatparatvād anyato balīyastvād atulyatvam atas tadbādhaḥ sarvakāmādiśruter ity arthaḥ*.

विकल्पोऽत्र न युक्तः स्यादेवमुक्तेन वर्त्मना ॥४५२॥

Here (the acceptance of) an option is not reasonable as shown in the above way. [452]

Verses 453-465 state the significance of akāmatva in the case of the Ātman.

असत्यकामनुत्तर्या कामोक्तिर्यापि चाष्टमी ।

सत्यास्त इम इत्यादि स्तुतिर्वा स्याद्विधित्सते ॥४५३॥

And, also, that reference to desire stated in the eighth Adhyāya (*prapāṭhaka*) which is related to desires for the removal of the desires for the unreal (things/objects) is (just) a praise as in *satyās ta ime* with respect to what is sought to be prescribed. [453]

This verse refers to CU 8.1.1 which is like an injunction and CU 8.3.1 which is like an Arthavāda (*stuti*). There is stress on the unreal aspect of desires.

सन्त्यात्मनि न चेत्कामास्तदेवं फलवद्वचः ।
अतिच्छन्दा इति शुभं कामशोकनिषेधकृत् ॥४५४॥

If there are not any desires in the Ātman, then the statement related to the result (*phalavat*) is *aticchandāh* ... would be auspicious, in that it would purport to reject desires and the (consequent) sorrows. [454]

निषिध्यन्ते न चेत्कामा यथोक्ताः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
अथ काममयत्वेऽस्य संसारोऽपि न वार्यते ॥४५५॥
मतं नालं प्ररोहाय ये कामाः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
किमर्था तर्हि तत्रैषां कल्प्यते भवता स्थितिः ॥४५६॥
न कश्चिदुपयोगोऽत्र कामानां विद्यते स्थितौ ।
अजागलस्तनस्येव प्रमाणाद्धन्धमोक्षयोः ॥४५७॥

(An objection is raised:) ‘If it is held that desires, which have been mentioned, are rejected (as existing) in the individual self, then it would be full of desires and its transmigration also would not be rejected (lit. warded off). Then, in the case of those desires, which you have stated are obtaining in the inner self, why are they not for producing any result, (why then) have you entertained their existence in that Ātman?’

[455-456]

‘The existence of desires here (in the Ātman) is not at all useful in respect of the removal of bondage and (securing) liberation; the (authoritative) means of knowing this is then like an udder on the neck of goat.’

[457]

These arguments are based on the Śruti statement *sa yathā kāmo bhavati* which should lead to the absence of liberation.

प्रमाणलब्धसद्भावो निष्फलोऽपि न वार्यते ।
प्रतीचि कामसंबन्धो न तथेति निषिध्यते ॥४५८॥

(The answer is made:) 'If there is existence (of a thing) known from an authoritative means of knowing, it is not rejected even if it is useless; therefore, the relation of desires to the inner self is rejected by the words *na tathā*'. [458]

कामादीनामनर्थानां प्रतीचि शतशः श्रुतौ ।
निषेधकानि वाक्यानि सन्त्यपि स्मृतिशासने ॥४५९॥

There are in the Śruti hundreds of sentences¹ which reject (the existence of) the useless things such as desire; so are they there in the teachings of the Smṛti² as well. [459]

¹For example, refer to *asthūlam avikāryam ...* (BU 3.8.2).

²For example, *Gītā 2.25: avikāryah*

कामक्लृप्तिरतो नेह प्रत्यगात्मनि युज्यते ।
प्रमाणासंभवात्तस्मात्सा न कल्प्या विपरिचिता ॥४६०॥

Therefore, it is not reasonable to entertain the notion (of the existence) of desires in relation to the Ātman; that notion should not be entertained by the wise owing to the impossibility or non-existence of an authoritative means (of conveying that). [460]

प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि ।
अदृष्टशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो निष्प्रमाणकः ॥४६१॥

In respect of the Śruti, one has to imagine very many things (*subahūni*) even if they are not seen, but as having (the Śruti) as the authoritative means (of knowing them); one should not entertain (any notion), even a hundredth portion of it which does not have any authoritative means (of knowing it). [461]

NKL (ms. p.739): introduces this verse thus: *nirmūlakalpanā nātra kāryety atra bhāṭṭasamvādam āha pramāṇavantīti ātmani kāmasambandho na kalpyate pratyakṣaśrutiviruddhatvād atrāha na ceti*

न चात्मकाम इत्यत्र कामाधारत्व आत्मनः ।
मानान्तरप्रसिद्धत्वात्प्रामाण्यं लभ्यते श्रुतेः ॥४६२॥

In the statement *ātmakāma*, there is not noticed any authoritative statement of the Śruti which points to the Ātman's being the basis of desires (even if) that (i.e. the absence of desires) is (already) known by some other authoritative means.

[462]

This is based on BU 4.3.21 and 4.4.6.

न चोपास्योऽयमप्यर्थः सर्वकामादिवच्छ्रुतेः ।
एकात्म्यवस्तुयाथात्म्यप्रकाशनपरत्वतः ॥४६३॥

Also, this thing (i.e. *kāma*) is not an object of worship (as it is clear) from the Śruti *sarvakāmah* ..., because the purport (of the Śruti statement is) to reveal the true nature of the real thing, i.e. its being single.

[463]

This is based on CU 3.14.2.

कणभुङ्गन्यायसिद्धा चेतकामाद्याश्रयतात्मनः ।
श्रुतेस्तदनपेक्षत्वात्त्रापेक्ष्यं कणभुङ्गमतम् ॥४६४॥

If it is held that the Ātman can be the basis of desire etc., as established in the Nyāya system of Kaṇāda, then (it is to be pointed out:) that view of Kaṇāda is not to be respected (*nāpeksyam*), because it is not sanctioned (lit. or supported) by the the Śruti.¹

[464]

In the system of Kaṇāda, *kāma*, *icchā*, *prayatna* etc. are said to be the properties (*dharmas*) of the Ātman—that is the basis of the argument in this verse.

¹SP states: desires etc. are the properties of *manas* and not of the Ātman which is *nirguṇa* as stated in the Śruti. Therefore, *upeksyam tanmatam*.

तन्निषेधश्रुतेश्चापि नापेक्ष्यं तद्विरोधतः ।
सौगताद्युक्तवत्तस्मान्न कामाश्रयतात्मनः ॥४६५॥

Further, on account of the Śruti's rejection of that,¹ also, that (i.e. the opinion of Kaṇāda)² is not to be respected (*nāpeksyam*), for the reason of its (being in) opposition to it (i.e. Śruti), like the teaching of Sugata (to be ignored, for the same reason). Therefore, there cannot be in the Ātman (the quality of) being the abode of desire. [465]

¹This refers to *ātmanah kāmāśrayatā*.

²This is already under reference in the preceding verse.

In verses 466-470, there is affirmation of the complete absence of any authoritative means to show the Ātman to be the support of desires.

न च कामाश्रयत्वेऽन्यत्प्रमाणं किञ्चिदीक्ष्यते ।
मानमेयातिवर्तित्वात्स्वतः सिद्धेश्च वस्तुनः ॥४६६॥

Moreover, there is not seen (i.e. known) any other¹ valid means of knowing *kāma* as having an abode in the Ātman; and also because the (real) thing is established, in its own right, with the nature of being beyond all the activity of knowing and the objects of knowing. [466]

¹This implies that the opponents of Vedānta might hold the sentence *sa vā ayam ātmā ... dharmamayo 'dharmamayah sarvamayah* (BU 4.4.5) as an authoritative means for knowing

the Ātman as the abode of desires.

मातृमानप्रमेयार्थाश्चागमापायिनः सदा ।
वीक्षते योऽविलुप्ताक्षः स आत्मानन्यमानगः ॥४६७॥

And the one whose (sight) is never lost, the one who does not accept any other means of knowing, sees those objects (other than the Ātman) as knower, means of knowing and object(s) of knowing, which ever keep on coming into existence and perishing. [467]

यः स्वतो नागमापायी तद्विरुद्धेषु सर्वदा ।
तत्रैवात्मेति धीरेषा नागमापायिवस्तुषु ॥४६८॥

The one, who is, on its own, not coming into existence and perishing, (is to be known as the Ātman); with respect to it, one should not entertain this notion which is the opposite of it (i.e. the one being), as they keep on coming into existence and perishing. [468]

कामिनं दुःखिनं मूढं योऽविलुप्ताक्ष ईक्षते ।
नासौ कामोऽथवा कामी तत्संबन्धोऽथवा स्वयम् ॥४६९॥

The one, who has (never) lost the sight, and who sees a person full of desires and sorrows (as) deluded (or ignorant), is itself not desire, nor one who has desires, nor is in any way related to that (i.e. desire). [469]

एवं दुःखादिषु ज्ञेयमुक्तं प्रत्यक्षसंश्रयात् ।
इच्छादेश्चिच्छतधर्मत्वात्कर्मस्थत्वं सुनिश्चितम् ॥४७०॥

Thus, it is well established that one should know the existence of sorrows etc. as resulting from (lit. abiding in) activity, because it is so seen directly that the desires are the properties of *citta*.¹ [470]

¹This refers to the intellect which is associated with the inner self. Cf. BUBV 4.3.922.

This verse states that the one who is the support of manas, the abode of desires, cannot be their support.

इच्छादिधर्मवत्साक्षाद्यः सदा वीक्षते मनः ।
तस्येच्छाद्यभिसंबन्धः केन मानेन गम्यते ॥४७१॥

The one, who ever sees *manas* to have the properties of desire etc.—how can it have relation to desires etc.? by what authoritative means can this be known? [471]

SP explains the thought in the saying: *auṣṇyadhīr jāle bhrāntir icchādidhīr apy ātmani tādrśī ced aviruddheti bhāvah.*

Verses 472-481 state that desires etc. are not the properties of the Ātman—this is known by pramāṇa.

प्रत्यग्वस्तु पराबुद्धिगम्यैरिच्छादिभिः कथम् ।
विरुद्धत्वादिशेष्यं स्यात्तमसा दिनकृद्यथा ॥४७२॥

(A question is asked:) ‘How can the (real) thing, i.e. the inner self, which is apart (lit. away) from body and objects, be characterized by desires etc. which are known (only) through the intellect, on account of its being opposed (to them), just as the maker of the day (=the sun cannot be characterized) by darkness?’ [472]

एकबुद्धयधिगम्यत्वं विशेषणविशेष्ययोः ।
नीलोत्पलादिवदृष्टं न तदृष्टं विरुद्धयोः ॥४७३॥

‘Being known in only one cognition of a thing is seen in the case of the qualifier and the qualified as in (the case of) a blue lotus and that (relation) is not seen in what is opposed (to them in character). [473]

नापि चात्मातिरेकेण ग्राहकोऽन्योऽवसीयते ।
ग्राहकस्थश्च कामादिः स कथं ग्राह्यतां व्रजेत् ॥४७४॥

Also, it is not ascertained that anyone else than the Ātman is one who grasps or knows; therefore, how can desire etc. which are held to be existing in the one who grasps be considered as an object to be grasped? [474]

This sets aside the notion that desire etc. cannot be the one who grasps an object or even a part of the one.

चक्षुर्दृष्टेन चक्षुस्थं कृष्णत्वाद्येति दृश्यताम् ।
प्रमातृस्थं न कामादि तद्वदेयात्प्रमेयताम् ॥४७५॥

The blackness etc. existing in the eye does not become an object of sight for the seeing eye; similarly, desire etc. which exist in the knower (i.e. the Ātman) would not become the object of its knowing. [475]

This confirms by example what is stated in the preceding verse.

आत्मत्वावगमाद्वापि जडस्यैवेह वस्तुनः ।
कामकाम्यादि तस्यास्तु दृष्टिमात्रात्मनो न तु ॥४७६॥

Or, let desire and the object of desire belong to that insentient thing which can here be taken to be the Ātman; but it cannot be the object of the Ātman which is merely the seer. [476]

This presupposes the opponent's hypothesis about the abode of desire to be either an insentient Ātman or merely a non-insentient (*ajada*) Ātman.

अचेतनैकनीडत्वं मयापीह प्रसाध्यते ॥४७७॥
स्वेन भासेति च स्वप्ने सर्वकामादिवर्जितम् ।
स्वेनैव ज्योतिषेत्युक्तं स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वसिद्धये ॥४७८॥

In this case also, I can establish that (desires etc.) have only the non-sentient as the basis. [477]

It is said in the Śruti *svena bhāsā* ... in relation to the dream of (the inner self) being devoid of all desires; also it is established in the words *svena jyotiṣā* ..., that the Ātman is by nature a self-shining light. [478]

This is based on BU 4.3.9.

स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वसिद्धिश्च श्रुतिन्यायपुरःसरा ।
कामाद्याश्रयतोक्त्यार्थात्सा त्वया बाधिता भवेत् ॥४७९॥

And that establishing (of the Ātman) as a self-shining light,¹ preceded by reasoning in the Śruti would be opposed by you by your statement (about the Ātman) as being the abode of desire etc. [479]

This refers to Sureśvara's mention of the opponent/object 'directly'—as 'you', 'in you' etc.

SP reads a concluding remark on the verse: *sā hi śrautī naiyāyikī vātmanah svaprakāśatvaprasiddhas tvayā kāmādīnām ātmāśrayatvoktyā bādhitā syāt svāśrayavṛttiviśeṣād eva tadāśrayasyātmano vaiśeṣikādivad dr̥ṣṭisambhavād ity arthaḥ.*

¹Cf. BU 4.3.14.

तथैवात्मनि दृष्टे च सर्वं दृष्टं भवेदिति ।
कामादेरात्मनोऽन्यत्वे तच्चापि स्यात्प्रबाधितम् ॥४८०॥

And, yet further, that (statement in the Śruti), viz. *ātmāni dr̥ṣṭe sarvaṃ dr̥ṣṭam bhavet*, would also be opposed; if desire etc. are held to be different object(s) as existing apart from the Ātman. [480]

The basis of this argument is CU 6.1.3ff.

सर्ववेदान्तबाधश्च कामाद्याश्रयता यदि ।
आत्मनोऽभ्युपगम्येत तेषां तत्प्रतिषेधतः ॥४८१॥

If it is accepted that the Ātman is the abode of desire etc., there would result stultification of all the Vedānta (texts), because rejection is the purport of them. [481]

Verses 482-488 are concluding remarks of Sureśvara about the rejection of the view of the Tārīkikas.

ऐकात्म्यस्यागमार्थत्वाच्छ्रुतेश्चान्यानपेक्षतः ।
यतोऽतस्तार्किकोक्तीस्ता नैवापेक्षामहे वयम् ॥४८२॥

Since only the non-duality of the Ātman is the thought conveyed by the traditional scripture and they do not depend on any other means of knowing; therefore, we do not favour (lit. regard) the statements of the Tārīkikas. [482]

SP makes this point clear, at length.

हृद्याश्रितत्वं कामानां नन्वत्रोक्तं विशेषणम् ।
संभवे व्यभिचारे च तच्च स्यात्फलवत्सति ॥४८३॥

(An objection is raised:) 'But indeed here is specifically stated about desires of their being supported by (or, having abode in) the heart; and that would be meaningful only if they were taken as being produced (there) and as different (or, apart) from (it)'. [483]

हृद्यनाश्रितकामानां संभवादिष्टमेव तत् ।
आत्माश्रयातिरेकेण तच्चावोचं पुराप्यहम् ॥४८४॥

(The answer is given:) 'In case there is possibility of desires not being supported by (or, having an abode in) the heart, then that is desirable (or, acceptable) to me, since I have earlier also said that they are apart from their support/abode,

i.e. the heart’.

[484]

This refers to verses 437-439 above.

मूर्तं मर्त्यं स्थितं सच्च पृथिव्यप्तेजसामिदम् ।
न विशेषणमित्यस्मादमूर्तत्वादिकल्पनम् ॥४८५॥

(Since) *mūrta*, *martya*, *sthita* and *sat* are not the specifiers (or, attributes) of earth, water and fire; therefore, there is here the notion about them being) *amūrta* etc. [485]

This refers to BUBV 2.3.27-34.

चलनात्मा मरुन्नित्यं दाहकोऽग्निरितीरिते ।
विशेषणश्रवात्क्लृप्तिनैतयोस्तद्विरुद्धयोः ॥४८६॥

Since it is said that wind (*marut*) is of the nature of movement and fire has the capacity for burning; therefore, on hearing (those) specifiers of these two, there cannot be (any specification) of what can be opposed to them. [486]

SP observes: *itaś ca viśeṣaṇaṃ vyāvartakam iti niyantum aśakyam.*

वास्येऽर्थे वासनाः सर्वाः सजातीये च ता यतः ।
निःसङ्गे भिन्नजातीये ताः कुतः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥४८७॥

Since all the impressions (*vāsanās*) are always to be noticeable in an object which should bear those (impressions) and which belong to the same type (lit. species); (therefore, how could) those (impressions be found) in the inner self which is of different species and has no attachment whatever? [487]

प्रत्यगात्मातिरेकेण प्राज्ञोऽन्यश्चेद्विवक्ष्यते ।
नेति नेतीति तस्योक्तान्निषेधान्नेह संभवः ॥४८८॥

If it is intended to state that a wise one (*prājña*,¹ who has known the nature of the Ātman) is different from the inner self, then such possibility is not acceptable here (in the discussion of scriptures), since it has been stated (to have the characteristic in the words *neti neti*). [488]

¹Though this can refer to the Ātman in the sleep state, there is literal translation given.

In verses 489-498, it is argued that desires do not exist in the Ātman; this, on the basis of the Śruti's statement tad vā asya

निःशेषकामकर्मादेर्व्युत्थाप्यात्मानमब्रवीत् ।
तद्वा अस्यैतदित्युक्त्या नातः कामादयोऽत्र ते ॥४८९॥

The Śruti has stated (the nature of) the Ātman, after having raised it above (i.e. after distinguishing it from) the entire mass (of desires, action etc.); therefore, those desires etc. are not there (as revealed) by the statement *tad vā asyaitat* [489]

BU 4.3.21.

तद्वा अस्यैतदित्यादेः प्राज्ञस्यान्तररूपतः ।
वासनाकामकर्मादेः कुतोऽस्यान्तररूपता ॥४९०॥

From the statements such as *tad vā asyaitat ...* it becomes known that the wise one has the nature of being inside the human body; therefore, how could impressions, desires, actions etc. belong to its inner nature? [490]

SP clarifies this thus: *prājñasya kāmakarmādinirmuktaṃ rūpam antaraṅgam ity anigīkārān na kāmādes tadantaraṅgarūpatetyarthah.*

पीतरक्तादिभी रूपैः कर्मकार्यैः प्रयुज्यते ।

निर्देष्टुं शक्यते तस्मादनिर्देश्योऽपि सन्नसौ ॥४९१॥

Being indescribable also, it has been mentioned to have the forms that are yellow, red etc., viz. those which are the effects of activity;¹ therefore, this (*vāsanā*) is thus² mentioned. [491]

¹This refers to the explanation given by Bhartṛprapañca of the process (*prakriyā*) in relation to BU 2.3.

²BUBV 2.3.158-163; SP explains *nirdeṣṭum śakyate* by saying *karmakāryavāsanātmakarūpasambandhe kāryam*.

भावनैव विजृम्भन्ती स्थूलत्वमुपगच्छति ।
अव्याकृतादिभावेन खवाद्यवादित्यसंज्ञितम् ॥४९२॥

It is only impression (*bhāvanā*),¹ which spreading itself, attains grossness; thus assuming various forms of what was unmanifest, viz. it becomes known as sky, wind, the sun etc. [492]

SP clarifies this: *prakṛtivilkṛtibhāvena vijṛmbhamāṇā bhāvanā bhūtabhautikātmakaṇi sthauilyam āpnotīti yāvat*.

¹Sureśvara understands *bhāvanā* as a synonym of *vāsanā*.

मूर्तामूर्तीदिभावाच्च क्षीयमाणा हि सैव तु ।
निर्गुणं सन्तमात्मानं रञ्जयित्वावतिष्ठते ॥४९३॥

And, having become *mūrtāmūrta* etc.,¹ the same (gradually) perishing² continues to stay after it has tainted the Ātman which is by nature devoid of any properties. [493]

This is to refer to the existence of *bhāvanā* in association (as it were) with the non-attached Ātman.

¹This refers to *martya, sthiti*

²This means *sūkṣmatvam upagacchantī*.

भावना बहुरूपासौ बहुरूपत्वमात्मनः ।
करोत्यनामरूपस्य मणोरास्तरणं यथा ॥४९४॥

That impression, which has various forms, causes mutiplicity of forms in the case of the Ātman which is (in reality) without any name and form, as a covering (lit. wrapper causes various appearances) of a jewel (*mañi*). [494]

This explains the thought in the preceding verse.

Verses 495-500 bring out the self-contradiction in the statement by Bhartṛprapañca.

इत्यादि भवतैवोक्तं वासनोक्तिप्रसङ्गतः ।
इहोक्तेस्तद्विरुद्धत्वात्परस्परविरुद्धता ॥४९५॥

This and such other¹ statements, which you have made in relation to (*prasaṅgataḥ*) the statement about impressions, point to a mutual contradiction between the statements here (and) that (which you made earlier) on account of their being mutually opposed. [495]

This refers to Bhartṛprapañca's positing of three *rāśis*; cf. BUBV 2.3.112-113.

SP states: *atra manṭre kāmādīnām ātmāśrayatvaṃ svato 'stīti bhavadvākyaṣya pūrvoktenātmany aupādhikakāmasambandhavādi svavākyaena viruddhatvān mitho viruddhatvāt svavyākhyānasyā-tmano na kāmādyāśrayatety arthaḥ.*

कर्मराशिगिरात्मापि यदि तत्र विवक्षितः ।
निषेधात्तस्य नेतीति शून्यतैव प्रसज्यते ॥४९६॥

If, by the statement of (or, words about) *karmarāśi*, it is intended by you to refer to the Ātman also, then there would result mere void, owing to the fact that it (i.e. *karmarāśi*) has been rejected/denied in the words *neti* [496]

This refers to BU 2.3, and reference to *śrutivirodha* in relation

to mutual contradiction in the theory of Bhartṛprapañca under verse 496.

परमार्थात्मनोऽथान्यः कश्चिदात्मेति भण्यते ।
अस्तु कामं स कामादेराश्रयो न निवार्यते ॥४९७॥

(An objection is raised:) 'It may be stated that (this) Ātman¹ is different from the highest Ātman'; (then the answer is:) 'Well, be it so, yet that also cannot be warded off as being the support of desires etc.' [497]

The Ātman is understood by the opponent as having unreal nature (*aparamārtha*) and then it could not be described as the abode of desires etc.

¹It refers to the abode of desires.

शक्त्यात्मनाप्यवस्थानं कारणात्मनि युज्यते ।
तस्य शक्त्यभिसंबन्धान्न त्वकारण आत्मनि ॥४९८॥

Also, in the case of this Ātman, which is taken as the cause (of this complex world) because it has been there in the form of one having a capacity to create (*śaktyātmanā*); then, there can be close association of that capacity (with desires etc.) But (this is) not (so), in the case of the Ātman which is not the cause (as said before).¹ [498]

¹This refers to *sūkṣma* form of this postulated Ātman which is *paramātman*.

न च कारणमात्रत्वं रूपमिष्टं परात्मनः ।
अनिर्मोक्षप्रसवितत्वाच्छ्रुत्यनारम्भसविततः ॥४९९॥

Moreover, it is not accepted that the highest Ātman has the form which consists merely in being the cause (of the universe), because (if it were so accepted) there would result the contingency of the absence (or impossibility) of liberation and

also of the absence of the activity of the Śruti (for conveying the nature of the Ātman). [499]

स्थूलादीनां च सर्वेषां प्रतीचि प्रतिषेधतः ।
विशेषणानां संबन्धो नातः स्यात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥५००॥

Owing to the rejection/denial of all attributes such as *sthūla*, there is not any relation of the inner self to the specifiers. [500]

Verses 501-502 are the concluding remark in refutation of Bhartrprapañca.

आत्माश्रयत्वं कामानां न युक्त्या नापि शास्त्रतः ।
अपव्याख्यानतस्तेषां कामा आत्माश्रया इति ॥५०१॥
एवं समवनीतेषु प्राणेष्व्वात्मनि तद्विदः ।
पूर्ववद्देहसंबन्धः किमिवेह न जायते ॥५०२॥

That desires have an abode in the Ātman cannot (be postulated on the strength) of reasoning or scripture; therefore, the statement 'Desires have an abode in the Ātman' is an incorrect explanation. [501]

When the *prāṇas* have been thus brought down (i.e. have merged) into the Ātman, there does not any more remain here¹ any relation to a body, (as before) in the case of the one who has known that (Ātman). [502]

¹On this SP writes: *viduṣo vidyayātmamātratvena prāṇeṣu bādhiteṣv api dehe ced asau vartate pūrvavad asya tadyogaḥ syāt tato vidyāvaiyarthyam iti codyārthaḥ.*

Verses 503-509 explain the BU sentence tadyathāhinirlvayanī.

सर्पनिर्मोकवत्कृत्स्नमात्माविद्यैकहेतुजम् ।
यथावस्तुधिया हित्वा निर्ममो निरहंकृतः ॥५०३॥

All (of the things) produced merely by/from ignorance about the nature of the Ātman are, in their entirety, like the slough of a serpent; because the Ātman has become without (any feeling of) having a sense of its belonging(s) and without ego, on account of (i.e. on having attained) the knowledge (*dhī*) of the real thing as it is. [503]

This refers to the statement of the one liberated, while apparently continuing in the body of this life.

वर्तमानोऽपि देहादौ लोकदृष्टिव्यपेक्षया ।
नात्मात्मीयत्वबुद्ध्यासौ देहादीन्समुदीक्षते ॥५०४॥

Continuing in the body etc. though, in the eyes of the people (of the world), the Ātman does not look upon body etc. as (some) belonging of itself. [504]

षष्ठ्यर्थहेतुविध्वंसाद्यथावस्त्ववबोधतः ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं पूर्णं वस्त्ववतिष्ठते ॥५०५॥

Owing to the destruction of the cause which is expressed by the sense of genitive case¹ and also by (having) the knowledge of the (real) thing as it is, (the individual self) stays as undifferentiated as and dissimilar to (any other thing), and the (real) thing in its fullness. [505]

¹This refers to *ātmīyatvabuddhi* mentioned in verse 503 and also *mametibuddhi* in verse 510 below.

अहिनिल्वयनीवाचा सर्पनिर्मोक उच्यते ।
मृता सत्यहिना न्यस्ता वल्मीकान्तर्बिलाश्रये ॥५०६॥

By the word *ahinirivayani* is expressed the slough of a serpent and that being discarded by a serpent becomes dead and (remains)¹ in its abode, viz. in the hollow of an ant-hill.² [506]

¹This is expressed in the word *satī*.

²This refers to the popular notion that a serpent resides in a big hillock/mound made by ants from particles of earth.

अहिदेहवियोगोऽत्र मृतशब्देन भण्यते ।
वल्मीकाश्रयणं तस्याः प्रत्यस्तेत्यभिधीयते ॥५०७॥

In this sentence, the word dead (*mṛta*) expresses the separation (of the slough) from the body of the serpent; and the word *pratyastā* expresses its being supported¹ in an ant-hill. [507]

¹Actually, *āśrayana* refers to a support but the slough cannot take a support in the way it lies therein.

अहिनिर्मोकविषयो व्यापारस्तावदीरितः ।
निर्ममाहंकृतित्वं तु सर्पदृष्टान्तसंश्रयम् ॥५०८॥

Thus (or, to begin with *-tāvat*) the happening (lit. activity) in relation to the slough of a serpent is explained, and (the Ātman's)¹ having the sense of any of its belonging (lit. having no feeling like 'This is mine') has a place (only) in the example of the serpent. [508]

¹This refers to a man who has been liberated in his life, as said in verse 505 above.

बिले त्यक्तेऽहिना यद्वत्स्वनिर्मोके न पूर्ववत् ।
निर्गच्छन्प्रविशन्सर्पो निर्मोकमनुरुध्यते ॥५०९॥
नाहं ममेति वा बुद्धिस्तत्राहेरुपजायते ।
तत्रैव वर्तमानस्य यथैवं प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥५१०॥
संबन्धहेतोरुच्छित्तेरात्मसंबन्धवर्जितम् ।
शेते शरीरं सूक्ष्मं च स्थूलं चैकात्म्यधीहनुतम् ॥५११॥

When a serpent has left its slough (in an ant-hill) it does

not appear to go out of and enter into it and thus remains
unconnected with the slough, [509]

that is to say, there does not arise on the part of the serpent
in respect of it (viz. the slough, any feeling) as 'I am this,
this is mine'; similarly, in the case of the inner self which
continues to be there in the body of that life, [510]

there remains its body, be it gross or subtle, covered (lit.
concealed) ¹ by the knowledge of its oneness with the Ātman,
owing to the destruction of the cause of its relation to the
body and also (because it is) devoid of any relation to the
body (*ātmasambandhavarjita*). [511]

¹Cp. verses 519 and 520 below, for this use of the word
nihnute.

अहिनिर्मोकदृष्टान्तदाष्टान्तिकमितीरितम् ।

दाष्टान्तिकोऽर्थः सर्पस्य दृष्टान्तस्याथ उच्यते ॥५१२॥

Thus, there has been the statement made about the example
of the slough of a serpent and what is (thereby) exemplified.
Now is explained (or, described in full) the nature of what
is exemplified and the example of a serpent. [512]

In the verse, the words *atha ucyate* occur together without
a Saṃdhi; the use of Sureśvara's avoiding Saṃdhi is to be
explained by SP as the reference to the sentence in the discussion
(viz. the *pratīka* of it).

अहिनिर्मोकयोरत्र संगतिः पूर्ववन्मिथः ।

निषिध्यते प्रयत्नेन स्थितिर्नात्र विवक्षिता ॥५१३॥

Here (in this example) the mutual association of the serpent
and its slough is denied as before, with a special effort ¹ and
mere existence (of the two in two different places) is not
intended. [513]

¹This consists in the use of the different attributive sentences in relation to the slough of a serpent. In relation to this, SP adds the following: *evam dārṣṭantike 'pi mithyābhimānākhyasambandhanīṣedho vivakṣito bhedena sthitis tv avivakṣiteti śeṣaḥ.*

In verses 514-519 there is explanation of athāyam aśarīro 'mṛtaḥ.

प्रधानवादः प्राप्नोति यदि देहात्मनोः पृथक् ।
विवक्ष्यते स्थितिरिह न्यषेधि बहुशः स च ॥५१४॥

(An objection might be raised:) 'If this¹ existence of the body and the Ātman as two distinct things (is understood), then that leads to the acceptance of the theory of the Sāṃkhyas (*pradhānavāda*)².' (the answer is: 'No, this is not so) that is many times rejected (by the Śruti)'. [514]

¹That is, in the statement of a person who has attained the knowledge of the Ātman and, therefore, liberation in this very life (*vidyāvasthā*).

²According to the Sāṃkhya *pradhāna*, i.e. *avyakta prakṛti* is the cause of universe.

हेत्वर्थे त्वथशब्दोऽयं हेतूक्तेः प्रकृतत्वतः ।
सकारणस्य देहस्य त्यागो हेतुर्विवक्षितः ॥५१५॥

This word *atha* is for conveying the sense of reason, because the statement of reason is what is to be stated as a matter of course; (hereby) is intended to express a person abandoning the notion of having this body together with its cause, i.e. ignorance. [515]

स्रगज्ञानमनादाय नाहियोगः स्रजो यथा ।
प्रतीचो देहसंबन्धो नात्माज्ञानादृते तथा ॥५१६॥

As there cannot be (entertained the notion of) a serpent in the place of a wreath, unless one accepted ignorance (about

the true nature of) the wreath; so also, there cannot be (accepted) the connection of the inner self with the body without ignorance. [516]

प्रत्यग्ज्ञानशिखिध्वस्ते मिथ्याज्ञाने सहेतुके ।
नेतिनेतिस्वरूपत्वादशरीरो भवेत्ततः ॥५१७॥

Then, after the false knowledge, together with its cause (i.e. ignorance), is burnt (lit. destroyed) by the fire in the form of knowledge (about the nature) of the inner self, there would be the bodiless Ātman (known/established) to have the form (i.e. to be describable) in the words *neti neti*. [517]

This explains the meaning of the word *atha* by way of repetition and *aśarīra* as an attribute of the Ātman.

स्वतोऽदिग्देशकालादेः प्रत्यक्चिन्मात्रवस्तुनः ।
देशादिमच्छरीरेण न संबन्धस्तमो विना ॥५१८॥

There cannot be any connection of the (real) thing (which consists only in) the inner self with a body, that is not delimited by direction, region, time etc. (unless that has known the limitation on it by its own nature), that there exists) darkness, viz. ignorance. [518]

कल्पितेनाभिसंबन्धो न ह्यकल्पितवस्तुनः ।
अज्ञानकालेऽप्यस्तीह किमुताज्ञाननिहनुतौ ॥५१९॥

Indeed, there cannot be any connection of a really existing thing with what is (merely) imagined even in the state of ignorance; what then to say (that it is not) here in (i.e. this context of) concealment of the ignorance. [519]

Verses 520-522 discuss the Mādhyandina reading anasthiko 'śarīraḥ prājña ātmā ... brahmaiva loke eva samrāt.

अनस्थिकगिरा स्थूलदेहस्येह निवारणम् ।
तथाशरीरशब्देन सूक्ष्मो देहो निषिध्यते ॥५२०॥

In (or, By) the word *anasthika* (of the Mādhyandina recension), there is here (in this statement) rejection of the gross body; so also, in (or, by) the word *aśarīra*, there is the rejection of the subtle body. [520]

In the Kāṇva recension the word *anasthika* is not read.

सूक्ष्मदेहनिषेधोक्त्या स्थूलस्यापि निषेधतः ।
तन्निषेधाय यत्नोऽतः काण्वश्रुत्या न भण्यते ॥५२१॥

(With reference to this Sureśvara says:) By the statement of the rejection of the subtle body, therefore, there follows (or, is easily understood) the rejection of even the gross body; therefore, there is not stated in the Śruti of Kāṇvas any specific expression for the rejection (of the same). [521]

यद्वाशरीरशब्देन तच्छ्रुतौ लिङ्गनिहनुतिः ।
स्थूलस्यामृत इत्युक्त्या निषिद्धत्वात्त्र निहनुतिः ॥५२२॥

Or perhaps. in (or, by) the word *aśarīra* (in that recension) there is conveyed the rejection (lit. concealment) of the subtle form, since there is not the rejection of the gross body by (the use of) the word *amṛta*. [522]

This is some justification offered regarding the meaning conveyed in verse 520 above.

SP states in this context the Mādhyandina recension *viśeṣanadvayārtho 'mṛtaśrutau pindīkṛtyocyate*. Also it states the reason for the Kāṇva recension which does not state any rejection thus, according to the rule, *yaś cārthād artho na sa codanārthah*.

Verses 523-525 explain the śruti prāṇo brahmaiva.

साक्षिणः प्राणशब्देन विशेष्यस्याभिधेष्यते ।
ब्रह्मैवेति तु शब्देन तद्विशेषणमुच्यते ॥५२३॥

By the use of the word *prāṇa*,¹ it is accepted that the one, who is to be qualified is the witness. And, in the expression (lit. words, *śabda*) *brahmaiva*, there is stated the predicative expression about that (i.e. the witness). [523]

By *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya* one should not understand grammatical substantive and its adjective. There is reference only to the accepted practice of predicating something of any other thing(s).

¹This refers to the individual self in verse 526 below.

साक्षिणः सद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मणश्च परोक्षताम् ।
तद्धेतुप्रतिषेधेन वाक्यमेतन्निषेधति ॥५२४॥

This sentence rejects the notion of the witness as being with a second and of the Brahman as being beyond perception, i.e. through the rejection of the causes of the same. [524]

In the statement *prāṇo brahmaiva*, we find that the words *prāṇa* and *brahman* are put in the same case (*samānādhikarāṇa*); therefore, there is explanation necessary of the same, as given in this verse.

नामोपक्रममाशान्तं प्राणकारणसंश्रयम् ।
प्राणो ब्रह्मेति वचसा तदात्मनि निषिध्यते ॥५२५॥

By the expression (i.e. statement) *prāṇo brahmaiva* is denied in the context of the Ātman the resorting to *prāṇa* as its cause, which begins with (the mention of) the name and ends in that of the quarters. [525]

Verses 526 and 527 explain the significance of teja eva.

ब्रह्मात्मनोश्च संसर्गो मा प्रापत्कृष्णसर्पवत् ।

इत्यर्थं तेज एवेति श्रुतिः संसर्गवारिणी ॥५२६॥

In order that there should not occur (the idea of) any connection between the Brahman and the Ātman (the individual self),¹ as between (the property) dark colour and a serpent, there is the statement in the Śruti *teja eva*, and which averts (such) connection. [526]

SP refers to *tasya bhāsā ... sarvam idam vibhāti* (Kāthopaniṣad 5.15; *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.11; *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.14. This serves to avoid the notion of any relation between *prāṇa* and *brahman* as an attribute and a substantive. The addition of *teja eva* is helpful in understanding *prāṇa* as *tejas* and therefore it is not only an attribute of the Brahman.

¹This is what is earlier referred to as *prāṇa* in verse 523.

व्यावर्त्यभेदादाभाति भेदो ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोः ।
वस्तुतस्त्वेक एवात्मामानित्वादिर्यथा तथा ॥५२७॥

There (is accepted) a difference (of signification) in the expressions *brahman* and *ātman* on account of (the effort of the speaker) for achieving distinction (between the two); however, in reality, there is only one single Ātman (and the Brahman does not exist apart from it), as it is mentioned by the use of the expression *amānitva* etc. [527]

Verses 528-530 bring out the import of the twofold use of the word eva.

ब्रह्मैव तेज एवेति ह्युभयत्रावधारणम् ।
संसर्गप्रतिषेधार्थं मा भून्नीलोत्पलादिवत् ॥५२८॥

In the words *brahmaiva* and *teja eva*, there is, at both places, the specification for the purpose of averting the idea of any contact (between them), lest it might occur/arise as (it does) in the word *nīlotpala*. [528]

सर्वानर्थैकबीजस्य प्रत्यगज्ञानरूपिणः ।
कार्योऽत्र वचसा बाधः केवलो नान्य इष्यते ॥५२९॥
यस्मादेतत्स्वतो बुद्धमतः शुद्धमसंगतेः ।
मुक्तं चातः स्वतो वस्तु किमन्यत्कार्यमिष्यते ॥५३०॥

Here by the statement of the Śruti, there is expected (the idea of) the stultification of the seed of all the undesired (effects) which is of the form of ignorance regarding the inner self and no other (stultification) is kept in view.¹ [529]
Since this is so, (it is accepted) that (the real) thing is, by its own nature, awakened and, therefore, pure owing to its being non-attached and (thus) ever liberated—what other effect is then sought to be achieved? [530]

¹The statement of the purport of the following sentence *atha ...*; viz. BU 4.4.7.

Verses 531-536 state that the knower (of the Brahman) has acquired all that is to be achieved.

कृतं चिकीर्षितं सर्वं बुद्धं यच्च बुभुत्सितम् ।
आप्तं बोधात्तथाप्तव्यं वर्जनीयं च वर्जितम् ॥५३१॥

(In the state of liberation) there is accomplished all that is sought to be accomplished (by an individual), also known whatever is sought to be known, and obtained, through knowledge, all that is to be obtained, and avoided whatever is to be avoided. [531]

कामप्रश्नः समाप्तोऽतो निराकाङ्क्षोऽभवन्नृपः ।
सोऽहं सहस्रमित्याह तस्मादेव च कारणात् ॥५३२॥

Thus, there is here the conclusion in respect of the question about desires; (therefore), the king (now) became one without any (more) expectation. Then (i.e. for that reason) only, he

said, 'May I (offer you) a thousand?'

[532]

ननु प्रश्नः समाप्तश्चेन्नादात्सर्वं स किं नृपः ।
सहस्रमेव तु प्रादादेकदेशोक्तिवत्कथम् ॥५३३॥
मतं विद्यारसाकृष्टो विद्यां भूयोऽपि चेन्नृपः ।
शुश्रूषति तदर्थं च सहस्रं मुनये ददौ ॥५३४॥
शुश्रूषालिङ्गमेतत्स्यान्न त्वियं गुरुदक्षिणा ॥५३५॥
सर्वस्वं चेदहं दद्यामिहैव च तदा मुनिः ।
निवृत्तकामं मां मत्वा विद्यां भूयो न वक्ष्यति ॥५३६॥

(A doubt arises:) 'Indeed if the question about desires is thus concluded, why did the king not give (away) all? Instead he gave only a thousand! Why only a part of the promised present?'

[533]

'If it is held that the king, being overwhelmed by his thirst (or, longing) for acquiring the lore (of the Brahman), wished to hear about it) yet again; and, therefore, he gave away to the sage thousand, and

[534]

this would be the indication of his desire to hear but (was) not this the fee to be given to the preceptor?'

[535]

(His thought would be:) If I were to give all of my belongings, then the sage would think that I have stopped having any more desire (and) would not instruct me again.

[536]

Verses 537-541 state a hypothesised explanation of the king's small gift and its rejection.

इत्येतस्माद्भयाद्वा राजा श्लोकशुश्रूषयेरितः ।
प्रादात्सहस्रमेवास्मै शुश्रूषालिङ्गवित्तये ॥५३७॥

'With this apprehension in mind, the king, prompted by a desire to hear (more about) the *śloka*, gave only a thousand (cows) for conveying (that to the sage), so that he knew the desire (on his own part) for hearing (more).'

[537]

इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्याच्छ्रुतेः प्रामाण्यकारणात् ।
श्रुतौ न युक्ता व्याजोक्तिरप्रमाणनरोक्तिवत् ॥५३८॥

(The answer is:) 'If this is so held, it would not be so, since the Śruti is always authoritative; in respect of the Śruti, it is not reasonable to hold (that it would make) some statement under certain pretext which would be like the statement of a human being which is not as much authoritative (as the Śruti)'. [538]

The Śruti is held to make a direct statement and not any indicative statement which may be made by a human being.

संभवाच्चार्थशेषस्य सर्वसंन्यासरूपिणः ।
प्राग्यथोक्तात्मविज्ञानसाधनस्येह चाश्रवात् ॥५३९॥

'Moreover, there is (the possibility of) yet more of the thought to be conveyed in respect of what is about total renunciation, since there is not heard here (in this Śruti) any mention of the means to achieving the specific knowledge (*vijñāna*) of the Ātman as it was stated before.' [539]

यत एवमतोऽयुक्ता पुनरुक्तार्थकल्पना ।
गतौ सत्यामनृज्वीयं नापि विद्यास्तुतिर्मता ॥५४०॥

'Since this is so, it is unreasonable (to hold) the notion of repetition of the matter (*artha*); so also this praise of the lore of the Brahman should not be considered as not following in smooth course (*anrjvī*), when there has been a way (of explaining the situation mentioned in the Śruti).' [540]

This refers to BU 3.5.1 for *śama* etc. in relation to this praise.

Read SP (which explains the meaning thus): *na tāvat samnyāso vidyāstutir viditvā vyutthāyeti samānakarṭṛkatvanirdeśāt—uktam caitat pañcame nāpi samādi vidyāstutis tatrāpi vidher vakस्यामānatvād iti.*

ननु यद्यर्थशेषोऽस्ति कस्माद्ब्रूते न पूर्ववत् ।
विमोक्षायैव मे ब्रूहीत्यदोषोऽयं कुतो यतः ॥५४१॥
विमोक्षायेह नैवालमन्यदात्मावबोधतः ।
मुक्तस्य च मुमुक्षोश्च सर्वत्यागव्यपेक्षतः ॥५४२॥

(Yet another objection:) ‘But indeed if something yet remained to be said, why does not the Śruti state it (even) as before? Tell me, “this is for liberation,” for that would be faultless; why (this way)?’ (The answer:) ‘Since [541] anything else than the knowledge of (the nature of) the Ātman is not sufficient for attaining liberation and because, in the case of both the liberated and the one seeking liberation, there is need of abandoning everything’. [542]

In this context, read SP: *muktena mumukṣunā ca saṁnyāso 'pekṣyate tasya muktisādhanatve na sa muktena mumukṣunevāpekṣyeta sādhyābhāvād ity arthah.*

It is to be noted incidentally that in verse 542 onwards, there is reference to the subsequent Śruti which, as BUB states, is for prescribing Saṁnyāsa for both the *mumukṣu* and the *mukta*.

स्वरूपसाधनत्वाभ्यां त्यागस्यैवान्तरङ्गतः ।
नापूर्ववद्विधेयत्वं न च त्यागाद्विमुक्तता ॥५४३॥

For the reason that renunciation is only a part (of liberation) owing to its being the nature of and means to it, that should not be considered as what is to be prescribed like (any means of attaining) *apūrva*; so also, liberation does not result from renunciation.¹ [543]

This last argument is to answer away the objector’s stand on the basis of another Śruti statement.

¹*tyāgenaike amṛtatvam ānaśuḥ (Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 10.10.3).* Also cf. SV 215: *tyāga eva hi sarveṣāṁ mokṣasādhanam uttamam.*

प्रागात्मज्ञानसंभूतेः संन्यासो ज्ञानसाधनम् ।
उत्पन्नात्मधियः पश्चाज्ज्ञानमेव हि तत्तथा ॥५४४॥

Indeed (*hi*), before the rise of the knowledge (of the nature of) the Ātman, renunciation is a means to (that) knowledge and, in the case of one in whom the knowledge of the Ātman, also has arisen, only knowledge is that (means to renunciation).

[544]

Read SP in this context: *sarvakarmatyāgātmakam pārivrājyam tad ity ucyate vividiṣāsaṃnyāsasya dhīhetutvavad itarasya phala-tvaṃ tathāśabdārthaḥ.*

THIS IS THE END OF BU 4.4.7.
